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In an era where use and dependence of information systems is significantly high, the 
threat of incidents related to information security that could jeopardize the information 
held by organizations is more and more serious. Alarming facts within the literature point 
to inadequacies in information security practices, particularly the evaluation of 
information security controls in organizations. Research efforts have resulted in various 
methodologies developed to deal with the information security controls assessment 
problem. A closer look at these traditional methodologies highlights various weaknesses 
that can prevent an effective information security controls assessment in organizations. 
This dissertation develops a methodology that addresses such weaknesses when 
evaluating information security controls in organizations. The methodology, created 
using the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB based on fuzzy theory and fuzzy logic, uses 
fuzzy set theory which allows for a more accurate assessment of imprecise criteria than 
traditional methodologies. It is argued and evidenced that evaluating information security 
controls using fuzzy set theory addresses existing weaknesses found in the literature for 
traditional evaluation methodologies and, thus, leads to a more thorough and precise 
assessment. This, in turn, results in a more effective selection of information security 
controls and enhanced information security in organizations. 
 
The main contribution of this research to the information security literature is the 
development of a fuzzy set theory-based assessment methodology that provides for a 
thorough evaluation of ISC in organizations. The methodology just created addresses the 
weaknesses or limitations identified in existing information security control assessment 
methodologies, resulting in an enhanced information security in organizations.  
 
The methodology can also be implemented in a spreadsheet or software tool, and promote 
usage in practical scenarios where highly complex methodologies for ISC selection are 
impractical. Moreover, the methodology fuses multiple evaluation criteria to provide a 
holistic view of the overall quality of information security controls, and it is easily 
extended to include additional evaluation criteria factor not considered within this 
dissertation. This is one of the most meaningful contributions from this dissertation. 
Finally, the methodology provides a mechanism to evaluate the quality of information 
security controls in various domains. Overall, the methodology presented in this 
dissertation proved to be a feasible technique for evaluating information security controls 
in organizations.   
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     Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
 
1. Background 
In an era where use and dependence of computers and information systems is 
significantly high, the threat of incidents related to information security that could 
jeopardize the information held by organizations is becoming more and more serious. 
Throughout the years, organizations have experienced numerous losses which have had a 
direct impact on their information. Fraud over information is such an example. As 
evidenced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), by the end of 2009, there were 
592 corporate fraud cases involving manipulation and abuse of financial information 
throughout the United States (U.S.), several of which involved losses to public investors 
that individually exceeded the $1 billion mark. The FBI also reported that in 2011 alone, 
there were 726 pending corporate fraud cases in the U.S. involving accounting schemes 
designed to deceive investors, auditors, and analysts regarding the true financial 
condition of a corporation. Figure 1 shows the number of corporate fraud pending cases 
investigated by the FBI in the U.S. since 2007 through 2011.  
Additionally, the 2009 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey (conducted on 
443 information security and information technology (IT) professionals in the U.S.) 
found that average information security losses in organizations, leading to computer 
security breaches, reached approximately $234,300 per respondent. Along the same line, 
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in a study performed by Bedard, Graham, and Jackson (2008), about 21 percent of all 
deficiencies detected in selected audited organizations were related to information 
 
Note: Adapted from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Financial Crimes Report to the 
Public Fiscal Year, Department of Justice, U.S., 2011 
Figure 1. U.S. corporate fraud pending cases investigated by the FBI since 2007 
 
security. Particularly, Bedard et al.’s (2008) study noted that there were no adequate 
information security controls (ISC) in place within the organizations examined, and the 
ones in place were not operating effectively. This was the main reason for such 
significant percentage of deficiencies identified. To further emphasize the significance of 
security over organizations’ information, a 2008 survey conducted by Chief Information 
Officer Research on 173 IT executives revealed that information security is by far the 
single largest potential barrier to organizations (Mather, Kumaraswamy, & Latif, 2009). 
Another fact in today's organizational culture is that most information security 
challenges are being addressed through the use of security tools and technologies, such 
as, encryption, firewalls, access management, etc. (Volonino & Robinson, 2004; Vaast, 
3 
 
 
 
2007). Although tools and technologies are an integral part of organizations’ information 
security plans, it is argued that they alone are not sufficient to address information 
security problems (Herath & Rao, 2009). To improve overall information security, 
organizations must evaluate (and thus implement) appropriate ISC that satisfy their 
specific security requirements (Barnard & Von Solms, 2000; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; 
Karyda, Kiountouzis, & Kokolakis, 2004). However, due to a variety of organizational-
specific constraints (e.g., costs, availability of resources, etc.), organizations do not have 
the luxury of selecting and implementing all required ISC.  
The alarming facts and figures just presented point to existent inadequacies and 
inefficiencies in regards to information security practices, while also serve as motivation 
for finding innovated ways to assist organizations improve their capabilities for securing 
valuable information. To this end, it is imperative that ISC around systems and 
applications in organizations be evaluated and, most importantly, accurately prioritized so 
that only the best and most appropriate ones get implemented. Adequate selection and 
implementation of ISC reduce opportunities for information system failures. 
Simultaneously, the effective operation of ISC assists organizations in maintaining a 
well-designed and controlled information systems environment.  
Research efforts have resulted in various approaches and methodologies developed to 
deal with the ISC assessment problem. A closer look at these approaches and 
methodologies highlights various opportunities to create new methodologies for ISC 
evaluation with the potential to significantly improve the overall information security in 
organizations. For instance, and as will be supported in the next Chapter, there have been 
weaknesses identified in traditional ISC assessment methodologies that can preclude an 
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effective assessment and, therefore, implementation of ISC in organizations over their 
information. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Adequate evaluation of ISC is crucial to organizations in maintaining sound 
information security as well as in protecting their information assets. Nevertheless, the 
literature points out several issues, gaps, weaknesses, and/or inadequacies within 
traditional ISC assessment methodologies that prevent an effective assessment of ISC in 
organizations. To mention one, the selection of ISC in organizations using traditional 
methods has been mainly determined based on crisp or dichotomous values (i.e., yes or 
no type answers based solely on decision makers’ preferences). Organizations base their 
selection process subjectively on whether the ISC is either relevant or not. ISC that are 
determined to be relevant will be selected and implemented. There are other reasons that 
cause current ISC assessment methodologies to prompt for improvement. For example, 
some methodologies do not adequately account for organization constraints (e.g., costs, 
resource availability, scheduling of personnel, etc.), while other methodologies leave the 
identification of ISC to users, resulting in the potential inclusion of unnecessary ISC 
and/or exclusion of required ones. Furthermore, there are less formal assessment 
methodologies that base their ISC selection on ad hoc or random approaches, leading 
once again to the potential inclusion of unnecessary ISC and/or exclusion of required 
ISC. To continue on, ISC assessment methodologies based on checklists could result in a 
flawed information security strategy as checklists are concerned on what can be done 
without any analytical stability about the kind of actions identified. For a complete 
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description of weaknesses found in the literature related to ISC assessment 
methodologies, refer to Chapter two.  
The weaknesses identified above not only affect the ISC selection process, but also 
impact the overall protection of the information’s confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability (Saint-Germain, 2005). In other words, the lack of adequate information 
security over valuable, sensitive, or critical financial information may allow for (1)  
fraud, manipulation, and/or misuse of data; (2) security-related deficiencies and findings; 
(3) bogus trades to inflate profits or hide losses; (4) false accounting journal entries; (5) 
computer security breaches; and (6) false transactions to evade regulators, among others. 
Traditional ISC assessment methodologies, such as, Risk Analysis and Management 
(RAM), baseline manuals or best practice frameworks (e.g., OCTAVE, NIST, etc.), ad-
hoc approaches, and checklists, among others, must therefore be strengthened and 
improved to assist organizations with their ISC selection process. The existence of 
weaknesses within these traditional ISC assessment methodologies does not promote an 
effective assessment, selection, or prioritization of ISC in organizations over their 
information. Effective information system security implementation requires 
identification, assessment, and prioritization of the most appropriate ISC (van der Haar & 
von Solms, 2003), taking into account the issues presented above. In order to increase the 
effectiveness of the evaluation and selection process for ISC in organizations, new, 
effective, and efficient assessment methods need to be developed. Development of such 
assessment methodology constitutes a significant contribution to the information security 
literature. The aim of this dissertation or research problem was, therefore, to develop an 
ISC assessment methodology that adequately address the existing weaknesses identified 
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in traditional ISC assessment methodologies, resulting in a more effective selection of 
ISC and, in turn, enhanced information security in organizations.  
1.2 Dissertation Goal 
The goal of this dissertation was to develop an assessment methodology that (a) 
considers all-inclusive scenarios when evaluating ISC; (b) adequately accounts for 
organizations’ restrictions and constraints; (c) significantly minimizes subjectivity and 
ambiguity (via providing precise evaluation values for ISC); and (d) prevents 
unnecessary and random ISC selections. The aforementioned methodology can better 
assist organizations when selecting ISC in order to mitigate information security risks.  
As it will be explained and evidenced in later chapters, fuzzy set theory (FST) allows 
for a more adequate representation of imprecise parameters (i.e., when determining the 
importance of ISC) than existing and traditional methodologies. An evaluation of ISC 
using FST could therefore lead to a thorough, more detailed assessment by providing 
precise values, thus, supporting a more effective ISC evaluation and prioritization, 
ultimately improving information security in the organization.  
1.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Currently, there are significant weaknesses in traditional ISC assessment 
methodologies that can prevent the effective assessment, prioritization, and 
implementation of ISC in organizations over their information. Failure of paying 
adequate attention to address these weaknesses and/or inadequacies may open up 
opportunities for information security breaches which can negatively impact 
organizations, including their IT environments. Some of these information security 
breaches may include security-related deficiencies and findings; false accounting journal 
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entries; false transactions to evade regulators; bogus trades to inflate profits or hide 
losses; and fraud, manipulation, and/or misuse of data; among others. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to develop a methodology that corrects 
weaknesses identified in existing ISC assessment methodologies, and explore whether 
such new methodology enhance the overall information security in organizations. A 
methodology that resolve the weaknesses identified, while capable of modeling imprecise 
parameters (i.e., criteria for determining relevance) when evaluating ISC will result in a 
more accurate assessment, which is crucial to determine the best ISC. One technique that 
can be used to address the limitations stated above is through FST.  
The FST-based ISC assessment methodology is expected to address the weaknesses 
identified in current evaluation processes by (a) contemplating all-inclusive ISC 
scenarios; (b) employing a less-subjective, accuracy-based method; (c) preventing / 
eliminating the random and unnecessary selection of ISC; (d) considering organizations’ 
restrictions and constraints; and (e) improving, in turn, the overall information security in 
organizations.  
To recall, the research problem described earlier was to develop a methodology that 
addresses the existing weaknesses in traditional ISC assessment methodologies, which 
may result in an enhanced information security in organizations. Consistent with the 
above, the research questions (RQ) to be addressed by this dissertation follow:  
RQ1: How does an ISC assessment methodology that is developed using FST 
address the weaknesses identified in the academic literature for traditional 
assessment methodologies? 
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RQ2: To what extent does an ISC assessment methodology developed with FST 
enhance information security in the organization? 
In seeking answers to RQ1 and RQ2, the following research hypotheses (H) were 
derived:  
H1: An ISC assessment methodology that is constructed using FST contemplates 
all-inclusive ISC scenarios; employs a less-subjective, precision/accuracy-based 
method; prevents or eliminates the random and unnecessary selection of ISC; and 
considers organizations’ restrictions and constraints when assessing ISC.  
H2: An ISC assessment methodology developed with FST that addresses the 
weaknesses identified in traditional assessment methodologies enhances 
information security in the organization. 
Based on the information, arguments, and claims presented above, the research model 
is illustrated in Figure 2.   
 
 
 
1.4 Relevance and Significance 
It is essential that organizations adjust their information security to meet a reasonably 
expected security level. Organizations should assess regularly their information security 
in order to ensure the safety of their information assets. Nonetheless, since there is a large 
number of ISC that can be selected and implemented, organizations usually do not know 
FST-based ISC 
assessment 
methodology 
 
Enhances information 
security in the 
organization 
Addresses existing 
weaknesses in 
traditional assessment 
methodologies 
H1 H2 
 Figure 2. Relationship Between a FST-based ISC Assessment Methodology and Information 
Security in the Organization 
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which ISC are the most effective in protecting their information. The evaluation and 
prioritization of ISC conducted within this dissertation, therefore, constitute a strategic 
decision making problem. An assessment methodology that evaluates and prioritizes ISC 
effectively, in a more precise manner, is undoubtedly of interest to many organizations.  
When evaluating ISC, organizations must evaluate and prioritize them in order to 
satisfy their IT security requirements (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Karyda, Kiountouzis, & 
Kokolakis, 2004; Barnard & von Solms, 2000). Equally important, organizations do not 
have the luxury of implementing all available ISC due to a variety of organizational-
specific constraints (e.g., costs, resources availability, scheduling restrictions, etc.). 
ISC assessment methodologies, such as the one built in this dissertation, must need to be 
available to assist organizations when evaluating and prioritizing ISC.  
The evaluation process referred to above must be performed carefully in order to fit 
the specific needs of the organization, as there is no single IT solution that can fit all 
organizations (Whitman, Towsend, & Aalberts, 2001). Additionally, the assessment 
methodology developed herein precisely evaluates and prioritizes ISC, according to 
organizations’ specific requirements and criteria, as well as generates more accurate 
assessment scores, representing a valid and significant contribution to the information 
security literature.  
Moreover, except for studies performed by Zlateva, Velev, and Zabunov (2011) and 
Schryen (2010), which used fuzzy logic to estimate real estate investment risks, and to 
present a novel fuzzy-set based decision support model for security investment decision 
makers, respectively, to the best of the author’s knowledge, there have been no other 
research studies within the literature that have specifically evaluated and prioritized ISC 
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in organizations using FST (Otero, Ejnioui, Otero, & Tejay, 2012a; Otero, Tejay, Otero, 
& Ruiz, 2012b; Ejnioui, Otero, Tejay, Otero, & Qureshi, 2012). Schryen (2010) 
presented a unique fuzzy-set based decision support model for security investment 
decision makers. The author proposed a formal security language by applying 
propositional logic, decision theory, and FST in order to develop the decision model. 
Schryen (2010) further drew on computational complexity theory to analyze the 
complexity of the model. Zlateva et al. (2011), on the other hand, proposed a fuzzy logic 
model for complex estimation of real estate investment risks, based on available 
information sources and expert knowledge. The fuzzy logic model was designed as a 
hierarchical system that included several variables. Zlateva et al.’s (2011) model was 
intended to be implemented as a Web service in a cloud computing environment for 
increasing the span and efficiency of real estate manager activities. 
Based on the above, an assessment methodology that precisely evaluates and 
prioritizes ISC using FST represents a valid contribution to the information security 
literature and is of significant interest to organizations. The methodology developed in 
this dissertation adds practical value, as it helps organizations in dealing with the 
information security problem by accurately identifying which ISC need to be selected, 
and eventually implemented in order to ensure adequate protection of the information.  
1.5 Definitions of Terms 
The following definitions are provided to ensure a clear understanding of some 
specific terms used throughout this dissertation. 
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Best Practices: Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) 4.1 
defines best practices as proven activities or processes that have been successfully used 
by multiple organizations.  
Design-Science Research: refers to, based on Hevner, March, Park, and Ram (2004), a 
problem-solving paradigm. Hevner et al. (2004) also refer to Denning (1997) and 
Tsichritzis (1998) when stating that Design-Science Research “seeks to create 
innovations that define the ideas, practices, technical capabilities, and products through 
which the analysis, design, implementation, management, and use of information systems 
can be effectively and efficiently accomplished” (p. 76).   
Fuzzy Set Theory: Based on Zimmermann (2001), Fuzzy Set Theory “provides a strict 
mathematical framework …in which vague conceptual phenomena can be precisely and 
rigorously studied” (p. 318).  Fuzzy Set Theory is utilized to model situations in which 
fuzzy relations, criteria, and phenomena exist (Zimmermann, 2001). 
Fuzzy Logic: allows logical reasoning with partially true imprecise statements (Das, 
2009). In other words, in fuzzy logic, propositions can be true to some degree; meaning 
that truth values are no longer restricted to the two values ‘true’ and ‘false’, but expressed 
by the linguistic variables ‘true’ and ‘false’ (Zimmermann, 2010). Fuzzy logic is a 
complex mathematical method that allows solving difficult simulated problems with 
many inputs and output variables. 
Information: defined as an asset essential to organizations which needs to be suitably 
protected. It can exist in many forms (e.g., printed or written on paper, electronically 
stored, transmitted using electronic means, shown on films, spoken in conversations, etc.) 
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(British Standard International Organization for Standardization (ISO) / International 
Electro technical Commission (IEC) 27002, 2005). 
Information Security: according to the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005), refers to “the protection of 
information from a wide range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimize 
business risk, and maximize return on investments and business opportunities” (p. viii). 
Security of information is achieved by implementing a suitable set of procedures or 
controls, including, but not limited to, policies, processes, guidance, best practices, and 
organizational structures, among others.   
Information Security Controls: include policies, processes, guidance, best practices, 
organizational structures, and software and hardware functions, among others. These 
controls are established, implemented, monitored, reviewed, and enhanced, where 
necessary, to ensure that (1) specific information security business objectives are 
achieved, as well as (2) information security risks are addressed or mitigated (ISO/IEC 
27002, 2005). 
Organization: defined per COBIT 4.1 as the manner in which an enterprise is structured 
(i.e., entity). 
Risk: in business terms, COBIT 4.1 defines it as the potential that a given threat will 
exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets to cause loss and/or damage to the 
assets. It is usually measured by a combination of impact and probability of occurrence.  
1.6 Summary 
Chapter one stressed how critical information security is to organizations given the 
current high use and dependence of computers and information systems. Specific facts 
and figures identified by the FBI, the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, and 
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the literature related to fraud schemes and information security breaches, among others, 
were mentioned and discussed. Such alarming facts and figures give rise to inadequacies 
and inefficiencies in regards to information security practices, while also serve as 
motivation for finding innovated ways to assist organizations improve their capabilities 
for securing their valuable information.  
As seen above, the literature argues that the current use of information security tools 
and technologies (encryption, firewalls, access management, etc.) alone is not sufficient 
to protect the information and address information security challenges. Another major 
step towards the protection of information is the implementation of ISC. Nevertheless, 
due to a variety of constraints (e.g., costs, availability of resources, etc.), business 
objectives, organizational-specific criteria, etc., organizations can not implement all 
possible ISC. More importantly, when reviewing traditional approaches and 
methodologies used for ISC assessments in organizations, the literature shows several 
issues, gaps, weaknesses, and/or inadequacies among these assessment methodologies 
that prevent an effective ISC evaluation in organizations. This research aimed to develop 
an ISC assessment methodology that adequately address the existing weaknesses 
identified in traditional ISC assessment methodologies, resulting in a more effective 
selection of ISC and, in turn, enhanced information security in organizations. The 
aforementioned represents the problem that was investigated throughout this research 
effort. An effective evaluation of ISC must ensure that only the best and most appropriate 
ISC get implemented. Adequate selection and implementation of ISC reduce 
opportunities for information system failures, potentially improving the overall 
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information security in organizations. Development of such assessment methodology 
constitutes a significant contribution to the information security literature.   
Consistent with the above, the goal of this dissertation was to develop an assessment 
methodology that considers all-inclusive ISC evaluation scenarios, adequately accounts 
for organizations’ restrictions and constraints; significantly minimizes subjectivity and 
ambiguity; and prevents unnecessary and random ISC selections. To this end, various 
research questions and hypotheses were created and proposed, respectively. 
The research problem stated above was of great relevance and significance to 
organizations as they constantly find themselves looking for ways to adjust their 
information security plan and strategy in order to meet a reasonable information security 
level. As a result, the assessment methodology developed herein that evaluates and 
prioritizes ISC effectively, in a more precise manner, is undoubtedly of interest to many 
organizations. The methodology helps organizations in dealing with the aforementioned 
information security problem by accurately identifying which ISC need to be selected, 
and eventually implemented in order to ensure adequate protection of the information. 
From here on, this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter two reviews and 
discusses the literature related to the evaluation of ISC in organizations. Chapter three 
describes the research methodology as well as the specific research method employed. 
Chapter three also explains the theory adopted for developing the ISC assessment 
methodology instrument, and presents the data collection method and the rationale for its 
adoption. Chapter four presents and discusses the results of this dissertation, while 
Chapter five concludes this dissertation by providing the conclusions, implications, 
recommendations, and summary, among others, as a result of the investigation process. 
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 Chapter 2 
2. Review of the Literature 
 
2. Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to discuss and review the literature related to the 
evaluation of ISC in organizations. Following is a detailed description of the approaches 
and methodologies that have been used in organizations in regards to ISC evaluations, 
including several weaknesses and inadequacies identified within them. 
2.1 Risk Analysis and Management 
Based on Barnard and von Solms (2000), the process of identifying, selecting, and 
prioritizing ISC in organizations has been a challenge in the past, and plenty of attempts 
have been made to come up with the most effective way possible. Risk analysis and 
management (RAM) is just one example. RAM (Methodology 1) consists of performing 
business analyses as well as risk assessments, resulting in the identification of 
information security risks (i.e., requirements) (Barnard & von Solms, 2000). RAM would 
then list the information security requirements as well as the proposed ISC to be 
implemented to mitigate the risks resulting from the analyses and assessments performed.  
RAM, however, has been described as a subjective, bottom-up approach (van der 
Haar & von Solms, 2003), not necessarily taking into account organizations’ specific 
constraints. For example, through performing RAM, an organization may identify 30 
ISC. Nonetheless, the organization may not be able to implement effectively the 30 ISC 
due to costs and scheduling constraints, among others. Moreover, there may not be 
enough resources within the organization to ensure the 30 ISC are effectively put in 
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place. In this particular case, organizations list all ISC identified and subjectively 
determine how critical each individual ISC is, while considering costs versus benefit 
analyses. The weakness just described prompts organizations to explore new ways to 
determine and measure the relevancy of ISC.   
According to Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006), there is no doubt that RAM has proved 
useful in ensuring information security. In fact, in cases where security-related incidents 
have occurred in the past, and calculation of costs is reasonable, RAM has proven to be 
very practical. Nonetheless, RAM is not identified as the best or fundamental mean to 
ensure information security. Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) state that organizations, when 
performing RAM, establish controls that are either unnecessary or relate to trivial issues. 
Furthermore, exclusive reliance on RAM has often been criticized since it has proven to 
be more problematic for maximizing information security rather than beneficial. 
2.2 Baseline Manuals / Best Practice Frameworks, Ad-Hoc Approach 
Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks (Methodology 2) are approaches 
widely used by organizations to introduce ISC in organizations (Barnard & von Solms, 
2000). Saint-Germain (2005) states that best practice frameworks assist organizations in 
identifying and selecting ISC. Some best practices include: COBIT, Information 
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and 
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE), and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) also mention other best practice 
frameworks which have assisted the identification and selection of ISC. These practice 
frameworks are: ISO/IEC 177995 and ISO/IEC 27001, and ISO/IEC 27002, PROTECT, 
Capability Maturity Model (CMM), and Information Security Architecture (ISA).  
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In Siougle and Zorkadis (2002), a baseline manual selection process was created to 
provide data controllers with a framework for selecting appropriate ISC that satisfy 
privacy protection legislation requirements, as well as the security and privacy objectives 
of an organization. National and European data protection laws regulate the processing of 
personal data and impose serious obligations to data controllers for their protection and 
secure processing. Therefore, the response of organizations to data protection law 
provisions and related user interests become determining factors, as well as improve 
acceptance of their business services. Given the above, Siougle and Zorkadis (2002) 
developed a model that would select ISC from a baseline manual, satisfying the legal 
privacy protection requirements and any particular privacy requirements of the data 
controller regarding the secure processing of personal data.  
The process of selecting the most effective ISC from baseline manuals or best 
practice frameworks is a challenging one (van der Haar & von Solms, 2003). Van der 
Haar and von Solms (2003) state that baseline manuals or best practice frameworks leave 
the identification of ISC to the user, while offering little guidance in terms of determining 
the best controls to provide adequate information security for the particular business 
situation. Additionally, identification of ISC via baseline manuals or best practice 
frameworks does not necessarily take into consideration organization specific constraints, 
such as, costs, scheduling, and resource constraints, among others. Other less formal 
methods used, such as, ad hoc or random approaches (Methodology 3), could also lead to 
the inclusion of unnecessary ISC or exclusion of required ISC (Barnard & von Solms, 
2000).  
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2.3 Information Security Checklists  
Another method to identify and select ISC in organizations is through completing 
checklists (Methodology 4). Chen and Yoon (2010) used checklists as a framework to 
identify common ISC, including information security risks, within cloud-based 
organizations. The checklists were to be used by both, internal and external auditors, in 
assuring a secure computing environment. Chen and Yoon (2010) completed checklists 
for the Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) delivery 
service models within a public cloud. Checklists were also completed for the community 
and private deployment models. The hybrid deployment model and the Platform-as-a-
Service delivery service model were not included within the checklists as Chen and Yoon 
(2010) opted to address those in the future. Table 1 shows the issues specifically 
addressed by Chen and Yoon’s (2010) developed information security checklists. 
Numerous information security checklists have been proposed and used over the 
years (Baskerville, 1993). Their importance, according to Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006), 
has been focused on identifying “all possible threats to a computer system and propose 
solutions that would help in overcoming the threat” (p. 294). Nonetheless, Dhillon and 
Torkzadeh (2006) stressed that over the years the significance of information security 
checklists has declined simply “because they provide little by way of analytical stability” 
(p. 294). Based on interviews conducted by Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) on 
information security managers, checklists are not considered to be the essence of 
information security. Even though checklists may be viewed as good means to ensure 
information security, exclusive reliance on them could result in a flawed information 
systems security strategy (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006). Furthermore, Backhouse and 
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Table 1. Checklists completed by Chen and Yoon (2010) to identify ISC 
Model Issues addressed by Information Security Checklist 
IaaS Data location aware, data ownership aware, data protection plan and best 
practice, data processing isolation, data lock-in, IaaS IT architecture, regulatory 
compliance, cloud IT technique, reporting control, cloud disaster recovery plan, 
cloud business continuity, and overall IT projects costs. 
  
SaaS Data activity surrender, format, monitoring for availability, and performance. 
  
Community Community cloud IT architecture, cloud management, and exit strategy. 
  
Private Private cloud IT architecture, private cloud reporting control, and disaster 
recovery / continuity plan. 
  
Dhillon (1996) argued that although checklists draw concern on particular details of 
procedures, they do not completely address the key task of understanding the substantive 
questions. Checklists are concerned on what can be done without any analytical stability 
in regards to the kind of actions identified (Baskerville, 1993). 
2.4 Control Selection Process 
Barnard and von Solms’s (2000) formalized control selection process (CSP) 
(Methodology 5) approach for the selection and evaluation of ISC included a process that 
eliminated the need for a random selection; as well as integrated information security 
policies to formally identify ISC from the ISO/British Standard (ISO/BS) 7799 best 
practice framework. In particular, Barnard and von Solms’s (2000) business analysis 
included a set of high-level business oriented questions that analyzed the specific 
business situation, and determined how important information security and information 
security management were to the particular organization. The above resulted in the 
determination of information security requirements that proposed the particular 
information security policy to be introduced in the organization. Each of the security 
requirements dictated one or more information security policy statements that became 
part of the overall organization’s information security policy. Each policy statement 
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within the information security policy was enforced by one or more ISC from the ISO/BS 
7799 best practice framework.  
Barnard and von Solms (2000) argued that their proposed CSP approach of 
formalizing business analyses into security requirements and, eventually, information 
security policies is essential for identifying ISC. Nevertheless, this ISC selection process 
although eliminated the need for a random selection, still involved a high degree of 
subjectivity when determining which ISC will be ultimately selected. An ideal case 
would be if all processes involved (i.e., from business analyses to the selection of ISC) 
could be tightly integrated into one formalized process subject to a methodological 
approach that would address the subjectivity factor, thus, providing for a more accurate 
ISC evaluation (Barnard & von Solms, 2000). 
2.5 Desirability Functions 
In Otero, Otero, and Qureshi (2010), an innovative ISC evaluation and selection 
approach was developed to help decision makers select the most effective ISC in 
resource-constrained organization environments. The proposed approach used desirability 
functions (Methodology 6) to quantify the desirability of each ISC after taking into 
account benefits and restrictions associated with implementing the particular control. The 
above provides organizations with a measurement that is representative of the overall 
quality of ISC based on organizational goals. Through a case study, the approach proved 
successful in providing a way for measuring the quality of ISC (based on multiple 
application-specific criteria) in organizations. 
Otero et al.’s (2010) methodology took into consideration relevant quality attributes 
of ISC in order to determine their relative importance. This allowed an ISC prioritization 
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scheme that represented how well ISC met quality attributes, and how important those 
quality attributes were for the specific organization. Desirability was defined in terms of 
different features, where each feature was determined by the organization to either be 
present or not. Once all features were identified, each individual ISC was evaluated 
against each feature using a simple binary (boolean) scale (i.e., 0 or 1). ISC that satisfied 
the highest number of features exposed a higher level of quality (or priority) for that 
particular quality attribute.  
Even though the above resulted in an ISC evaluation/prioritization approach based on 
how well ISC met quality attributes, and how important those quality attributes were for 
the organization, a boolean criteria for evaluating the quality attributes of ISC in order to 
determine which ones to select, may not be considered a precise enough assessment for 
selecting, and ultimately implementing ISC in organizations. 
2.6 Information Security Control Attribute Profile 
In van der Haar and von Solms (2003), a model was developed to derive the optimal 
set of control attributes, called the Information Security Control Attribute Profile 
(ISCAP) (Methodology 7) that in the end would assist the selection of ISC. The authors 
examined attribute profiles to support the selection of ISC in organizations. Specifically, 
they required organizations to obtain a set of attributes that should accompany every ISC 
before being selected. Examples of these attributes included: strength; correct 
installation; rules and procedures; clearance; and acceptance criteria. According to van 
der Haar and von Solms (2003), before determining whether an ISC should be selected, 
each ISC should have characteristics or attributes in place such as the above.  
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As stated by van der Haar and von Solms (2003), identification of optimal security 
characteristics for every ISC is crucial prior of being selected to ensure their effective and 
continuous operation. In order to address the relevance of ISC, van der Haar and von 
Solms’s (2003) ISCAP approach was based on the diversity and unique properties of 
organizations, the environment that renders a security control adequate, the 
organization’s information security goals and objectives, and the attributes that can 
support information security. Through their ISCAP model, determination of the attributes 
which ultimately would result in the selection of ISC was based on feedback gathered 
from organization personnel, stating whether the information security attribute was either 
present or not. Formalizing the ISCAP model into one methodological approach that 
addresses the subjectivity involved when evaluating ISC in organizations, would provide 
for a more accurate assessment of ISC.  
2.7 Information Security Risk-Control Assessment Model   
Ou Yang, Shieh, and Tzeng (2011) proposed an information security risk-control 
assessment model (ISRCAM) (Methodology 8) to improve information security for 
companies and organizations. Specifically, the authors developed an information security 
risk-control assessment model that combined the Multi-criteria Optimization and 
Compromise Solution technique (also known as VIKOR in Serbian), the analytic network 
process (ANP), and the decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL), all 
together, to assess the performance and validate the effectiveness of already-implemented 
ISC in organizations and, thus, improve overall information security.  
VIKOR is based on an aggregating function that represents closeness to the ideal, and 
was employed to rank risk-control areas and risk values (Ou Yang et al., 2011). Ou Yang 
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et al. (2011) state that the “VIKOR method introduced the multicriteria ranking index 
based on a particular measure of ‘closeness to the ideal/aspired level’ and was introduced 
as an applicable technique within Multiple Criteria Decision Making” (p. 2). VIKOR then 
ranks a set of choices in the presence of conflicting criteria, assisting decision makers in 
selecting the best alternative (Opricovic & Tzeng, 2007). 
The ANP is derived from the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980), and 
has been used in Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) problems to relax 
restrictions on hierarchical structure. Saaty (1996) proposed ANP as a new MCDM 
method in order to resolve the problems of interdependence and feedback among criteria 
and alternatives in real-world cases. ANP accounts for clusters with similar weights 
(contrary to traditional normalization methods), dealing with different degrees of 
influence among the clusters of criteria in real world situations. Ou Yang, Shieh, Leu, and 
Tzeng (2008) indicate that “the assumption of equal weights for each cluster to obtain the 
weighted supermatrix is unrealistic and needs to be improved” (p. 2). As a result, Ou 
Yang et al. (2011) used DEMATEL results to improve the normalization process within 
ANP. DEMATEL was used not only to construct the interrelations between criteria in 
building the Ou Yang et al.’s (2011) network relations map, but also to improve the 
normalization process of ANP (Fontela & Gabus, 1976; Gabus & Fontela, 1972). A 
hybrid model such as the ISRCAM above has been successfully used in several fields 
(Tzeng, Chiang, & Li, 2007; Liou, Tzeng, & Chang, 2007).  
Biery (2006), however, stated that the risk management process is an ongoing process 
composed of phases, such as, risk assessment; risk remediation; risk monitoring and 
review; and risk management enhancement. Ou Yang et al.’s (2011) research above 
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regarding the ISRCAM focused on improving the risk monitoring and review phase by 
proposing a risk-control assessment method to improve controls and reduce risk. The 
purpose of their research was to develop an assessment model for evaluating and 
monitoring previously implemented ISC to ensure the safety of information assets. An 
empirical example for information security risk control assessment was presented to 
illustrate the proposed method. Nonetheless, Ou Yang et al.’s (2011) research study did 
not address the selection of ISC, as their work assumed that ISC had already been put in 
place by the organization. Instead, their work was focused on assessing the performance 
and validating the effectiveness of already-implemented ISC, rather than evaluating from 
an initial, all-inclusive set of ISC, and determining which ones are the best to implement.  
2.8 Information Security Risk Management Method   
In Lv, Zhou, and Wang (2011), an information security risk management method 
(ISRMM) (Methodology 9) was developed for ranking ISC quantitatively with the help 
of the PROMETHEE methodology, and the GAIA plane. The PROMETHEE method is a 
multi-criteria analysis method based on pair wise comparisons (Lv et al., 2011). The 
authors introduced the PROMETHEE methodology into the field of information security, 
and proposed a ranking method for different types of ISC measurements by establishing a 
group decision model. A multi-attribute model was designed based on the PROMETHEE 
method to evaluate ISC to certain risks from several aspects provided by decision maker 
preferences. A ranking of the measures was given accordingly, and a sensitivity analysis 
was put forward based on the GAIA module, which considers specific organizations’ 
criteria and shows a graphical visualization tool for analyzing the ISC. The criteria used 
included the cost of operating the security measurements, the effectiveness of the solution 
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to reduce risks, social ethics, the organization security demand, and other requirements 
the decision maker was concerned with.  
Lv et al.’s (2011) contribution included a control ranking model which considered 
multiple criteria analyses as well as the interests of decision makers for an information 
security control plan to be implemented. However, as noted by the authors, even though 
the expectation of every decision maker is to identify ISC that optimize all criteria, there 
is still no absolute best solution, and the selection of ISC based on Lv et al.’s ISRMM 
methodology mainly depended on the decision maker’s preference, resulting in the 
potential selection of unnecessary ISC, or the exclusion of required ones. As seen, 
subjectivity was a major contributing factor in Lv et al.’s (2011) selection of ISC research 
study. In other words, decision makers employed a high degree of subjectivity when 
implementing ISRMM to determine the criticality of each individual ISC before its 
selection. Organizations must continue to explore new assessment methods to precisely 
and accurately measure the relevancy of each ISC before determining their selection.  
2.9 Legal Requirements Determination Model   
In another study, Gerber and von Solms (2008) created a Legal Requirements 
Determination Model (LRDM) (Methodology 10) for defining legal requirements, which 
in turn, indicated relevant ISC to be selected from the list provided in the ISO/IEC 27002 
best practice framework to satisfy the identified legal requirements. Specifically, the 
authors: (1) developed a structured model to assist in establishing information security 
requirements from a legal perspective; (2) provided an interpretation of the legal source 
associated with information security requirements; and (3) proposed potential ISC from 
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the ISO/IEC 27002 best practice framework to address the already identified legal 
information security requirements. 
Legal information security requirements were determined by devising and utilizing a 
legal compliance questionnaire in combination with a legal matrix that included 
mappings of legal aspects within each of the proposed legal categories to all related 
ISO/IEC 27002 controls. Following determination of the legal requirements, a list of 
relevant ISC from the ISO/IEC 27002 framework was produced to satisfy the previously 
identified legal requirements.  
Nonetheless, as identified and evidenced earlier, the selection of ISC from baseline 
manuals or best practice frameworks, as it is the case with the LRDM using the ISO/IEC 
27002 framework, represents a weakness. Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks 
offer little guidance in terms of determining the best controls to provide adequate security 
for the particular business situation (van der Haar & von Solms, 2003). Furthermore, 
baseline manuals or frameworks do not necessarily take into consideration organization 
specific constraints, such as, costs, scheduling, and resource constraints, among others. 
2.10 Grey Relational Analysis  
In Otero et al. (2012a), a methodology that used Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) 
(Methodology 11) was developed to solve a multi-attribute decision making problem that 
consisted of evaluating relevant quality attributes and features of ISC, and selecting the 
best (high ranked) set based on those attributes and features.  
Otero et al.’s (2012a) GRA assessment methodology used grey systems theory as the 
basis for its development. The theory has been effective for decision problems with 
imprecise or ambiguous data leading to conflicting situations in which the evaluation of 
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alternatives becomes difficult. Such is the case when selecting and implementing ISC in 
organizations. Grey systems theory, according to Liu and Lin (2011), has also provided 
significant contributions in related areas such as: 
 Grey algebraic systems, grey equations, and grey matrices; 
 Sequence operators and generation of grey sequences; 
 System analysis based on grey incidence spaces and grey clustering; 
 Grey prediction models; 
 Decision making using grey target decision models; and  
 Optimization models using grey programming, grey game theory, and grey 
control. 
Otero et al. (2012a) performed a case study to implement and evaluate the 
methodology. The first step involved identifying a set of ISC that could be implemented 
in the organization. These ISC were obtained from the ISO/IEC 27002 standard best 
practice framework, which includes an all-inclusive list of ISC that can potentially be 
selected and implemented. The second step identified relevant quality attributes related to 
information security and used them as evaluation criteria for all potential ISC. The 
attributes were defined in terms of different features, where the importance of each 
feature was expressed as a grey number. In practical applications, a grey number 
represents an indeterminate number that takes its possible value from an interval or a set 
of numbers. 
ISC that satisfied the highest number of features exposed a higher level of quality for 
that particular attribute. Once all ISC were evaluated and measurements computed for all 
quality attributes and features, the methodology used the Euclidean distance between ISC 
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being evaluated and ideal ISC to fuse all measurements into one unified value that was 
representative of the overall quality of the ISC. The resulting ranking of each ISC was 
derived based on the goals and specific needs of the organization. 
As seen, Otero et al.’s (2012a) evaluation of ISC was fully dependent on the 
particular organization and its information security objectives. Through a case study, the 
methodology was proven successful in providing a way for measuring the quality of 
information security controls based on multiple application-specific criteria. In regards of 
contributions, first, the methodology is relatively simple, can be easily implemented in a 
spreadsheet or software tool, and promote usage in practical scenarios where highly 
complex methodologies for ISC selection may become impractical. Second, the 
methodology fuses multiple evaluation criteria and features to provide a holistic view of 
the overall ISC quality. Third, and probably the most meaningful contribution from a 
practical standpoint, the methodology is easily extended to include additional attributes 
and features, and can evaluate ISC in various domains. Overall, the methodology proved 
to be a feasible technique for evaluating ISC in organizations.  
Otero et al. (2012a) noted, however, that their methodology did not consider the true 
degree of relevance (imprecise in nature) when evaluating ISC. Subjectivity was still a 
factor when evaluating attributes and features of ISC to base their ultimate selection. The 
above still represents a major problem for organizations that can potentially impact the 
overall security over the information. While grey numbers can handle easily ambiguous 
and imprecise data, grey systems still do not provide the powerful analytical tools 
available in, for instance, FST, which allows for a more accurate, less-subjective 
assessment of imprecise parameters. Otero et al. (2012a) acknowledged that the 
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development of an assessment technique, based on FST, can better tackle challenging 
problems with imprecise data such as ISC evaluations. An ISC assessment methodology 
based on FST provides benefits and advantages over traditional methods, including a 
strict mathematical methodology that can precisely and rigorously examine vague 
conceptual phenomena (Zimmermann, 2010). FST has been used as a modeling, problem 
solving, and data mining tool, and has proven superior to existing methods as well as 
attractive to enhance classical approaches.  
Based on the thorough literature review presented above, which resulted from 
numerous search queries (including backward and forward search reviews) that included 
keywords, such as, information security controls; selection, evaluation, or assessment; 
organizations; and information security; among others, and to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, there have been no other studies within the literature that have addressed the 
evaluation and selection of ISC in organizations. Table 2 summarizes the literature 
review just presented, pointing out the weaknesses/inadequacies of the aforementioned 
ISC assessment methodologies. 
As stated, the literature clearly evidences weaknesses in existing assessment 
methodologies for ISC in organizations. Risks resulting from those weaknesses may 
include inaccurate or incomplete processing of data; unauthorized access to data that 
might destroy or manipulate data (or report logic) in a fraudulently or unintentionally 
way; as well as the potential loss of data or inability to access data as required (Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)). To support the above, in September 
of 2011, investment banking company, UBS, lost more than $2 billions on unauthorized 
trades, resulting from unauthorized access or access gained beyond necessary ones, by a 
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Table 2. Weaknesses of literature-based ISC assessment methodologies 
Table 2. (Continued). Weaknesses of literature-based ISC assessment methodologies 
  
ISC Assessment 
Methodology 
Description of Weakness/Inadequacy 
1. Risk Analysis and 
Management (RAM)  
(Barnard & von Solms, 
2000; Dhillon & 
Torkzadeh, 2006) 
 
- RAM has been described as a subjective, bottom-up approach (van 
der Haar & von Solms, 2003), not taking into account specific 
organizations’ constraints (Barnard & von Solms, 2000).  
- Per Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006), when organizations perform 
RAM, controls that are either unnecessary or relate to trivial issues 
are implemented.  
- Exclusive reliance on RAM has proven to be more problematic 
than beneficial for maximizing information security (Dhillon & 
Torkzadeh 2006). 
 
 
2. Baseline Manuals or Best 
Practice Frameworks 
(COBIT, ITIL, OCTAVE, 
NIST, ISO / IEC 177995, 
ISO/IEC 27001, and 
ISO/IEC 27002, 
PROTECT, CMM, and 
ISA) (Barnard & von 
Solms, 2000; Saint-
Germain, 2005; Da Veiga 
& Eloff, 2007; Siougle & 
Zorkadis, 2002) 
 
- Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks leave the 
identification of ISC to the user, while offering little guidance in 
terms of determining the best ISC to provide adequate security for 
the particular business situation (van der Haar & von Solms, 2003).  
- Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks do not necessarily 
account for organization specific constraints, such as, costs, 
scheduling, and resource constraints, among others (Barnard & von 
Solms, 2000). 
 
3. Ad Hoc or Random 
Approach (Barnard & von 
Solms, 2000) 
 
- Ad hoc or random approaches lead to the inclusion of unnecessary 
ISC and/or exclusion of required ISC (Barnard & von Solms, 2000). 
 
4. Information Security 
Checklists (Chen & Yoon, 
2010; Dhillon & 
Torkzadeh, 2006; 
Baskerville, 1993; 
Backhouse & Dhillon, 
1996) 
 
- Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) stress that the significance of 
information security checklists has declined simply “because they 
provide little by way of analytical stability” (p. 294).  
- Exclusive reliance on checklists could result in a flawed 
information systems security strategy (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006).  
- Backhouse and Dhillon (1996) indicate that checklists do not 
completely address the key task of understanding the substantive 
questions.  
- Checklists are concerned on what can be done without any 
analytical stability in regards to the kind of actions identified 
(Baskerville, 1993). 
 
5. Control Selection Process 
(Barnard & von Solms, 
2000) 
- Barnard and von Solms’ (2000) control selection process although 
eliminated the need for a random selection, still involved a high 
degree of subjectivity in the determination of which ISC will be 
ultimately selected.  
- Lack of integration of all processes involved (i.e., from business 
analyses through ISC selection) into one formalized methodological 
approach that would adequately address subjectivity (Barnard & von 
Solms, 2000). 
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Table 2. (Continued). Weaknesses of literature-based ISC assessment methodologies 
  
ISC Assessment 
Methodology 
Description of Weakness/Inadequacy 
6. Desirability Functions  
(Otero et al., 2010) 
- A boolean criteria for evaluating the quality attributes of ISC in 
order to ultimately determine which ones to select may not be 
considered a precise enough (less-subjective) assessment for 
selecting ISC in organizations (Otero et al., 2010). 
  
7. ISC Attribute Profile (van 
der Haar & von Solms, 
2003) 
 
- The objective of van der Haar and von Solms’ (2003) developed 
model was to identify security characteristics that would be crucial 
for every ISC prior of being selected to ensure their effective and 
continuous operation. 
- Determination of security attributes that resulted in the selection of 
ISC was based strictly on feedback gathered from organization 
personnel, stating whether the information security attribute was 
either present or not. Formalizing the above into one methodological 
approach that addresses the subjectivity involved when evaluating 
ISC would provide for a more accurate assessment of ISC. 
 
8. Information Security 
Risk-Control Assessment 
Model (Ou Yang et al., 
2011) 
 
 
- Ou Yang et al.’s (2011) work was focused on assessing the 
performance and validating the effectiveness of ISC already 
implemented instead of evaluating from an initial, all-inclusive pool 
of ISC, and determining which ones to implement. 
- Ou Yang et al.’s (2011) research study did not address the initial 
selection of ISC, as they assumed that ISC had already been put in 
place in the organization.  
 
9. Information Security Risk 
Management Method (Lv 
et al., 2011) 
- Selection of ISC mainly depended on the decision maker’s 
preference (Lv et al., 2011).  
- Subjectivity was a major factor employed by the organization to 
determine the criticality of each individual ISC before its selection.  
  
10. Legal Requirements 
Determination Model 
(Gerber & von Solms, 
2008)  
 
- Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks leave the 
identification of ISC to the user, while offering little guidance in 
terms of determining the best ISC to provide adequate security for 
the particular business situation (van der Haar & von Solms, 2003).  
- Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks do not necessarily 
account for organization specific constraints, such as, costs, 
scheduling, and resource constraints, among others (Barnard & von 
Solms, 2000). 
  
11. Grey Relational Analysis 
(GRA) (Otero et al., 
2012a) 
 
- The GRA methodology did not consider the true degree of 
relevance (imprecise in nature) when evaluating ISC, as subjectivity 
was still a factor involved in the evaluation (Otero et al., 2012a).  
- GRA lacks the powerful analytical tools available in FST, which 
allows for a more accurate, less-subjective assessment of imprecise 
parameters. 
  
 
rogue trader (Kantšukov & Medvedskaja, 2013). Various months after that, in early 2012, 
card processor Global Payments, Inc., a provider of electronic transaction processing 
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services for merchants, financial institutions, government agencies and multi-national 
corporations, among others, experienced its second data breach in less than 12 months 
involving sensitive customer information for millions of cardholders (Cheney, Hunt, 
Jacob, Porter, & Summers, 2012).  
Figure 3 illustrates the weaknesses listed earlier, as well as some of the risks just 
mentioned that those weaknesses may translate into. Most importantly, Figure 3 shows 
the significant contribution of the proposed ISC assessment methodology by addressing 
the weaknesses identified and preventing and/or avoiding the potential risks illustrated, 
resulting in a more effective selection of ISC and, in turn, enhanced information security 
in organizations (research problem). 
Table 3 further summarizes and combines the weaknesses into five and present them 
in question format. Table 3 also shows the relationship between the traditionally-used 
ISC assessment methodologies reviewed above (referred to as ‘M’ in the table) and each 
weakness listed. That is, a “-” sign in Table 3 indicates that the methodology does not 
address the weakness in question (i.e., the weakness is present in the assessment 
Methodology); whereas a “+” sign indicates that the methodology does address the 
weakness. A more significant purpose of Table 3 is that it supports how a FST-based 
methodology (last column on the right) addresses all of the weaknesses identified from 
the literature and, by doing this, how will it contribute favorably to the information 
security literature. 
As evidenced above, the FST-based ISC assessment methodology is expected to (a) 
enhance current evaluation processes for the initial selection of ISC in organizations; (b) 
employ a less-subjective, precision/accuracy-based method; (c) eliminate or prevent the 
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random and unnecessary selection of ISC; (d) consider organizations’ restrictions and 
constraints; and (e) improve the overall information security in organizations. Equally 
significant, a FST-based assessment methodology allows for the modeling of imprecise 
parameters (i.e., criteria for determining ISC relevance), resulting in a more accurate 
assessment, which is crucial to determine the best ISC. Surprisingly, such a methodology 
Figure 3. Weaknesses, risks, and significance of the research problem 
 
High levels of 
subjectivity; 
dichotomous 
decision-based 
approach (yes 
or no). 
 
Organizations’ 
constraints and 
restrictions not 
necessarily 
considered. 
 
ISC selection 
left to users; 
potential 
selection of 
unnecessary 
ISC. 
Ad-hoc, 
random ISC 
selections, or 
checklists 
provide little 
analytical 
stability. 
Evaluation 
focused on 
existing ISC 
does not 
consider all-
inclusive 
scenarios. 
Risks:  
Information security around financial systems and applications may not be enhanced, allowing for, among 
others: 
Literature-based weaknesses identified in traditional ISC assessment methodologies: 
Fraud, manipulation, 
and/or misuse of data 
Security-related 
deficiencies & findings 
False accounting 
journal entries 
Bogus trades to inflate 
profits or hide losses 
False transactions to 
evade regulators 
Computer security 
breaches 
Proposed ISC Assessment Methodology 
(Research Problem) 
34 
 
 
 
Table 3. Relationship between ISC assessment methodologies and literature-supported 
weaknesses (a “-” sign indicates that the ISC assessment methodology does not address 
the weakness in question, while a “+” sign does) 
Weakness/Inadequacy   M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 FST 
Minimizes subjectivity 
significantly? (van der Haar 
& von Solms, 2003) 
- - - - - - - + - - - + 
             
Considers organizations’ 
restrictions and constraints? 
(van der Haar & von Solms, 
2003) 
- - - + - + + + + - + + 
             
Prevents selection of 
unnecessary ISC? (Dhillon 
& Torkzadeh, 2006; 
Barnard  & von Solms, 
2000) 
- - - - + + + + - - + + 
             
Eliminates random 
selection? (Barnard  & von 
Solms, 2000; Dhillon & 
Torkzadeh, 2006; Saint-
Germain, 2005; Da Veiga & 
Eloff, 2007; Siougle & 
Zorkadis, 2002; Baskerville, 
1993; Otero et al., 2010; van 
der Haar & von Solms, 
2003; Ou Yang et al., 2011; 
Lv et al., 2011; Gerber & 
von Solms, 2008) 
+ + - + + + + + + + + + 
             
Consider all-inclusive, best 
practice ISC for evaluation 
rather than assessing just the 
ISC already in place? (Ou 
Yang et al., 2011) 
+ + + + + - - - - + + + 
             
Results 2+ 2+ 1+ 3+ 3+ 3+ 3+ 4+ 2+ 2+ 4+ 5+ 
             
has not been proposed within the information security literature. The next Chapter will 
describe the research methodology, including the specific research method to be 
employed, as well as discuss and explain the theory used for developing the ISC 
assessment instrument. 
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     Chapter 3 
3. Methodology 
 
3. Introduction 
This Chapter describes the research methodology as well as the specific research 
method employed. Chapter three also explains the theory adopted for developing the ISC 
assessment methodology, including reasons supporting its selection, as well as the 
underlying assumptions, and various benefits and advantages of a FST-based 
methodology over traditional methodologies. Moreover, Chapter three presents the data 
collection method and the rationale for its adoption.  
 3.1 Research Method 
This dissertation follows the design-science research (DSR) method. Simon (1996) 
states that the DSR method is fundamentally a problem-solving paradigm. DSR creates 
and evaluates IT artifacts intended to solve identified organizational problems. Artifacts, 
as defined by Denning (1997) and Tsichritzis (1998), refer to innovations made to 
develop ideas, best practices, technical capabilities, and products, among others, through 
which the analysis, design, implementation, and use of information systems can be 
effectively and efficiently achieved. Nunamaker, Chen, and Purdin (1991a) further state 
that the process of constructing IT artifacts enables DSR researchers to understand the 
problem being addressed, as well as the feasibility of the artifacts’ approach to the 
problem’s solution. For purposes of this dissertation, an ISC assessment methodology 
(i.e., artifact) will be developed to address the existing weaknesses identified in 
traditional evaluation methodologies (the terms artifact and methodology will also be 
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used interchangeably). The new methodology is expected to deliver rich information 
about the research problem, as well as provide a solution (Hevner et al., 2004) by 
enhancing current evaluation methods, ultimately improving information security in the 
organization. The utilization of DSR is appropriate as it matches the purpose of this 
investigation which is the creation of an artifact (i.e., FST-based ISC methodology) to 
address a problem by providing effective and efficient solutions or improvements. Next, 
the various DSR guidelines or process steps are listed along with their proposed 
implementation.  
3.2 DSR Guidelines / Process Steps  
As mentioned, the DSR method is inherently a problem solving process. The 
fundamental principle of DSR is that knowledge and understanding of a design problem 
(and its solution) are obtained in the building and application of an artifact (Hevner et al., 
2004). Hevner et al. (2004) list seven guidelines that are crucial in understanding the 
requirements for effective DSR. Similar to Hevner et al.’s (2004) guidelines, Vaishnavi 
and Kuechler (2004) also developed a general method underlying DSR. Their method 
included only five process steps, which represent a summarized version of Hevner et al.’s 
(2004) seven DSR guidelines (see Table 4). Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2004) further 
identified expected outputs for their five DSR process steps. Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s 
(2004) five-process-steps General Methodology of DSR was followed in this dissertation. 
3.3 Implementation of DSR’s General Methodology  
Following is a description of the five process steps from Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s 
(2004) General Methodology of DSR, and how they will be used within the context of 
this dissertation.  
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Table 4. Hevner et al.’s (2004) DSR Guidelines and correspondent Process Steps from 
Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2004) General Methodology of DSR 
Hevner et al.’s 
(2004) Guidelines 
Hevner et al.’s (2004)  
Guidelines Description 
Vaishnavi and 
Kuechler’s 
(2004) Process 
Steps 
Vaishnavi and 
Kuechler’s 
(2004) 
Expected 
Outputs 
Guideline 1 - 
Problem Relevance 
DSR allows for the development and 
implementation of solutions, using 
appropriate technology, to address 
significant business problems. 
Awareness 
of 
Problem 
Proposal 
    
Guideline 2 - 
Research Rigor 
Rigorous methods are used by DSR to 
construct and evaluate the design artifact. 
That is, DSR requires that the artifact is 
rigorously defined as well as formally 
represented, and well-articulated. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suggestion Tentative 
Design 
  
Guideline 3 - 
Design as Search 
Process 
An effective artifact is searched/identified 
via utilizing correct actions and available 
resources to develop the desired solution, 
while addressing constraints within the 
problem.  
   
Guideline 4 -  
Design as an 
Artifact 
DSR results in the creation of an innovative, 
purposeful artifact (instantiation) in the form 
of a construct, model, or method. 
Development Artifact 
    
Guideline 5 - 
Design Evaluation 
Evaluation of the artifact in terms of its 
utility, quality, and efficacy must be 
rigorously performed. 
Evaluation 
Performance 
Measures 
    
Guideline 6 - 
Research 
Contributions 
Clear and verifiable contributions are 
provided in the areas of the design artifact, 
design foundations, and/or design 
methodologies. 
Conclusion Results   
Guideline 7 - 
Communication of 
Research 
Effective communication of DSR results 
must be presented to technical and 
managerial audiences. 
    
3.3.1 Process Step 1: Awareness of Problem 
 
Hevner et al. (2004) define a problem as “differences between a goal state and the 
current state of a system” (p. 85). Awareness of problem refers to the identification of 
relevant needs, issues, gaps, or inadequacies that prompt for new technology-based 
developments to get any system from its current state to a desired, goal state. In this 
dissertation and as evidenced above, adequate evaluation of ISC in organizations is 
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determinant in relation to information security. Nevertheless, the literature points out 
several weaknesses in existing methodologies that prevent an effective assessment of ISC 
in organizations. Consistent with the aforementioned, the research problem of this 
investigation calls for the creation of an ISC assessment methodology that adequately 
addresses existing weaknesses identified in traditional ISC assessment methodologies, 
resulting in a more effective selection of ISC. Moreover, a new ISC assessment 
methodology that accounts for the weaknesses identified in traditional assessment 
methodologies will better assist organizations in mitigating information security risks, 
ultimately enhancing overall information security. The above is consistent with the 
expected output of this first process step: Proposal of a new research effort. 
3.3.2 Process Step 2: Suggestion 
 
Suggestion represents an integral part of the DSR’s General Methodology, and refers 
to recommended (or suggested) solutions, based on existing knowledge or theory base, 
that can potentially address the problem at hand (Peirce, 1931). This process step 
involves the engaging of rigorous research methods, utilizing available means, to identify 
potential solutions and construct artifacts that can satisfy the problem and its constraints. 
Suggestion results from the proper use of knowledge base-theoretical foundations, as well 
as research methodologies used to discover effective solutions to problems. Hevner et al. 
(2004) indicate that success within this step follows exhaustive (literature) reviews and 
evaluations of existing tools and methodologies, including noting their advantages and 
disadvantages (weaknesses), before developing a new artifact. Within this dissertation, a 
thorough literature review has been performed in Chapter two, which is inline with, and 
clearly supports, the objectives of this second process step. Additionally, the FST theory 
adopted for designing the ISC assessment methodology, including reasons supporting its 
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selection, as well as its underlying assumptions, benefits, and advantages over traditional 
methodologies, is explained later in this chapter. The expected output for this step is the 
Tentative Design of a prototype solution for the stated problem.  
3.3.3. Process Step 3: Development 
 
Development consists of implementing the tentative design of a prototype solution 
(i.e., artifact) from process step 2. According to Hevner et al. (2004), the ultimate result 
of DSR is a purposeful IT artifact developed to provide a solution to a significant 
organizational problem. Hevner et al. (2004) define artifacts as “innovations that define 
the ideas, practices, technical capabilities, and products through which the analysis, 
design, implementation, and use of information systems can be effectively and efficiently 
accomplished” (p. 83). In the context of this dissertation, the artifact built is a FST-based 
ISC assessment methodology, which is also the expected output of this process step. FST 
was used to prioritize ISC within higher-ranked information security areas identified by 
the organization through completing a questionnaire (data collection method; refer to 
Data Collection Method and Rationale for its Adoption section below) by fusing their 
respective assessment values into a single, quantified measure using the Mamdani Max-
Min fuzzy reasoning technique. This provided the organization with a measurement of 
relevance for each ISC based strictly on specific criteria, including the organization’s 
goals, objectives, and restrictions. The derived relevance measurement is used as the 
main metric for evaluating and ultimately selecting ISC. 
3.3.4 Process Step 4: Evaluation  
 
When evaluating the artifact, Hevner et al. (2004) stress that the artifact’s 
functionality, accuracy, reliability, usability, and other relevant quality attributes must be 
thoroughly demonstrated via well-executed and articulated assessment methods. 
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Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2004) also state that evaluation of artifacts must be inline with 
the research problem established. The artifact must be evaluated according to 
performance measures (e.g., criteria, etc.) established in the research problem. This is the 
expected output of this process step. The evaluation phase also assists in addressing 
research questions and in determining whether the hypotheses drawn about the behavior 
of the artifact hold or not.  
According to Hevner et al. (2004), there are five design evaluation methods typically 
used when assessing an artifact. These are: (1) Observational (case studies, field studies); 
(2) Analytical (static analysis, architectural analysis, optimization, dynamic analysis); (3) 
Experimental (controlled experiments, simulations); (4) Testing (functional, structural); 
and (5) Descriptive (informed arguments, scenarios). 
The selection of the evaluation method must conform adequately with the artifact 
being created as well as the selected evaluation metrics. In this dissertation, the FST-
based assessment methodology was evaluated through performing comparisons and 
contrasts against existing ISC assessment methodologies found in the literature (Aalst & 
Kumar, 2003). The evaluation method just explained refers to the “Descriptive Design 
Evaluation Method” (Hevner et al., 2004). This type of design evaluation method was 
selected over the other four evaluation methods to perform relevant comparisons and 
determine whether the artifact created herein enhanced existing ISC assessment 
methodologies, satisfying the original requirements set in the research problem.   
When compared to the other four evaluation methods, the Descriptive Design 
Evaluation Method was critical in evaluating and comparing the artifact’s suitability and 
effectiveness against information from the knowledge base (i.e., existing ISC assessment 
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methodologies found in the literature) in order to build convincing arguments and/or 
scenarios and demonstrate the artifact’s utility. 
3.3.5 Process Step 5: Conclusion  
   
Conclusion is the final process step as defined by Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2004) 
General Methodology of DSR. Here, results (output of this step) from the research are 
documented and communicated. Results are also associated with clear and verifiable 
research contributions from the creation of the artifact. Results either support, firmly, the 
objectives and direction of the investigation or simply evidence the opposite.  
In regards to communication, Hevner et al. (2004) recommend presenting results to 
two audiences: technology and managerial audiences. When presenting to technology-
oriented audiences, the artifact’s benefits must be described clearly so that practitioners 
acknowledge them and encourage the artifact’s use, as well as its further evaluation and 
improvement. IT practitioners must also become aware of (and understand) the process 
followed to create and evaluate the artifact. A full understanding of the artifact and the 
process used would allow effective evaluations and further extensions or improvements 
to the artifact. On the other hand, when communicating results to managerial audiences, 
Hevner et al. (2004) state that enough details must be provided for them “to determine if 
the organizational resources should be committed to constructing (or purchasing) and 
using the artifact within their specific organizational context” (p. 90). Management 
personnel must understand the significance of the research problem and, most 
importantly, the advantages and solutions achieved by the artifact. Zmud (1997) 
concludes by advising that presenting result details in a short, concise, and well-
articulated manner is an appropriate and effective communication mechanism for both 
audiences. 
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Artifacts developed effectively under DSR provide clear contributions regarding the 
artifact itself, its construction (foundation), and its evaluation (methodology). Hevner et 
al. (2004) summarize these three types of contributions in Table 5. Next, the concept of 
fuzzy logic is explained as well as the fuzzy set theory adopted for developing the ISC 
assessment methodology. Reasons supporting the fuzzy set theory selection are 
described, including the benefits and advantages a methodology based on FST provide 
over traditional methodologies.  
Table 5. DSR’s research contributions 
Contribution Description 
Artifact - The artifact itself (e.g., methodologies, design tools, and prototype systems, etc.), 
designed to enable solutions to unsolved problems, represents a practical-purpose 
contribution to the environment. 
  
Foundations - The creation of effective, adequately-evaluated methodologies that also extend and 
enhance existing methodologies (i.e., foundations) denotes a significant contribution. 
  
Methodologies -  The development and use of evaluation methods mentioned earlier (i.e., experimental, 
analytical, observational, testing, and descriptive) along with their correspondent 
measures and assessment metrics are crucial contributions of DSR. 
  
3.4 Fuzzy Logic  
Based on Zimmermann (2010), the majority of traditional tools for formal modeling, 
reasoning, and computing are crisp, deterministic, and/or precise in character. Crisp 
refers to dichotomous, meaning yes or no type answers, rather than a more-or-less type. 
When dealing with traditional dual logic, for example, statements can be either true or 
false, nothing else. This implies that the decision of whether an element belongs to a set 
is unequivocal and has no ambiguities. In other words, parameters within a model are 
known and there are no doubts about their values or their occurrence. Zimmermann 
(2010) indicates that (logic) assumptions or beliefs, similar to the above, are not correct 
in order to describe reality. Zimmermann (2010) further states that the “complete 
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description of a real system would often require far more detailed data than a human 
being could ever recognize simultaneously, process, and understand” (p. 317). 
According to Klir and Yuan (1995), logic refers to the study of methods for 
reasoning. Logic can be of type classical and fuzzy, among others. Classical logic relies 
on the assumption that propositions are either true or false. In fuzzy logic, on the other 
hand, propositions can be true to some degree, allowing logical reasoning with partially 
true imprecise statements (Das, 2009). That is, in fuzzy logic, the truth values are no 
longer restricted to the two values ‘true’ and ‘false’, but expressed by the linguistic 
variables ‘true’ and ‘false’ (Zimmermann, 2010). 
The subsections below provide a general description of FST and fuzzy reasoning 
methods, including the Mamdani Max-Min method, followed by the defuzzification 
process, and the various benefits and advantages of FST over traditional assessment 
methods. The understanding of these concepts is fundamental to comprehend the fuzzy 
logic utilized in developing the ISC assessment methodology. To end the section, the data 
collection method is presented, followed by a summary. 
3.5 Fuzzy Set Theory 
According to Schryen (2010), FST refers to a valuable, uncertainty theory that is 
useful in the absence of probabilities and in the presence of subjective assessments. The 
theory has been utilized in many decision-making processes due to its ability to deal with 
uncertain conditions (Yaakob & Watada, 2009). FST considers uncertainty and 
constraints to model reality better than traditional theories (Zimmermann, 2010; Schryen, 
2010). The idea of FST, as stated by Schryen (2010), is “the extension of the (crisp) 
membership concept in traditional set theory by providing for a degree with which an 
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element belongs to a set” (p. 8). Such a degree is specified by a membership function. 
The degree of truthfulness of propositions –grounded on FST– also allows parameters to 
be represented with simple linguistic terms (Zimmermann, 2010). The association of 
linguistic terms with membership functions forms fuzzy sets.  
Zadeh (1965) defines fuzzy sets as those sets which have boundaries that are not 
precise. Moreover, Klir and Yuan (1995) state that a “fuzzy set can be defined 
mathematically by assigning to each possible individual in the universe of discourse a 
value representing its grade of membership in the fuzzy set” (p. 4). Such a grade refers to 
the degree to which that individual, entity, etc., is similar or compatible with the concept 
represented by the fuzzy set. In other words, those individuals or entities may belong in 
the fuzzy set, either to a greater or a lesser degree, as indicated by a larger or smaller 
membership grade (Klir & Yuan, 1995). The membership in a fuzzy set is not a matter of 
affirmation or denial, right or wrong but rather a matter of a degree (Zadeh, 1965).  
Membership grades or functions map elements from any universal set into real 
numbers within the range 0 - 1. The resulting number represents the degree of 
membership of elements to particular fuzzy sets, where values closer to one represent 
higher degrees of membership (Zimmermann, 2010). There are various forms of 
membership functions and determining the appropriate ones is essential for making FST 
practically useful (Klir & Yuan, 1995). The most common membership functions used to 
represent fuzzy numbers are formed by using straight lines. They are: triangular and 
trapezoidal. Triangular membership functions are usually preferred due to their 
combination of solid theoretical basis and simplicity (Pedrycz, 1994). Figure 4 shows an 
example of a triangular fuzzy set to denote AVERAGE as a function of estimated 
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implementation costs for each ISC. Here, a cost of $25,000 fully belongs to the fuzzy set; 
therefore, the degree of membership is 1.0.  Costs of $20,000 and $30,000 have 0.5 
degrees of membership to the fuzzy set, while costs less than $15,000 and greater than 
$35,000 are not part of the fuzzy set.  
Lorterapong (1995) describes a trapezoidal membership function as a function 
represented by four parameters or characteristic points (i.e., a, b, c, and d), where a and d 
 
Figure 4. Example of a Triangular Fuzzy Set 
 
are the lower and upper bounds, respectively, while b represents the lower modal value, 
and c the upper modal value. Figure 5 shows an example of a trapezoidal fuzzy set to 
denote a MEDIUM classification when measuring the number of applications the 
particular ISC is expected to protect (i.e., scope). Here, one (1) is the lower bound and 
four (4) is the upper bound. Two (2) and three (3) in the horizontal axis represent the 
lower and upper modal values, respectively. In other words, ISC that protect two (2) and 
three (3) applications fully belong to the fuzzy set shown in Figure 5 and, thus, will have 
a higher priority of selection; while ISC that do not protect any application (less than one 
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(1)) and those that protect five (5) applications and more will fall outside of this specific 
fuzzy set. 
There are other situations where more complex functions may be required to 
represent the degrees of membership of elements in fuzzy sets. Klir and Yuan (1995) 
discuss direct and indirect methods to form fuzzy sets by gathering and processing 
responses from subject matter experts, or from literature reviews.  
 
 
Figure 5. Example of a Trapezoidal Fuzzy Set 
 
3.6 Fuzzy Reasoning 
Based on Das (2009), fuzzy reasoning refers to the process of developing logical 
inferences from imprecise premises. Such process results from classical logic concepts. 
In classical logic, a widely used inference rule is the modus ponens. The modus ponens 
inference rule states that a conclusion can be inferred given a conditional proposition and 
a fact. For instance, a classical modus ponens inference using the relationship between 
the value (or score) of a particular ISC, and its level of priority can be expressed as 
shown in Table 6. Table 6 shows that if the generated value/score of ISC_1 is x 
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(Proposition 1), and x implies a ‘low priority’ for an ISC, as defined by the organization 
based on a specific criteria (Proposition 2), then it can be inferred that ISC_1 has a ‘low 
priority’ and, therefore, must not be selected for implementation (Conclusion). Notice 
that this type of inference structure deals with binary-valued propositions, meaning that 
the solution set to describe the priority level of a ISC is {0,1} when using the classical 
modus ponens.  
Table 6. Classical Modus Ponens 
Type of Statement Statement 
Proposition 1 Generated value/score of ISC_1 = x 
  
Proposition 2 ‘x’  A low priority ISC as 
specified by the organization 
  
Conclusion ISC_1 = A low priority ISC 
  
 
The classical modus ponens just described must be generalized in order to be used for 
fuzzy reasoning purposes. Such generalization is obtained as follows. First, the 
generalized version considers degrees of membership of elements to fuzzy sets. 
Therefore, the solution set to describe the priority level of ISC is expanded from {0,1} to 
[0,1]. Second, propositions showing completely true implications via the ‘=>’ symbo l are 
replaced with fuzzy rules.  
Fuzzy rules are conditional and unqualified propositions implying fuzzy relationships 
between antecedents and consequences (Klir & Yuan, 1995). This relationship, also 
known as a fuzzy implication, is not explicit but rather embedded within the proposition 
and determined for all values of antecedents and consequences (Demicco & Klir, 2004). 
Fuzzy systems usually involve more than one fuzzy rule. The process of obtaining overall 
consequences from individual consequences is known as aggregation (Ross, 2010). 
48 
 
 
 
Aggregation combines several fuzzy sets to produce a single fuzzy set. Aggregation of 
rules can be performed: 
 conjunctively: rules are jointly satisfied, using connector “AND”, producing an 
aggregate output based on the fuzzy intersection of all individual rule 
consequences, as well as  
 disjunctively: at least one rule needs to be satisfied (trough using connector 
“OR”), resulting in an aggregate output based on the fuzzy union of all individual 
rules. 
In this dissertation, decisions were made based on the testing of all rules defined 
within the proposed fuzzy inference system. Therefore, all rules were combined in order 
to obtain a single fuzzy set. Through the aggregation process, all fuzzy sets that represent 
the output of every single rule are combined into a single fuzzy set (i.e., determination of 
whether ISC should or should not be selected). 
The third step in generalizing the classical modus ponens involves the use of the 
compositional rule of inference shown in equation (1).  
)(yB  = sup min [
)(xA , R(x, y)]               
(1)
 
   x∈X 
Klir and Yuan (1995) state that equation (1) obtains degree of membership )(yB  for all 
y ∈ Y given a fuzzy implication R; as well as degree of membership )(xA  given that R is 
a fuzzy relation on X x Y and A and B are fuzzy sets on X and Y, respectively. With the 
compositional rule of inference, a fuzzy conclusion can be obtained given both, a fuzzy 
rule and a fuzzy fact. The generalized modus ponens form of inference (shown in Table 
7) is considered by many as the foundation for various fuzzy reasoning methods 
presented in the literature (Mizumoto & Zimmermann, 1982).   
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Table 7. Generalized Modus Ponens 
Type of Statement Statement 
Fuzzy Rule If x is A, Then y is B 
  
Fact )(xA  
  
Fuzzy Conclusion )(yB  
  
 
3.7 Mamdani Max-Min Fuzzy Reasoning Technique 
The fuzzy reasoning technique used in this dissertation was the Mamdani Max-Min 
(Mamdani) method, which engages the generalized modus ponens process just described 
for each fuzzy rule. This Mamdani method is the most commonly used fuzzy inference 
technique (Kaur & Kaur, 2012) and it is performed in four steps: (1) Fuzzification of the 
input variables; (2) Evaluation of rules (inference); (3) Aggregation of the rule outputs 
(composition); and (4) Defuzzification. The Mamdani method follows the multi-
conditional reasoning structure which is illustrated in Table 8. 
Based on the Mamdani method, the fuzzy implication (required by the compositional 
rule of inference) equals the truth value of the antecedent. In other words, and based on 
Table 8. Multi-conditional Reasoning Structure 
Type of Statement Statement 
Rule 1 If x is A1, then y is B1 
Rule 2 If x is A2, then y is B2 
… … 
Rule n If x is An, then y is Bn 
Fact )(xA  
Conclusion )(yB  
 
Otero and Otero (2011), the fuzzy implication for singleton fuzzy rules equals the degree 
of membership of the only statement in the antecedent (Figure 6A). For non-singleton 
fuzzy rules and based on operator ‘AND’, the fuzzy implication is computed as the 
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intersection or conjunction of the statements in the antecedent via the minimum logical 
operation shown in equation (2) (Figure 6B).  
)(x
BA

 = min [
)(xA , )(xB ]               
(2)
 
Equation (2) returns the smallest element where A and B are limited to the range (0, 1). 
Fuzzy operator ‘OR’, on the other hand, is known as the fuzzy union or disjunction, 
returning the maximum elements where again A and B are limited to the range (0, 1). It is 
denoted by equation (3), where A and B are two given fuzzy sets with memberships 
functions μA(x) and μB(x). 
)(x
AUB
 = max [ )(xA , )(xB ]             (3) 
An antecedent with a truth value greater than zero automatically implies that its 
consequence also has a truth value greater than zero. In fuzzy reasoning terms, a true 
antecedent causes a rule to fire. The fired rules are then combined into fuzzy sets which 
are used to make final inferences (Figure 6C). Fired rules will be combined according to 
each criteria or fuzzy set evaluated. In evaluating ISC, the methodology will require the 
creation of a fuzzy set for each criteria evaluated. Evaluation criteria in this study include 
estimated implementation costs, scope, compliance, and risks. Therefore, there were four 
fuzzy sets created for cost, scope, compliance, and risks used to assess and determine 
ultimate ISC selection. Each criteria have its own set of fuzzy or inference rules defined 
to assist with the evaluation. Upon the result of truth values from antecedents, fired rules 
are aggregated per criteria, and utilized for final ISC selection inference.  
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3.8 Mamdani and Other Fuzzy Reasoning Methods 
Other very common fuzzy implication or inference mechanism methods include the 
Sugeno-Type Fuzzy Inference (also known as Takagi-Sugeno method) and the Larsen 
Product Implication, both described in Table 9. 
 
Figure 6. Mamdani Max-Min Inference 
When compared to the Mamdani approach, Kaur and Kaur (2012) state that the Sugeno-
Type Fuzzy Inference method (1) works well with optimization and adaptive techniques, 
which makes it very attractive in control problems; (2) has enhanced processing time 
over the Mamdani’s defuzzification process; (3) is computationally efficient since it  
Table 9. Common Fuzzy Reasoning Methods 
Method Description 
Sugeno-Type 
Fuzzy Inference 
Similar to the Mamdani method in the first two parts of the 
fuzzy inference process (i.e., fuzzifying the inputs and rules 
evaluation). Nonetheless, its output membership functions are 
either linear or constant. That is, instead of a fuzzy set (or 
defuzzification) as used by Mamdani, Sugeno uses a 
mathematical function (weighted average) of the input 
variable to compute the crisp output (Kaur & Kaur, 2012). 
  
Larsen Product 
Implication 
Larsen uses the arithmetic product operation between the two 
membership functions as a fuzzy implication in the universe 
of discourses (Larsen, 1980). 
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works with linear techniques; and (4) may guarantee continuity of the output surface and 
is well-suited to mathematical analysis. Nevertheless, the Mamdani approach is more 
intuitive and has a widespread of acceptance. The major disadvantage of the Sugeno 
method is that it is not well suited to human input when compared to the Mamdani 
approach. Moreover, the expressive power and interpretability of Mamdani output is lost 
in Sugeno since its consequents or outputs are not fuzzy, but linear or constant in nature.  
The Larsen product implication method is somewhat similar to the Mamdani method 
described above, but it uses the arithmetic product operation (i.e., multiplication) between 
the two membership functions as a fuzzy implication in the universe of discourses 
(Larsen, 1980). This way, the overall antecedent of the fuzzy rule is the maximum of the 
two fuzzy propositions of the antecedent. Mamdani, on the other hand, uses fuzzy 
operators ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ to obtain a single number that represents the result of the 
antecedent evaluation. The operator ‘AND’ evaluates the intersection or conjunction of 
the rule antecedents, while ‘OR’ assesses the union or disjunction of the rule antecedents. 
The Larsen product implication, however, becomes computationally difficult as more and 
more rules are added to the fuzzy evaluation system (Larsen, 1980). The Mamdani 
approach may also entail a substantial computational burden (i.e., increase in computing 
time) as the number of rules grows, however, the precision of the system also increase 
with the increment in fuzzy rules (Bhoyar & Kakde, 2009).  
The Mamdani method was chosen for this dissertation because, when producing 
output for decision-making, it does so by providing fuzzy, non-linear conclusions 
obtained given both, fuzzy rules and fuzzy facts. Given the high subjectivity identified in 
current evaluation methods from the literature when selecting ISC in organizations, 
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Mamdani offers advantages when providing for mathematical convenience due to its 
simplicity and low computational complexity, high degree of accuracy when evaluating 
imprecision information, and ease of implementation and testing. In Sugeno, the output 
produced is not fuzzy-based (as Sugeno has no output membership functions), but 
restricted to constant or linear values. In other words, outputs in Sugeno are limited, 
subject to the range 0-1 (Kaur & Kaur, 2012), which makes the approach not suitable 
when handling imprecise criteria as required by this dissertation.  
Another critical advantage of using a rule-based approach such as Mamdani is that 
processing for all received inputs, via fuzzy ‘if-then’ rules, is strictly human based. This 
approach can be expressed in simple language words using the logic a human would use 
to perform the tasks. Cox (2005) supports the aforementioned by stating that a 
Mamdani’s fuzzy rule-based system derives its ‘expertise’ (rule induction process) from 
subject matter experts. The rules represent nonprocedural statements of knowledge in the 
form of ‘if-then’ sentences. The rules also reference local variables that, in turn, reference 
fuzzy sets which ultimately define control regions over the variables’ domain. Cox 
(2005) further states that the framework of a rule-based approach is “relatively 
uncomplicated” (p.100).  
As evidenced, the Mamdani approach represents a suitable method for performing an 
effective evaluation of ISC in organizations. Such fuzzy reasoning technique offers 
robustness, as its defined rules tolerate imprecise measurements and component 
variations, and easy adaptation in terms tuning fuzzy rules as it becomes necessary 
(Salmasi, 2007). According to Kaur and Kaur (2012), its intuitiveness, human-like 
manner for capturing expert knowledge, expressive power and interpretability of its fuzzy 
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output, as well as its widely use, particularly, in decision support applications, made the 
Mamdani method the appropriate reasoning technique for this dissertation.  
3.9 Defuzzification 
Defuzzification converts conclusions from fuzzy sets into a real number, or a single 
crisp value (Yager, 1996). Ross (2010) also defines the defuzzification process as the 
conversion of a fuzzy quantity to a precise quantity, represented by the logical union of 
two or more fuzzy membership functions defined on the universe of discourse of the 
output variable. In other words, the purpose of defuzzification is to find one single crisp 
value that summarizes the fuzzy set. There are several methods available for 
defuzzification; among the most common are the center of gravity approach (i.e., 
centroid) and the weighted average method (Ross, 2010).  
The centroid method is the most prevalent and intuitively appealing defuzzification 
technique. This method takes the center of gravity (COG) and uses integrals to calculate 
the area of a combination of fuzzy sets. Equation (4) describes algebraic expression for 
this method, where A  are the degrees of membership 
COG =
mA (x)xdx
a
b
ò
mA (x)dx
a
b
ò
                                                 (4) 
The calculation of the center of gravity is simplified if a finite universe of discourse and 
thus a discrete membership function is considered. 
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In equation (5), μi is the value of the membership function of the fuzzy set rule i, iA  is the 
corresponding area and i is the degree that the rule i is fired (between 0 and 1). Figure 
6C illustrates the center of gravity or centroid of a fuzzy set. 
Other methods, such as the weighted average method (shown in equation 6), are 
reliable, less complicated, less time consuming, and also accurate to approximate the 
center of gravity (Genske & Heinrich, 2009). The weighted average defuzzification 
method, based on peak values for every fuzzy set, calculates weighted sums of the peak 
values. Based on those weight values and the degree of membership for fuzzy outputs, 
crisp values of the output are determined using the following formula, where μi is the   

 

i
ii
x
Wx
Z
)(
)(
0


                       
(6) 
degree of membership in output singleton i, and Wi is the fuzzy output weight value for 
the output singleton i (Ross, Hassanein, & Ali, 2010). The weighted average method has 
also been frequently used in cases similar to this dissertation (Otero & Otero, 2011). 
Nonetheless, the weighted average method is usually restricted to symmetrical output 
membership functions, a limitation identified by Ross (2010). In this dissertation, the 
center of gravity approach or centroid method was employed. Figure 6C shows an 
example of the estimated center of gravity of a fuzzy set converted using the center of 
gravity approach from two fired fuzzy rules. Figure 7 depicts, at an overall level, the 
steps just described within a fuzzy inference system. 
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Figure 7. Fuzzy Inference System 
 
3.10 Benefits and Advantages of FST over Traditional Methods 
Based on the above, and as supported by Zimmermann (2010), a FST-based 
framework: (1) provides a natural, effective way of handling problems in which the 
source of imprecision is the absence of sharply defined criteria; (2) offers a strict 
mathematical methodology that can precisely and rigorously examine vague conceptual 
phenomena; (3) has been used as a modeling, problem solving, and data mining tool, and 
has proven superior to existing methods, as well as attractive to enhance classical 
approaches; (4) relaxes classical and/or traditional assumptions through fuzzy reasoning; 
and (5) suggests opportunities to improve existing methodologies and approaches. Kaur 
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and Kaur (2012) further stress the flexibility of the fuzzy approach, particularly, when 
adding more variables to a problem, as it would only require writing new rules or editing 
the existing ones. The above translates into a lesser amount of effort than rewriting an 
entire algorithm.  
Klir and Yuan (1995) state that since FST deals with uncertainty, it is a great utility 
also considered essential to science. FST assists in understanding the phenomenon of 
reality (be it natural or man-made) via: (1) performing adequate predictions or 
retrodictions; (2) learning about controlling the phenomenon; and (3) utilizing such 
capabilities for various other ends. Furthermore, a FST-based approach leads to more 
detailed and thorough assessments (Otero & Otero, 2011), while appropriately modeling 
human decisions, which are imprecise in nature (Petrovic-Lazarevic, 2001). 
3.11 Data Collection Method and Rationale for its Adoption 
To create the FST-based ISC assessment artifact, specific data from the organization 
needed to be collected. The data collection method adopted for this study involved survey 
approach. A questionnaire was provided to key information security management 
personnel within the organization, such as, the Information Security Manager, 
Information Security Director, or the Chief Information Security Officer, as applicable.  
The survey/questionnaire approach is used when a series of questions are posed to 
willing participants and their responses are summarized with percentages, frequency 
counts, and/or more sophisticated statistical indexes (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). Then, 
inferences about particular populations are drawn from the responses of the sample. 
Surveys are a common approach used with more or less sophistication in many areas of 
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human activities. Survey research typically employs online assessments, written 
questionnaires, face-to-face interviews, or telephone interviews (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). 
Skulmoski, Hartman, and Krahn (2007) state that online technologies facilitate the 
administration and management of surveys, particularly, questionnaires, as they allow 
control by the researcher. Online questionnaires have extensively been used in the 
literature to collect individuals’ data (Cabaniss, 2001; Richards, 2000; Schmidt, 1995). 
Administration of questionnaires was conducted through e-mail which provides many 
advantages to both, researcher and participants (Skulmoski et al., 2007), as e-mails can 
speed up the questionnaires’ turnaround time.  
Questionnaires also examine the level of agreement or disagreement of participants 
(Sekaran, 2003). Additional support for using surveys or questionnaires is provided by 
Leedy and Ormrod (2001) when stating that survey approach looks more closely at 
phenomena of the moment and, therefore, captures responses/feedback from a specific 
moment in time. 
To expand on the above, requests for participation were made for organizations 
meeting the following requirements: 
- Industry: Schools, Universities, and Not-for-profit 
- Location: Puerto Rico 
- Size: Small-to-Medium 
- Convenience and Availability 
A critical part of the scope of this dissertation involved the information systems (i.e., 
applications) to be in scope. The systems and applications where ISC were evaluated 
comprised only financial applications. All other applications and/or information systems 
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within organizations (e.g., applications, databases, operating systems, networks in place 
for operational / non-financial purposes, etc.) were not included in this dissertation.  
The target audience comprised information security management personnel. Due to 
their knowledge and experience, the target audience reflected an accurate representation 
of the population, allowing for results to be generalizable and, thus, consistently applied 
to other populations with the same characteristics in different settings (Salkind, 2009).  
Data collected from participants will be maintained and available only for 
investigation and analysis purposes. Moreover, to increase confidence, the survey 
participants were assured that no personal information will be attached nor disclosed to 
their responses, and that the data collected will be strictly for research purposes. To 
attract participants and encourage their involvement in the study, the study’s research 
results will be made available to interested participants, as suggested by Okoli and 
Pawlowski (2004).  
3.12 Summary 
This Chapter provided an overview of the research methodology as well as the 
specific research method that was used. Chapter three also explained the fuzzy set theory 
adopted for developing the ISC assessment methodology, including reasons supporting 
its selection, as well as the underlying assumptions. Benefits and advantages of a FST-
based methodology over traditional methodologies were also mentioned. Moreover, 
Chapter three presented the data collection method used and the rationale for its adoption.  
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     Chapter 4 
4. Results 
 
4. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the results of this dissertation. 
Specifically, a description of the data collection process is provided, followed by an 
explanation of the development of the FST-based artifact, including descriptions of the 
Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB editors and viewers used. Findings and results are 
also discussed, as well as detailed evaluations of the artifact developed against (1) 
traditional ISC assessment methodologies, and (2) the organization’s already 
implemented ISC, to determine whether the proposed hypotheses described in sub-
section “Research Questions and Hypotheses” have been supported. Lastly, a summary is 
presented to close the chapter. 
Data for this research were collected via a questionnaire sent through email (see 
Appendix A). As stated earlier, e-mails can speed up the questionnaires’ turnaround time 
and look more closely at phenomena of the moment, capturing responses and feedback 
from a specific moment in time. Given that the ISC and Security Areas included in the 
questionnaire were adopted from the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) Baseline Manual or Best 
Practice Framework, which is well known and a widely accepted model, the validity of 
the questionnaire was acceptable. Additionally, the content of the questionnaire was pre-
tested as well as edited, as necessary, by three subject matter experts for semantic and 
syntactic checking purposes, as suggested by Emory and Cooper (1991). The three 
experts have around 15-20 years of experience and have held Management positions 
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within global, also known as Big Four, accounting and audit firms. They have also 
provided numerous auditing and consulting services to small-to-medium size type 
organizations within the schools, universities, and non-profit industry, among others. The 
experts’ experience also includes working for private industries, as well as for 
information systems and technology audit departments.  
The questionnaire was emailed to the Information Security Manager (ISM) of a 
small-to-medium size organization within the industry of schools, universities, and not-
for-profits. The specific organization is a University located in Puerto Rico that offers 
associate, baccalaureate, masters, and doctoral degrees in arts, humanities, natural and 
social sciences, as well as in professional areas such as business, education, nursing, law, 
and medical technology. Currently, there are approximately 15,000 students attending. 
In regards to IT and related support activities, the organization’s approach is 
centralized. That is, the organization’s computer processing is performed by its IT 
Department, which is the sole provider of technology and telecommunications for the 
various departments. Furthermore, the IT Department provides data processing and end-
user support for the organization's systems and applications, including training and 
documentation of application system controls and procedures. The IT Department’s 
organizational structure consists of approximately 30 staff, under the direction of an IT 
Executive Director. For purposes of this dissertation, the organization specifically 
requested to remain anonymous and not make the results publicly available. The 
anonymous request just mentioned is consistent with various studies from the literature 
such as Bowman (2009), as well as Wang, Xu, Chan, and Chen (2002). In Bowman 
(2009), the microeconomic theory was applied to the problem of calculating the 
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economic value of volunteers to nonprofit organizations. Case study and survey analysis 
performed in an anonymous Australian organization supported the investigation. In 
another study, critical success factors of a web-based training system within an 
anonymous organization were raised and evaluated via survey analysis (Wang et al., 
2002). In a further study, both the perceived organizational support for safety and the 
perceived coworker support for safety were evaluated as predictors for employee safety 
voice, using survey analysis on urban bus drivers from a United Kingdom’s anonymous 
organization (Tucker, Chmiel, Turner, Hershcovis, & Stride, 2008). 
Upon receipt of the questionnaire and as planned, the ISM started by identifying the 
ISC already in place at the organization that protect financial-related applications (Step 
1). All other applications and/or information systems within the organization (e.g., 
applications, databases, operating systems, networks, etc.) in place for operational or non-
financial purposes were out of scope for purposes of this dissertation. In other words, the 
ISM only identified the ISC that were implemented to secure financial-related 
applications. The purpose of identifying the ISC already in place is to compare them with 
the ones generated by the newly-developed methodology and evaluate, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2, whether the new set of ISC enhances information security in the 
organization. The ISC were selected from an all-inclusive list of ISC from the ISO/IEC 
27002 best practice framework.  
Following identification of the ISC currently implemented, the ISM ranked, in order 
of relevance, the 11 information security areas found in the ISO/IEC 27002 best practice 
framework (Step 2). As instructed and for purposes of this dissertation, the ISM 
identified the first three ranked information security areas. These were: Access Control, 
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Compliance, and Human Resources Security. As mentioned earlier, a significant 
advantage of the FST-methodology built herein is that it can accept and, thus, evaluate 
unlimited information security areas (not only the three included in this dissertation).  
For each ISC within the three ranked information security areas, and in order to start 
the assessment process (Step 3), the ISM provided specific data related to literature-
supported criteria (i.e., EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risks). That is, for each ISC, the 
ISM entered data related to EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risks. For instance, for one 
ISC within the Access Control information security area, the ISM entered the following: 
 EIC - $16,000; 
 Number of systems/applications protected by ISC (Scope) - 2; 
 Extent to which the ISC complies with required, external laws and regulations 
(Compliance) - 20%; and  
 Extent to which the ISC addresses information security risks (Risks) - 15%. 
With the specific information provided by the ISM related to each ISC within the 
three ranked information security areas, the FST-based artifact was ready to be developed 
using the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB.  
4.1 Artifact Development  
According to the DSR Guidelines in Hevner et al.’s (2004), and correspondent 
Process Steps from Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2004) General Methodology of DSR, and 
consistent with Process Step 3: Development from Chapter three, the following explains 
how the FST-based artifact was developed. 
Hevner et al. (2004) state that the ultimate result of DSR is a purposeful IT artifact 
developed to provide a solution to a significant organizational problem. In the context of 
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this dissertation, the artifact built refers to a FST-based ISC assessment methodology. 
FST allows for prioritization of ISC within information security areas (identified by an 
organization as relevant) by fusing their respective assessment values into a single, 
quantified measure using the Mamdani Max-Min fuzzy reasoning technique. This 
provides organizations with a measurement of relevance for each ISC based strictly on 
organizations’ specific criteria (i.e., EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risks), including goals, 
objectives, and restrictions. The derived relevance measurement is used as the main 
metric for evaluating and ultimately selecting ISC. 
The artifact was built using the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB (“toolbox”). The 
toolbox is a tool for solving problems with fuzzy logic. The toolbox refers to a collection 
of functions built on the MATLAB computing environment that provides tools and 
technologies to create and modify fuzzy inference systems (FIS) within the framework of 
MATLAB. The toolbox provides several interactive tools that allow access to many of 
the functions through a graphical user interface (also known as “GUI”). These GUI-based 
tools set an environment for FIS design, analysis, and implementation. A significant 
advantage of the toolbox is that it links most of human reasoning and concept formation 
to fuzzy rules. That is, the toolbox amplifies the power of human reasoning through 
providing a systematic framework for computing with fuzzy rules. 
The toolbox comes with five GUI editors and viewers defined to build, edit, and view 
FIS. The FIS interprets the values in the input vector and, based on user-defined rules, 
assigns values to the output vector. Using the editors and viewers within the toolbox, a 
rules-set is built, membership functions are defined, and FIS behaviors get analyzed. 
Table 10 lists and describes the editors and viewers just mentioned.  
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Table 10. Description of Toolbox’s Editors and Viewers 
Editors and  
Viewers 
Description 
FIS Editor Displays general information about a FIS. It is within this editor that inputs are 
defined and named, as well as outputs. This editor also displays information 
such as the name of the FIS, type of fuzzy reasoning that is used (i.e., 
Mamdani), and defuzzification method (i.e., centroid), among other information. 
  
Membership Function 
Editor 
Allows for editing the various membership functions associated with the input 
and output variables of the FIS. It is within this editor that membership 
functions that describe input and output variables are either created or edited. 
  
Rule Editor Displays and allows for editing the various fuzzy rules using one of three 
formats: full English-like syntax (verbose), concise symbolic notation, or an 
indexed notation. It is within this editor that rule statements that define the 
behavior of the system (also known as if-then rules) get created and modified. 
  
Rule Viewer Displays detailed behavior of a FIS based on the specific rules defined; also, 
examines the effect and behavior of modifying input variables.  
  
Surface Viewer Generates a three-dimensional surface resulting from inputs in relation to the 
output. The dependency of one output on any two inputs or one input is 
represented by the output surface map. 
  
Figure 8 illustrates a summary of the Toolbox editors and viewers just described that 
were used to develop the artifact. Specifically, Figure 8 shows the FIS Editor (top center), 
Membership Function Editor (top left), Rule Editor (top right), Rule Viewer (bottom 
left), and Surface Viewer (bottom right). 
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 Figure 8. Toolbox Editors and Viewers 
 
Following are snapshots, descriptions, and explanations of the editors and viewers 
used specifically for building the Fuzzy-based artifact. 
4.1.1 FIS Editor  
 
For purposes of the FST-based artifact being created, there are four fuzzy input 
variables defined (also known as linguistic terms), each constituting a specific, literature-
supported evaluation criteria (i.e., Estimated Implementation Costs (EIC), Scope, 
Compliance, and Risks). Refer to Figure 9. Estimated Implementation Costs for purposes 
of this assessment consider capital or operating expenditures on hardware, software, and 
personnel (Gordon & Loeb, 2006). Estimated Implementation Costs represent a critical   
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Figure 9. FIS Editor 
 
factor that must be closely evaluated and monitored by management before selecting and 
implementing ISC (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). Ou Yang et al. (2011) support this claim by 
stating that “managers should consider the related costs and resources when they 
implement the controls…” (p. 18). Significant implementation costs will likely preclude 
the selection of ISC. The second evaluation factor, Scope, assesses the impact of the ISC 
on the organization. ISC that provide security of information in multiple systems and/or 
applications rather than on a minimal number of systems and/or applications will have a 
higher priority of selection (Otero et al., 2012a; Ejnioui et al., 2012; Otero et al., 2010). 
The third factor to evaluate when determining selection of ISC is Compliance with rules, 
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laws, regulations, policies and procedures, etc. According to the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005), 
ISC assist organizations in complying with legal, statutory, regulatory, and contractual 
requirements, as well as with organizations’ established policies, principles, standards, 
and/or objectives (collectively referred to as “policies”). Compliance, as defined by 
Saint-Germain (2005), includes ensuring “that all laws and regulations are respected and 
that existing policies comply with the security policy in order to ensure that the objectives 
laid out by senior management are met” (p. 62). Saint-Germain (2005) also states that the 
lack of security compliance, perhaps by selecting and implementing the wrong set of ISC, 
can translate into business losses and, even worst, severe civil and criminal penalties, 
which can include fines and prison sentences. The higher the policies the ISC complies 
with, the higher its chances for selection. The last evaluation factor for purposes of this 
dissertation involves the number of Risks that are addressed from implementing ISC. Per 
NIST SP 800-30, risks are mitigated and/or reduced to acceptable levels through 
implementing the necessary controls (i.e., ISC). The higher the number of risks the ISC 
addresses, mitigates, or reduces; the higher its possibility for selection (Gerber & von 
Solms, 2008). The output variable used and evaluated within this dissertation was named 
ISC_Selected.   
4.1.2 Membership Function Editor 
 
Membership functions were created for each particular input considering the literature 
reviewed as well as input from field experts. When evaluating EIC, for instance, the 
fuzzy sets or alternatives for evaluation defined within this dissertation (i.e., low, 
average, and high) determine the degrees of membership for the crisp or actual data 
values obtained. The fuzzy set definitions of low, average, and high used were supported 
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Figure 10. Membership Function Editor for EIC 
 
by and validated with decision-makers within the organization. The fuzzy set for Average 
is depicted in a common triangular shape form in Figure 10 (values are expressed in 
thousands of dollars). As illustrated in Figure 10, the average estimated implementation 
cost for an ISC is defined in the range of $15,000 and $35,000. Additionally, a cost of 
$25,000 fully belongs to the fuzzy set; therefore, the degree of membership, or fuzzified 
input, is 1.0. EIC’s of $20,000 and $30,000 have 0.5 degrees of membership to the fuzzy 
set, while EIC’s less than $15,000 and greater than $35,000 are not part of the fuzzy set. 
Table 11 illustrates the inputs and output that have been defined as relevant for the 
FST-based artifact along with their corresponding ranges and membership functions.  
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As stated earlier, the input and output variables defined (also known as linguistic 
terms), constitute a specific, literature-supported evaluation criteria (refer to Figure 9). 
The range values utilized on each of the fuzzy sets resulted from phone calls and 
meetings held with decision-makers within the organization, particularly with the ISM. 
The range values used, according to Management, are considered standard when 
evaluating information security-related controls and procedures for potential 
implementation, as well as represent current practices within the industry. A similar 
approach was followed to support and validate the fuzzy set definitions (e.g., low, 
average, and high, etc.) specific to the inputs and output used in this dissertation.  
Table 11. FST-based FIS Inputs and Output  
Inputs Output 
Estimated Implementation Cost (EIC) 
Range: $0 - $50,000 
Membership Functions: 3 
   Low 
   Average 
   High 
ISC Selected 
Range: 0 - 10  
Membership Functions: 2 
   No  
   Yes 
  
Scope 
Range: 0 - 5  
Membership Functions: 3 
   Low 
   Medium 
   High 
 
  
Compliance 
Range: 0 - 100%  
Membership Functions: 2 
   Not-Comply 
   Comply 
 
  
Risk 
Range: 0 - 100%  
Membership Functions: 2 
   No  
   Yes 
 
  
Table 12 shows the membership function values for input EIC, while Figure 11 shows 
the graph of all membership functions within input EIC. 
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Table 12. Membership Functions of the EIC Input (values are expressed in thousands of 
dollars) 
Fuzzy Set Membership Function Values 
Low 
Average 
High 
Trapezoidal 
Triangular 
Trapezoidal 
0, 0, 7.5, 15 
15, 25, 35 
30, 40, 50, 50 
   
 
 
Figure 11. Graph of Membership Functions within the EIC Input 
 
Table 13 shows the membership function values for input Scope, while Figure 12 
shows the graph of all membership functions within input Scope. 
Table 13. Membership Functions of the Scope Input  
Fuzzy Set Membership Function Values 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Trapezoidal 
Trapezoidal 
Trapezoidal 
0, 0, 1, 2 
1, 2, 3, 4 
2, 4, 5, 5 
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Figure 12. Graph of Membership Functions within the Scope Input 
 
Table 14 shows the membership function values for input Compliance, while Figure 
13 shows the graph of all membership functions within input Compliance. 
Table 14. Membership Functions of the Compliance Input  
Fuzzy Set Membership Function Values 
Not-Comply Trapezoidal 0, 0, 60, 90 
Comply Trapezoidal 85, 90, 100, 100 
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Figure 13. Graph of Membership Functions within the Compliance Input 
 
Table 15 shows the membership function values for input Risk, while Figure 14 
shows the graph of all membership functions within input Risk. 
Table 15. Membership Functions of the Risk Input  
Fuzzy Set Membership Function Values 
No Trapezoidal 0, 0, 50, 80 
Yes Trapezoidal 75, 85, 100, 100 
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Figure 14. Graph of Membership Functions within the Risk Input 
Table 16 shows the membership function values for output ISC Selected, while 
Figure 15 shows the graph of all membership functions within output ISC Selected. 
Table 16. Membership Functions of the ISC_Selected Output  
Fuzzy Set Membership Function Values 
No Trapezoidal 0, 0, 6, 8 
Yes Trapezoidal 8, 9, 10, 10 
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Figure 15. Graph of Membership Functions within the ISC_Selected Output 
4.1.3 Rule Editor  
 
 
Figure 16. Rule Editor 
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Within the rule editor (see Figure 16), fuzzy rules were created considering all 
possible relevant scenarios. It is within the rule editor that fuzzified inputs (degrees of 
membership) are processed from the original crisp values obtained according to human-
based conditional statements or fuzzy “If-then” rules.  
As stated earlier, the logical “If-then” rule syntax was followed to formulate the 
conditional statements that encompass the fuzzy logic system. The first part of a rule (i.e., 
the “If” part) refers to the antecedent or the input within the rule. The input portion of a 
fuzzy rule is also the membership function of an element in a fuzzy set. The second part 
of the rule, called the “then” part, is known as the consequent or the system output 
associated to the fuzzy set. The combination of all inputs equals the possible number of 
rules. For the FST-based methodology, there are 36 fuzzy rules that have been defined.  
The rule building process just described was created based on the academic literature 
reviewed, as well as discussions with subject matter experts. Experts were asked to assist 
in the creation and validation of every single fuzzy rule given their relevant knowledge 
combined with prior significant experience. Table 17 shows the input combination that 
results (or not) in the selection of an ISC according to the experts. For instance, the first 
rule below is to be read as follows: 
IF EIC is High AND Scope is Low AND Compliance is Comply AND Risk is Yes 
THEN ISC_Selected is Selected.  
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Table 17. Rules to determine ISC Selection 
 EIC Scope Compliance Risk ISC_Selected 
1 High Low Comply Yes Selected 
2 High Medium Not Comply Yes Selected 
3 High Medium Comply Yes Selected 
4 High High Comply No Selected 
5 High High Not Comply Yes Selected 
6 High High Comply Yes Selected 
7 Average Low Comply Yes Selected 
8 Average Medium Comply No Selected 
9 Average Medium Not Comply Yes Selected 
10 Average Medium Comply Yes Selected 
11 Average High Comply No Selected 
12 Average High Not Comply Yes Selected 
13 Average High Comply Yes Selected 
14 Low Low Comply No Selected 
15 Low Low Comply Yes Selected 
16 Low Medium Comply No Selected 
17 Low Medium Not Comply Yes Selected 
18 Low Medium Comply Yes Selected 
19 Low High Comply No Selected 
20 Low High Not Comply Yes Selected 
21 Low High Comply Yes Selected 
22 High Low Not Comply No Not Selected 
23 High Low Comply No Not Selected 
24 High Low Not Comply Yes Not Selected 
25 High Medium Not Comply No Not Selected 
26 High Medium Comply No Not Selected 
27 High High Not Comply No Not Selected 
28 Average Low Not Comply No Not Selected 
29 Average Low Comply No Not Selected 
30 Average Low Not Comply Yes Not Selected 
31 Average Medium Not Comply No Not Selected 
32 Average High Not Comply No Not Selected 
33 Low Low Not Comply No Not Selected 
34 Low Low Not Comply Yes Not Selected 
35 Low Medium Not Comply No Not Selected 
36 Low High Not Comply No Not Selected 
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4.1.4 Rule Viewer  
 
 
Figure 17. Rule Viewer 
The rule viewer in Figure 17 displays the fuzzy rules that get triggered based on the 
input, and how the different membership functions affect the output. The output fuzzy set 
is obtained through finding one single crisp value that summarizes the fuzzy set. This is 
performed by taking the center of gravity and calculating the area of a combination of 
fuzzy sets. As stated in the Defuzzification section in Chapter three, the centroid 
approach (shown in equations 5 and 6) is employed to determine crisp values of the fuzzy 
output, as it is reliable and accurate when approximating the center of gravity (Genske & 
Heinrich, 2009). In the rule viewer, the number of rows is consistent with the number of 
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fuzzy rules defined (i.e., 36 in this case). Similarly, the columns displayed by the rule 
viewer refer to the defined membership functions for each input and output variable. 
4.1.5 Surface Viewer 
 
 
Figure 18. Surface Viewer  
The purpose of the Surface Viewer is to generate and plot the entire output surface 
map for the system based on any two inputs and any one output in order to see a three-
dimensional curve that represents the mapping from the inputs. Figure 18 illustrates the 
surface resulting from two input variables (Scope and EIC) in relation to the output 
variable (ISC_Selected). The Scope and EIC inputs were selected for demonstration 
purposes since, as stated, any two inputs can be selected. In this particular case, the 
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dependency of the output ISC_Selected in relation to the two inputs Scope and EIC is 
well represented by the output surface map.  
Having developed the artifact, the next steps were to execute fuzzy logic over the 
actual data collected to prioritize ISC within the higher-ranked information security areas, 
as well as perform the required evaluations on the artifact.  
4.2 Results 
As stated earlier, the ISM ranked, in order of relevance, the 11 information security 
areas found in the ISO/IEC 27002. As instructed and for purposes of this dissertation, the 
ISM evaluated only the first three ranked information security areas. These were (in 
sequential order): Access Control, Compliance, and Human Resources Security. A 
significant advantage of the FST-methodology built herein, as stated before, is that it can 
accept and, thus, evaluate unlimited information security areas (not only three as included 
in this dissertation). For each ISC within the three information security areas identified as 
relevant, the ISM provided specific data related to literature-supported criteria (i.e., EIC, 
Scope, Compliance, and Risks).  
The conclusions from fuzzy sets executed by the Toolbox were converted into real 
numbers, or single crisp values (i.e., Scores) through defuzzification. Defuzzification 
converts a fuzzy quantity to a precise quantity, represented by the logical union of two or 
more fuzzy membership functions defined on the universe of discourse of the output 
variable. In other words, defuzzification finds the one single crisp value that summarizes 
the fuzzy set. The defuzzification method used within this investigation, as discussed in 
Chapter three, was the center of gravity or centroid approach. The centroid approach 
81 
 
 
 
determines crisp values of the fuzzy output, and it is reliable and accurate when 
approximating the center of gravity.  
Table 18 shows defuzzification, or the one single crisp value (Score) that summarizes 
the fuzzy set of logical inference results (or output fuzzy sets) for each ISC of the Access 
Control area after the FST-based methodology was executed. 
Table 18. Access Control 
# ISC Description Score 
1 An access control policy should be established, documented, and reviewed based on business 
and security requirements for access. 
9.18 
2 There should be a formal user registration and de-registration procedure in place for granting 
and revoking access to all information systems and services. 
3.81 
3 The allocation and use of privileges should be restricted and controlled. 9.25 
4 The allocation of passwords should be controlled through a formal management process. 8.59 
5 Management should review users’ access rights at regular intervals using a formal process. 9.14 
6 Users should be required to follow good security practices in the selection and use of 
passwords. 
9.14 
7 Users should ensure that unattended equipment has appropriate protection. 3.50 
8 A clear desk policy for papers and removable storage media and a clear screen policy for 
information processing facilities should be adopted. 
3.50 
9 Users should only be provided with access to the services that they have been specifically 
authorized to use. 
9.11 
10 Appropriate authentication methods should be used to control access by remote users. 9.25 
11 Automatic equipment identification should be considered as a means to authenticate 
connections from specific locations and equipment. 
3.50 
12 Physical and logical access to diagnostic and configuration ports should be controlled. 8.53 
13 Groups of information services, users, and systems should be segregated on networks. 3.50 
14 For shared networks, especially those extending across the organization’s boundaries, the 
capability of users to connect to the network should be restricted, in line with the access 
control policy and requirements of the business applications. 
3.81 
15 Routing controls should be implemented for networks to ensure that computer connections 
and information flows do not breach the access control policy of the business applications. 
3.81 
16 Access to operating systems should be controlled by a secure log-on procedure. 9.25 
17 All users should have a unique identifier (user ID) for their personal use only, and a suitable 
authentication technique should be chosen to substantiate the claimed identity of a user. 
9.14 
18 Systems for managing passwords should be interactive and should ensure quality passwords. 8.67 
19 The use of utility programs that might be capable of overriding system and application 
controls should be restricted and tightly controlled. 
9.14 
20 Inactive sessions should shut down after a defined period of inactivity. 9.25 
21 Restrictions on connection times should be used to provide security for high-risk applications. 8.77 
22 Access to information and application system functions by users and support personnel 
should be restricted in accordance with the defined access control policy. 
9.07 
23 Sensitive systems should have a dedicated (isolated) computing environment. 3.93 
24 A formal policy should be in place, and appropriate security measures should be adopted to 
protect against the risks of using mobile computing and communication facilities. 
3.53 
25 A policy, operational plans, and procedures should be developed and implemented for 
teleworking activities. 
3.78 
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Table 19 shows defuzzification for each ISC within the second relevant information 
security area, Compliance, after the FST-based methodology was executed. 
Table 19. Compliance 
# ISC Description Score 
1 All relevant statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements and the organization’s 
approach to meet these requirements should be explicitly defined, documented, and kept up to 
date for each information system and the organization. 
9.14 
2 Appropriate procedures should be implemented to ensure compliance with legislative, 
regulatory, and contractual requirements on the use of material in respect of which there may 
be intellectual property rights and on the use of proprietary software products. 
8.59 
3 Important records should be protected from loss, destruction, and falsification, in accordance 
with statutory, regulatory, contractual, and business requirements. 
8.53 
4 Data protection and privacy should be ensured as required in relevant legislation, regulations, 
and, if applicable, contractual clauses. 
7.21 
5 Users should be deterred from using information processing facilities for unauthorized 
purposes. 
7.59 
6 Cryptographic controls should be used in compliance with all relevant agreements, laws, and 
regulations. 
3.83 
7 Managers should ensure that all security procedures within their area of responsibility are 
carried out correctly to achieve compliance with security policies and standards. 
8.59 
8 Information systems should be regularly checked for compliance with security 
implementation standards. 
9.11 
9 Audit requirements and activities involving checks on operational systems should be 
carefully planned and agreed to minimize the risk of disruptions to business processes. 
9.25 
10 Access to information systems audit tools should be protected to prevent any possible misuse 
or compromise. 
9.12 
 
Defuzzification results for the last relevant information security area, Human 
Resources Security, are shown in Table 20, after the FST-based methodology was 
executed.  
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Table 20. Human Resources Security 
# ISC Description Score 
1 Security roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third party users should be 
defined and documented in accordance with the organization’s information security policy. 
9.05 
2 Background verification checks on all candidates for employment, contractors, and third party 
users should be carried out in accordance with relevant laws, regulations and ethics, and 
proportional to the business requirements, the classification of the information to be accessed, 
and the perceived risks. 
3.54 
3 As part of their contractual obligation, employees, contractors and third party users should 
agree and sign the terms and conditions of their employment contract, which should state their 
and the organization’s responsibilities for information security. 
3.53 
4 Management should require employees, contractors and third party users to apply security in 
accordance with established policies and procedures of the organization. 
5.33 
5 All employees of the organization and, where relevant, contractors and third party users should 
receive appropriate awareness training and regular updates in organizational policies and 
procedures, as relevant for their job function. 
8.59 
6 There should be a formal disciplinary process for employees who have committed a security 
breach. 
3.81 
7 Responsibilities for performing employment termination or change of employment should be 
clearly defined and assigned. 
9.24 
8 All employees, contractors and third party users should return all of the organization’s assets in 
their possession upon termination of their employment, contract or agreement. 
3.50 
9 The access rights of all employees, contractors and third party users to information and 
information processing facilities should be removed upon termination of their employment, 
contract or agreement, or adjusted upon change. 
9.10 
 
Only ISC with scores of nine and higher are to be selected consistent with 
membership functions defined for the ISC_Selected fuzzy output variable in Table 16 and 
Figure 15. As a result, Tables 21, 22, and 23 show the ISC that should be selected, within 
each information security area, according to the FST-based methodology and 
membership functions defined. 
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Table 21. Access Control - ISC to be Selected 
# ISC Description Score 
1 An access control policy should be established, documented, and reviewed based on business 
and security requirements for access. 
9.18 
3 The allocation and use of privileges should be restricted and controlled. 9.25 
5 Management should review users’ access rights at regular intervals using a formal process. 9.14 
6 Users should be required to follow good security practices in the selection and use of 
passwords. 
9.14 
9 Users should only be provided with access to the services that they have been specifically 
authorized to use. 
9.11 
10 Appropriate authentication methods should be used to control access by remote users. 9.25 
16 Access to operating systems should be controlled by a secure log-on procedure. 9.25 
17 All users should have a unique identifier (user ID) for their personal use only, and a suitable 
authentication technique should be chosen to substantiate the claimed identity of a user. 
9.14 
19 The use of utility programs that might be capable of overriding system and application 
controls should be restricted and tightly controlled. 
9.14 
20 Inactive sessions should shut down after a defined period of inactivity. 9.25 
22 Access to information and application system functions by users and support personnel 
should be restricted in accordance with the defined access control policy. 
9.07 
   
Table 22. Compliance - ISC to be Selected 
# ISC Description Score 
1 All relevant statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements and the organization’s 
approach to meet these requirements should be explicitly defined, documented, and kept up to 
date for each information system and the organization. 
9.14 
8 Information systems should be regularly checked for compliance with security 
implementation standards. 
9.11 
9 Audit requirements and activities involving checks on operational systems should be 
carefully planned and agreed to minimize the risk of disruptions to business processes. 
9.25 
10 Access to information systems audit tools should be protected to prevent any possible misuse 
or compromise. 
9.12 
 
Table 23. Human Resources Security - ISC to be Selected 
# ISC Description Score 
1 Security roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third party users should be 
defined and documented in accordance with the organization’s information security policy. 
9.05 
7 Responsibilities for performing employment termination or change of employment should be 
clearly defined and assigned. 
9.24 
9 The access rights of all employees, contractors and third party users to information and 
information processing facilities should be removed upon termination of their employment, 
contract or agreement, or adjusted upon change. 
9.10 
 
 
Tables 24, 25, and 26 display the ISC already implemented at the organization 
(before running the FST-based methodology) for each relevant information security area, 
as well as those identified for selection by the new FST artifact. Differences are noted 
between the two. This comparison is discussed and evaluated in detail in the next sub-
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section to base the determination of whether information security in the organization is 
enhanced as a result of the new selection and evaluation of ISC (RQ2, H2). 
Table 24. Access Control - Differences between ISC Already Implemented  
and ISC Selected per FST 
# ISC Description 
Already 
Implemented 
Selected 
by FST 
Difference 
Noted 
1 An access control policy should be established, 
documented, and reviewed based on business and 
security requirements for access. 
Yes Yes - 
2 There should be a formal user registration and de-
registration procedure in place for granting and revoking 
access to all information systems and services. 
Yes No X 
3 The allocation and use of privileges should be restricted 
and controlled. 
No Yes X 
4 The allocation of passwords should be controlled 
through a formal management process. 
Yes No X 
5 Management should review users’ access rights at 
regular intervals using a formal process. 
No Yes X 
6 Users should be required to follow good security 
practices in the selection and use of passwords. 
Yes Yes - 
7 Users should ensure that unattended equipment has 
appropriate protection. 
No No - 
8 A clear desk policy for papers and removable storage 
media and a clear screen policy for information 
processing facilities should be adopted. 
Yes No X 
9 Users should only be provided with access to the 
services that they have been specifically authorized to 
use. 
Yes Yes - 
10 Appropriate authentication methods should be used to 
control access by remote users. 
Yes Yes - 
11 Automatic equipment identification should be 
considered as a means to authenticate connections from 
specific locations and equipment. 
No No - 
12 Physical and logical access to diagnostic and 
configuration ports should be controlled. 
No No - 
13 Groups of information services, users, and information 
systems should be segregated on networks. 
Yes No X 
14 For shared networks, especially those extending across 
the organization’s boundaries, the capability of users to 
connect to the network should be restricted, in line with 
the access control policy and requirements of the 
business applications. 
Yes No X 
15 Routing controls should be implemented for networks to 
ensure that computer connections and information flows 
do not breach the access control policy of the business 
applications. 
No No - 
16 Access to operating systems should be controlled by a 
secure log-on procedure. 
No Yes X 
17 All users should have a unique identifier (user ID) for 
their personal use only, and a suitable authentication 
technique should be chosen to substantiate the claimed 
identity of a user. 
Yes Yes - 
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# ISC Description 
Already 
Implemented 
Selected 
by FST 
Difference 
Noted 
18 Systems for managing passwords should be interactive 
and should ensure quality passwords. 
Yes No X 
19 The use of utility programs that might be capable of 
overriding system and application controls should be 
restricted and tightly controlled. 
No Yes X 
20 Inactive sessions should shut down after a defined period 
of inactivity. 
No Yes X 
21 Restrictions on connection times should be used to 
provide additional security for high-risk applications. 
No No - 
22 Access to information and application system functions 
by users and support personnel should be restricted in 
accordance with the defined access control policy. 
Yes Yes - 
23 Sensitive systems should have a dedicated (isolated) 
computing environment. 
No No - 
24 A formal policy should be in place, and appropriate 
security measures should be adopted to protect against 
the risks of using mobile computing and communication 
facilities. 
No No - 
25 A policy, operational plans and procedures should be 
developed and implemented for teleworking activities. 
No No - 
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Table 25. Compliance - Differences between ISC Already Implemented  
and ISC Selected per FST 
# ISC Description 
Already 
Implemented 
Selected 
by FST 
Difference 
Noted 
1 All relevant statutory, regulatory, and contractual 
requirements and the organization’s approach to meet 
these requirements should be explicitly defined, 
documented, and kept up to date for each information 
system and the organization. 
No Yes X 
2 Appropriate procedures should be implemented to 
ensure compliance with legislative, regulatory, and 
contractual requirements on the use of material in 
respect of which there may be intellectual property 
rights and on the use of proprietary software products. 
Yes No X 
3 Important records should be protected from loss, 
destruction, and falsification, in accordance with 
statutory, regulatory, contractual, and business 
requirements. 
No No - 
4 Data protection and privacy should be ensured as 
required in relevant legislation, regulations, and, if 
applicable, contractual clauses. 
Yes No X 
5 Users should be deterred from using information 
processing facilities for unauthorized purposes. 
No No - 
6 Cryptographic controls should be used in compliance 
with all relevant agreements, laws, and regulations. 
Yes No X 
7 Managers should ensure that all security procedures 
within their area of responsibility are carried out 
correctly to achieve compliance with security policies 
and standards. 
Yes No X 
8 Information systems should be regularly checked for 
compliance with security implementation standards. 
No Yes X 
9 Audit requirements and activities involving checks on 
operational systems should be carefully planned and 
agreed to minimize the risk of disruptions to business 
processes. 
No Yes X 
10 Access to information systems audit tools should be 
protected to prevent any possible misuse or 
compromise. 
Yes Yes - 
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Table 26. Human Resources Security - Differences between ISC Already Implemented 
and ISC Selected per FST 
# ISC Description 
Already 
Implemented 
Selected 
by FST 
Difference 
Noted 
1 Security roles and responsibilities of employees, 
contractors and third party users should be defined and 
documented in accordance with the organization’s 
information security policy.  
Yes Yes - 
2 Background verification checks on all candidates for 
employment, contractors, and third party users should be 
carried out in accordance with relevant laws, regulations 
and ethics, and proportional to the business requirements, 
the classification of the information to be accessed, and 
the perceived risks. 
No No - 
3 As part of their contractual obligation, employees, 
contractors and third party users should agree and sign the 
terms and conditions of their employment contract, which 
should state their and the organization’s responsibilities 
for information security. 
Yes No X 
4 Management should require employees, contractors and 
third party users to apply security in accordance with 
established policies and procedures of the organization. 
Yes No X 
5 All employees of the organization and, where relevant, 
contractors and third party users should receive 
appropriate awareness training and regular updates in 
organizational policies and procedures, as relevant for 
their job function. 
Yes No X 
6 There should be a formal disciplinary process for 
employees who have committed a security breach. 
Yes No X 
7 Responsibilities for performing employment termination 
or change of employment should be clearly defined and 
assigned. 
No Yes X 
8 All employees, contractors and third party users should 
return all of the organization’s assets in their possession 
upon termination of their employment, contract or 
agreement. 
Yes No X 
9 The access rights of all employees, contractors and third 
party users to information and information processing 
facilities should be removed upon termination of their 
employment, contract or agreement, or adjusted upon 
change. 
Yes Yes - 
     
Next, evaluation of the artifact is performed. The evaluation is performed in two 
parts. First, the newly-created artifact is evaluated against other traditional ISC 
assessment methodologies to determine whether the weaknesses identified in existing and 
traditional ISC assessment methodologies (refer to Chapter two) have been addressed. 
Second, the new set of ISC generated from the artifact are assessed by a group of experts 
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against the organization’s already-implemented ISC in order to determine whether such 
new set improves or not the current ISC selection process, as well as whether the overall 
information security in the organization is enhanced. 
4.3 Evaluation of Artifact Against Traditional ISC assessment Methodologies 
Following Hevner et al.’s (2004) DSR Guidelines and correspondent Process Steps 
from Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2004) General Methodology of DSR, and consistent 
with Process Step 4: Evaluation, procedures were performed against existing and 
traditional ISC assessment methodologies. To evaluate the artifact and determine whether 
the ISC assessment methodology created using FST addressed the weaknesses identified 
in the literature for traditional assessment methodologies (RQ1), Hevner et al.’s (2004) 
suggest five design evaluation methods that include Observational (case studies, field 
studies); Analytical (static analysis, architectural analysis, optimization, dynamic 
analysis); Experimental (controlled experiments, simulations); Testing (functional, 
structural); and Descriptive (informed arguments, scenarios). 
As stated earlier, evaluating the FST-based assessment methodology through 
performing comparisons and contrasts against existing ISC assessment methodologies 
found in the literature refer to the “Descriptive Design Evaluation Method” (Hevner et 
al., 2004). The Descriptive Design Evaluation Method prompts for comparisons between 
other existing ISC assessment methodologies, and assist in determining whether the 
artifact does enhance existing ISC assessment methodologies, satisfying the original 
requirements set in the research problem. The Descriptive Design Evaluation Method is 
also critical in evaluating and comparing the artifact’s suitability and effectiveness 
against information from the knowledge base (i.e., existing ISC assessment 
90 
 
 
 
methodologies found in the literature) in order to build convincing arguments and/or 
scenarios and demonstrate the artifact’s utility.  
To properly evaluate the FST-based artifact developed herein, reference is made to 
Table 3, which lists the weaknesses identified in the academic literature on existing and 
traditional ISC assessment methodologies that preclude the effective assessment and, 
therefore, implementation of ISC in organizations over their information. The weaknesses 
referred to: 
- involving high levels of subjectivity and ambiguity (van der Haar & von Solms, 
2003); 
- not adequately accounting for organizations’ restrictions and constraints (van der 
Haar & von Solms, 2003);  
- not preventing unnecessary ISC selections (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Barnard  
& von Solms, 2000);  
- not eliminating ad-hoc or random selections of ISC (Barnard  & von Solms, 2000; 
Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Saint-Germain, 2005; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; 
Siougle & Zorkadis, 2002; Baskerville, 1993; Otero et al., 2010; van der Haar & 
von Solms, 2003; Ou Yang et al., 2011; Lv et al., 2011; Gerber & von Solms, 
2008); and  
- not considering all-inclusive, best practice scenarios when evaluating ISC (Ou 
Yang et al., 2011). 
The weaknesses identified above not only affect the ISC selection process, but also 
impact the overall protection of the information’s confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability (Saint-Germain, 2005). In other words, the lack of adequate information 
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security over valuable, sensitive, or critical financial information may allow for (1) fraud, 
manipulation, and/or misuse of data; (2) security-related deficiencies and findings; (3) 
bogus trades to inflate profits or hide losses; (4) false accounting journal entries; (5) 
computer security breaches; and (6) false transactions to evade regulators; among others. 
Refer to Figure 3. 
Moreover, failure of paying adequate attention to address the weaknesses and/or 
inadequacies mentioned may allow opportunities for information security breaches which 
can negatively impact organizations, including their IT environments. 
As illustrated in Table 3, as well as evidenced and discussed in Chapter four’s 
Artifact Development, the FST-based ISC assessment methodology does address the 
weaknesses identified in traditional ISC evaluation processes specifically by: 
(a) employing a less-subjective, ISC assessment approach. Even though the criteria 
input values (i.e., EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risk) provided by the ISM 
reflects his opinion according to the organization’s goals and objectives, those 
input values did not by themselves guide the ultimate decision for determining 
whether ISC should or should not be selected. In other words, the initial criteria 
input values provided by the ISM for each ISC, as specifically designed, were 
processed into the FST-based artifact, which contrary to traditional methods, 
involves a strict mathematical methodology, allowing for more precise and 
accurate ISC evaluation scores. As a result, bias and personal influences for 
determining ISC selection at the organization were significantly minimized by the 
FST-based artifact developed, as proposed.  
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(b) considering organizations’ restrictions and constraints. The FST-based 
methodology developed herein allows any organization to adequately address 
their specific restrictions, constraints, goals, and/or objectives when determining 
which ISC to implement. In this particular case and in order to consider the 
organization’s specific scenario and environment, the ISM provided input values 
for criteria considered relevant in the selection of ISC not only in the academic 
literature, but to the organization evaluated in this dissertation. The criteria 
evaluated herein referred to estimated implementation costs, scope, compliance 
with laws and regulations, and addressing the organization’s risks, all four 
representing accepted evaluation criteria for ISC assessments based on the 
literature. By addressing specific restrictions and constraints (based on the above 
criteria), the FST artifact precisely evaluated and prioritized ISC for the 
organization.  
(c) preventing or eliminating unnecessary and/or random selection of ISC. Contrary 
to many existing ISC methodologies, the FST-based assessment artifact created 
did not leave the identification and selection of ISC to the users. Precise 
evaluation scores per ISC resulted from strict mathematical calculations 
performed by FST. The use of the FST-based method developed prevented ISC to 
be selected (many times at random) by organization users which typically results 
in the potential inclusion of unnecessary ISC and/or exclusion of required ones. 
The FST-based methodology prevented unnecessary and random ISC selections, 
resulting in a crucial help to the organization to select only the most effective ISC 
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to mitigate information security risks, ultimately enhancing its overall information 
security. 
(d) contemplating all-inclusive ISC scenarios. As evidenced, the FST-based 
methodology addressed this existing limitation by considering all available ISC 
for evaluation and potential inclusion. These ISC were obtained from the ISO/IEC 
27002 standard best practice framework, which contains an all-inclusive list of 
ISC that can potentially be selected and implemented. Having identified relevant 
information security areas for the organization (Access Control, Compliance, and 
Human Resources Security), ISC within these areas were included for the ISM to 
evaluate by providing specific criteria information. The methodology then 
incorporated all ISC on its calculation and ultimate selection determination.  
The FST-based ISC assessment methodology clearly enhanced current evaluation 
processes for ISC in the organization by (a) employing a less-subjective, accuracy-based 
method; (b) considering all possible organization’s restrictions and constraints; (c) 
eliminating or preventing the random and unnecessary selection of ISC; and by (d) 
contemplating all-inclusive ISC scenarios. The FST-based assessment methodology 
adequately modeled imprecise parameters (i.e., criteria for determining ISC relevance), 
and addressed the weaknesses identified in existing methodologies, thereby addressing 
and supporting RQ1 and H1, respectively, both defined under section “Research 
Questions and Hypotheses”.  
Next, the new set of ISC generated from the artifact are assessed by a group of 
subject matter experts against the organization’s already-implemented ISC in order to 
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determine to what extent does an ISC assessment methodology developed with FST 
enhance information security in the organization (RQ2). 
4.4 Evaluation of Artifact’s Results Against the Organization’s Already 
Implemented ISC 
A second and final evaluation consisted of determining to what extent the new ISC 
assessment methodology enhances information security in the organization (RQ2, H2). In 
order to respond to the above, subject matter experts were contacted and engaged to 
provide an evaluation focusing on: 
- the ISC that were already implemented but identified by the FST artifact as not to be 
implemented; as well as 
- ISC that were not already implemented, but identified by the FST artifact as needed 
to be implemented.  
These differences noted are illustrated in Tables 24, 25, and 26.  
The use of a panel of experts is very common and suitable for this type of evaluation 
and validation (Huang, Hung, Yen, Chang, & Jiang, 2011; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; 
Emory & Cooper, 1991). The criteria used for selecting the experts required a significant 
interest in the information security domain. There were three experts, each with 15-20 
years of experience holding Management positions for global, also known as Big Four, 
accounting and audit firms. They also had significant auditing and consulting services on 
small-to-medium size type organizations within several industries, including the schools, 
universities, and non-profit industry, relevant for this dissertation. The experts’ 
experience further included working for private industries, as well as for information 
systems and technology audit departments. All experts have performed work in Puerto 
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Rico as well as in the United States. The experts agreed to assist in the evaluation of the 
new set of ISC (via interview meetings and/or calls), resulting from the FST-based 
assessment methodology. Involvement of experts with the required knowledge, 
competency, and proficiency added significant value to this dissertation when 
interpreting and validating the results. 
Before assessing the FST artifact, the experts were provided relevant information 
about the organization, as well as the expectations from their evaluation and validation 
tasks.  
Table 24 shows the ISC for the Access Control information security area where 
differences were identified after running the FST assessment methodology. For instance, 
ISC 2, already implemented at the organization, should not be according to the FST 
methodology, while ISC 3 was not in place by the organization, but should now be. 
Tables 25 and 26 also show the ISC for the Compliance and Human Resource Security 
areas, respectively, where similar differences were identified after running the FST 
assessment methodology.  
Experts were asked to compare the resulting set of ISC from the FST methodology 
against the ISC already implemented by the organization in order to determine whether 
the new set of ISC results in an enhancement to the information security of the 
organization. Specifically, the experts were provided copies of the results shown in 
Tables 24, 25, and 26, listing both, the ISC that were already implemented but identified 
by the FST artifact as not to be implemented; as well as the ISC that were not already 
implemented, but identified by the FST artifact as needed to be implemented (refer to 
“Difference Noted” column within Tables 24, 25, and 26). The experts were requested to 
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determine if additional information security risks within the three areas (Access Control, 
Compliance, and Human Resources Security) were addressed by the new set of ISC. Or, 
vice versa, whether information security risks were now not covered with the new set of 
ISC. The evaluation exercise prompted the experts to ultimately determine if the new set 
of ISC enhanced the information security of the organization.  
Overall and based on numerous evaluation interviews and phone calls (captured and 
summarized in Appendix B), the experts were pleased with the new methodology and 
believed that the evaluation model could be useful for ISC assessment in practice, 
particularly, to: 
- assist Management in planning its evaluation of ISC by referencing rigorous 
baseline manuals or best practice framework such as the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005); 
-  identify which ISC are of higher priority in relation to a specific, organizational-
oriented assessment criteria; and 
- communicate with other departments within the organization. 
In a more detailed level (i.e., per information security area), the experts’ main points 
as a result of their evaluation were as follows: 
4.4.1 Access Control 
 
- For this information security area, the experts concluded that the ISC that were 
identified as to be selected under the FST-based methodology, but had not been 
implemented (i.e., ISC 3, ISC 5, ISC 16, ISC 19, and ISC 20) addressed other relevant 
information security risks within the organization and, thus, added significant value and 
protection to the organization’s financial information. Additional existing risks addressed 
by the new set of ISC are described below: 
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- Security parameters are not adequately configured, allowing for potential unauthorized 
user access to financially significant systems, applications, or databases. 
- Privileges are granted to users which are not consistent with their job functions. The 
above allows unauthorized or incorrect modifications to financial data, resulting in 
segregation of duties conflicts, unprevented or undetected errors, incorrect financials, 
and/or management decisions based upon misleading information. 
- Users with terminated accounts as well as other unauthorized users can gain access to 
financial systems or data, and view and/or change critical, confidential, or sensitive 
financial information.  
- Users with unauthorized accounts can change configuration settings or execute system 
administration activities to financial applications’ parameters, giving rise to potential 
fraud, invalid data, failure to safeguard assets, or misled management. 
On the contrary, the experts determined that those ISC that had been already 
implemented by the organization but were not identified as to be selected under the FST-
based methodology (i.e., ISC 2, ISC 4, ISC 8, ISC 13, ISC 14, and ISC 18), did not 
necessarily pose a significant impact to the organization’s financial information. In other 
words, the absence of such ISC within the organization did not represent a major concern 
to the financial information, as an adequate level of security was still in effect given the 
various other already-implemented ISC plus the new ISC resulting from the Fuzzy 
analysis (refer to Table 24), all of which mitigate access control risks and maintain proper 
levels of security.    
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4.4.2 Compliance 
 
- For this information security area, the experts concluded that the ISC that were 
identified as to be selected under the FST-based methodology, but had not been 
implemented (i.e., ISC 1, ISC 8, and ISC 9) addressed relevant information security risks 
and, thus, added significant value and protection to the organization’s financial 
information. Additional existing risks addressed by the new set of ISC are described 
below: 
- Breaches of any law, statutory, regulatory or contractual obligations, and of any security 
requirements take place over the design, operation, use, and management of information 
systems.  
- Information systems are not in compliance with organizational security implementation 
policies, standards, and documented security controls. 
- Operational systems and audit tools are not adequately safeguarded to prevent their 
misuse.  
The experts determined that the ISC that had been already implemented but were not 
identified as to be selected under the FST-based methodology (i.e., ISC 2, ISC 4, ISC 6, 
and ISC 7) did not pose a significant impact to the organization’s financial information. 
That is, the absence of such ISC within the organization did not represent a major effect 
to the financial information, as an adequate level of security would still be provided from 
the other implemented ISC. 
4.4.3 Human Resources Security 
 
- For this information security area, the experts concluded that the ISC that were 
identified as to be selected under the FST-based methodology (i.e., ISC 1, ISC 7, and ISC 
9) were not sufficient in providing effective protection to financial information systems 
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or addressing relevant information security risks related to the Human Resources area. As 
seen, few ISC were selected by the FST-based methodology based on the actual data 
collected from the organization. In looking back at such data collected, noted that the 
EIC’s provided to assess the selection and implementation of these Human Resources 
Security-related ISC were relatively high compared to the other two information security 
areas. Such increase in EIC’s, as expected, impacted the ultimate selection of ISC within 
the Human Resources Security area. The experts suggested that ISC per the new 
methodology must be combined with the ISC originally implemented by the organization 
to maintain an adequate level of security within the organization financial assets. Refer to 
Appendix B, interview/call 25-32, 35-45, and 47. Given the above, the three experts 
determined that the new assessment methodology did not necessarily provide significant 
additional value to the Human Resources information security area, although it helped in 
strengthening the area.  
- The experts determined that the combination of ISC already implemented at the 
organization plus the ones identified by the FST-based methodology (i.e., ISC 1, ISC 3, 
ISC 4, ISC 5, ISC 6, ISC 7, and ISC 8) provide a solid level of protection to the Human 
Resources Security area. For the organization, implementation of the above combined 
ISC helps address the following existing risks, thereby maintaining an enhanced level of 
information security. 
- Employees, contractors, and third party users do not understand their responsibilities, 
and are not suitable for the roles they are considered for.  
- The risk of theft, fraud or misuse of facilities is not reduced.  
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- Security responsibilities related to job descriptions and conditions of employment are 
not necessarily addressed prior to employment.  
- All candidates for employment, contractors, and third party are not adequately screened, 
especially for sensitive jobs.  
- Employees, contractors, and third party users are (1) not aware of information security 
threats and concerns, their responsibilities and/or liabilities; and (2) not equipped to 
support organizational security policy in the course of their normal work, and to reduce 
the risk of human error.  
- An adequate level of awareness, education, and training in security procedures and the 
correct use of information processing facilities is not provided to all employees, 
contractors and third party users to minimize possible security risks.  
- A formal disciplinary process for handling security breaches is not established. 
- The exit process for employees, contractors, and third party is not performed effectively 
or in a timely or orderly manner. Responsibilities should be in place to ensure an 
employee’s, contractor’s or third party user’s exit from the organization is managed, and 
that the return of all equipment and the removal of all access rights are completed.  
- Users with terminated accounts as well as other unauthorized users can gain access to 
financial systems or data, and view and/or change critical, confidential, or sensitive 
financial information.  
As evidenced, the ISC assessment methodology developed using FST had a positive 
impact on information security at the organization. The experts concurred that the 
implementation of the new set of ISC significantly enhanced the information security at 
the organization. Quotes and comments from the experts support the aforementioned 
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statement. Based on the interviews and calls conducted, the experts agreed that additional 
relevant information security risks within the three areas evaluated were addressed by the 
new set of ISC. Appendix B captures detailed information regarding these interviews and 
calls, including the date of the interview or call, relevant information security risk, expert 
number, whether it was an interview or a call, its duration, and determination, per expert, 
whether the relevant information security risk was addressed or not. After evaluation of 
such information, it was clear that RQ2 and H2, stated under section “Research Questions 
and Hypotheses” and prompting/posing whether an ISC assessment methodology that is 
developed using FST can enhance information security at the organization, were 
addressed and supported, respectively.  
Consistent with the main goal of this dissertation, the assessment methodology 
developed and presented in this dissertation not only addressed the weaknesses identified 
in traditional methodologies, but also proved to improve information security at the 
organization. This turned out to be of crucial interest to the organization, as well as 
represented a valid contribution to the information security literature.  
Equally significant, the methodology developed herein: 
- can be easily implemented in a spreadsheet or software tool, and promote usage in 
practical scenarios where highly complex methodologies for ISC selection may become 
impractical; 
- is easily extended to include additional evaluation criteria and features, and can 
evaluate ISC in various domains; and  
- most importantly, addressed the gaps and weaknesses identified in the academic 
literature, as well as enhanced information security in organizations. 
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Overall, the FST-based assessment methodology proved to be a feasible technique for 
evaluating ISC in organizations. 
4.5 Summary  
This Chapter presented and discussed the results of this dissertation. Specifically, 
detailed explanations of the data collection process were provided, followed by 
descriptions of the development of the FST-based artifact and the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox 
of MATLAB editors and viewers used.  
The artifact was built with the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB, which is used for 
solving problems with fuzzy logic. Such toolbox includes a collection of functions built 
on the MATLAB computing environment that provides technologies to create and 
modify fuzzy inference systems within the framework of MATLAB.  
The toolbox comes with five editors and viewers defined to assist in building, editing, 
and viewing fuzzy inference systems, and links most of human reasoning and concept 
formation to fuzzy rules. In other words, the toolbox amplifies the power of human 
reasoning through providing a systematic framework for computing with fuzzy rules. 
Findings and results of the FST-based artifact were next identified and explained, 
followed by evaluations of the artifact against other ISC assessment methodologies and 
second, against the organization’s already implemented ISC. The second part of the 
evaluation was performed through interviews and meetings with three field and subject 
matter experts. The evaluation results provided responses to RQ 1 and RQ 2, and 
supported the proposed H1 and H2. Finally, the evaluation results supported the main 
contribution of this dissertation which was the development of an ISC assessment 
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methodology that could address existing weaknesses in traditional methodologies and, in 
turn, enhance information security in the organization. 
The following chapter concludes this dissertation by providing the conclusions, 
implications, recommendations, and a final summary of the investigation work 
performed. 
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     Chapter 5 
5. Conclusions 
 
5. Introduction 
This Chapter states the conclusions based on the analysis performed and results 
achieved. The Chapter also delineates barriers, assumptions, limitations and delimitations 
of this dissertation. Further, this Chapter discusses the implications of the work on the 
field of study and its contributions to knowledge and professional practice. 
Recommendations for future research are presented next, followed by an overall 
summary of the work presented within this dissertation. 
5.1 Conclusions 
According to the DSR Guidelines in Hevner et al.’s (2004), and correspondent 
Process Steps from Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2004) General Methodology of DSR, 
conclusion is the final process step where research results are documented. Results are 
also associated with clear and verifiable research contributions from the creation of the 
artifact and either support the objectives and direction of the investigation or simply 
evidence the opposite. 
The goal of this dissertation was to develop an assessment methodology that (a) 
considers all-inclusive scenarios when evaluating ISC; (b) adequately accounts for 
organizations’ restrictions and constraints; (c) significantly minimizes subjectivity and 
ambiguity (via providing precise evaluation values for ISC); and (d) prevents 
unnecessary and random ISC selections. The aforementioned can better assist 
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organizations when selecting ISC in order to mitigate information security risks, 
ultimately enhancing the overall information security. Refer to Table 2 and Figure 3. 
Consistent with the above, the following RQ’s were investigated: 
RQ1: How does an ISC assessment methodology that is developed using FST 
address the weaknesses identified in the academic literature for traditional 
assessment methodologies? 
RQ2: To what extent does an ISC assessment methodology developed with FST 
enhance information security in the organization? 
Similarly, the following hypotheses (H) were proposed:  
H1: An ISC assessment methodology that is constructed using FST contemplates 
all-inclusive ISC scenarios; employs a less-subjective, precision/accuracy-based 
method; prevents or eliminates the random and unnecessary selection of ISC; and 
considers organizations’ restrictions and constraints when assessing ISC.  
H2: An ISC assessment methodology developed with FST that addresses the 
weaknesses identified in traditional assessment methodologies enhances 
information security in the organization. 
To address and test the research questions and hypotheses, data were collected via a 
questionnaire sent through email (see Appendix A) to an organization in Puerto Rico. The 
organization was a small-to-medium size organization within the industry of schools, 
universities, and not-for-profits. The questionnaire was emailed to the Information 
Security Manager (ISM). First, the ISM provided the ISC already in place at the 
organization that protect financial-related applications. The purpose of identifying the 
ISC already in place was to compare them with the ones generated by the newly-
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developed methodology and evaluate, consistent with Hypothesis 2, whether the new set 
of ISC enhances information security in the organization. Second, the ISM ranked, in 
order of relevance, the 11 information security areas found in the ISO/IEC 27002 best 
practice framework and widely used in organizations to improve information and 
processes (Step 2). The ISM identified only the three most relevant information security 
areas based on the organization’s goals and objectives. These were in specific order: 
Access Control, Compliance, and Human Resources Security. Finally, for each ISC 
within the three information security areas identified as relevant, and in order to start the 
assessment process, the ISM provided specific data related to a literature-supported 
criteria (i.e., EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risks). 
With the above data, the artifact was built using the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of 
MATLAB (“toolbox”). The artifact consisted of four fuzzy input variables, each 
constituting a specific, literature-supported evaluation criteria (i.e., Estimated 
Implementation Cost (EIC), Scope, Compliance, and Risks), and one output variable 
named ISC_Selected.  Next, membership functions were created for each particular input 
considering the literature reviewed as well as input from decision makers within the 
organization. Fuzzy “If-then” rules were then created considering all possible relevant 
scenarios. The rule building process described above was created based on the academic 
literature reviewed, as well as discussions with organization’s decision makers. Table 17 
shows the input combination that result in the selection of an ISC according to the 
experts. 
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With the artifact developed, the fuzzy logic was executed over the actual data 
collected, and results were produced. Only ISC with scores of nine and higher were 
selected consistent with membership functions defined.  
The artifact was next evaluated; first, against traditional ISC assessment 
methodologies to determine whether the weaknesses identified in existing and traditional 
ISC assessment methodologies (refer to Chapter two) have been addressed. Second, the 
new set of ISC generated from the artifact were assessed by a group of experts against the 
organization’s already-implemented ISC in order to determine whether such new set 
enhances the overall information security in the organization. 
Based on the evaluations performed, the ISC assessment methodology developed 
using FST addressed the weaknesses identified in the academic literature for traditional 
assessment methodologies. In addition, the ISC assessment methodology had a positive 
effect over the information security at the organization, according to the experts. Because 
of the above, both, research questions RQ1 and RQ2, stated under section “Research 
Questions and Hypotheses” and prompting whether an ISC assessment methodology that 
is developed using FST address weaknesses in traditional ISC assessment methodologies, 
as well as enhance overall information security at the organization, were successfully 
addressed. The artifact developed herein, thus, represented a significant contribution to 
the organization and to the information security literature.  
5.2 Barriers and Issues 
The research problem within this dissertation was inherently difficult to solve because 
organizations are usually not willing to share data about their information security 
environments (Straub, 1986). That is, a barrier of this dissertation was the reticence of the 
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organization to have its environment evaluated for research purposes. Challenges were 
also encountered when attempting to select an organization that was truly interested in 
participating of this research. Given demanding schedules, organization’s personnel felt 
reluctant in becoming part of this effort.  
The creation of the FST-based ISC assessment solution within this dissertation was of 
adequate difficulty, meriting significant attention (i.e., dissertation-level work) as it 
attempted to correct weaknesses identified in traditional, highly practical ISC assessment 
methodologies. Further challenges were identified when determining whether the new 
methodology developed would indeed result in a more effective selection of ISC, thereby 
enhancing information security in organizations. A last barrier or issue, was the relative 
short period of time (i.e., three weeks) provided to the organization to complete the 
questionnaire, which may have not been appropriate and, therefore, posed potential 
concerns.  
5.3 Assumptions 
This dissertation assumed that an FST ISC assessment methodology can address the 
weaknesses identified in the literature. This dissertation also assumed that an improved 
ISC assessment methodology may have a positive impact on the information security of 
the organization. 
In terms of data collection, this study assumed that responses from participants were 
true, reliable, and honest given that (a) the actual data collected was secured and available 
only for investigation and analysis purposes; (b) no personal information was attached 
nor disclosed to participants’ responses in order to increase their confidence; (c) 
respondents were competent and directly affected by this research; and (d) the study’s 
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research results were made available to interested participants, as recommended by Okoli 
and Pawlowski (2004).  
Another assumption was that the target audience, key information security 
management personnel, is familiar with information security and, most importantly, has 
the required knowledge and relevant experience necessary to be part of this investigation. 
A last assumption within this dissertation was that the ISC assessment methodology built 
herein can adequately evaluate ISC in organizations within the schools, universities, and 
non-profit industry.  
5.4 Implications for Research and Practice 
The research presented in this dissertation developed an innovative approach for 
evaluating ISC in organizations in a more precise and accurate manner by addressing 
several weaknesses identified in the literature. Specifically, it presented a methodology 
that used FST to create a unified measurement that represented how well ISC met 
specific organization criteria. Through the evaluation performed in this dissertation for a 
single organization, the methodology was proven successful in providing a way for 
measuring the quality of ISC.  
In terms of research implications, the ISC assessment methodology evidenced a more 
accurate and precise evaluation and prioritization of ISC, which clearly advanced the 
current information security literature. For practical purposes, the methodology is 
expected to assist organizations’ management in: 1) correcting weaknesses and 
inadequacies in existing ISC assessment methodologies, thereby, providing for a more 
effective selection of ISC; 2) granting efficient investment of resources; and 3) enhancing 
the overall information security in organizations. 
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The main contribution of this research to the information security literature is the 
development of a FST-based assessment methodology that provides for a thorough 
evaluation of ISC in organizations. The methodology created addresses the weaknesses or 
limitations identified in existing ISC assessment methodologies, resulting in an enhanced 
information security in organizations.  
An ISC assessment methodology based on FST provides benefits and advantages 
over traditional methods, including a strict mathematical methodology that can precisely 
and rigorously examine vague conceptual phenomena (Zimmermann, 2001). 
Additionally, FST has been used as a modeling, problem solving, and data mining tool, 
and has proven superior to existing methods, as well as attractive to enhance classical 
approaches.   
Klir and Yuan (1995) also point the significance of FST when handling uncertainty. 
FST helps in understanding the phenomenon of reality by performing adequate 
predictions or retrodictions; learning about controlling the phenomenon; and utilizing 
such capabilities for various other ends. Furthermore, a FST-based framework leads to 
more detailed and thorough assessments, while appropriately modeling human decisions 
related to ISC evaluation, which are imprecise in nature (Petrovic-Lazarevic, 2001). 
A suitable FST-based ISC assessment methodology accounts for imprecise 
parameters and criteria when calculating the relevance of ISC. Such evaluation is also 
focused on how well ISC address organization goals, objectives, restrictions, risks, laws, 
and regulations. Results from this research supported that a FST-based methodology 
assisted the organization in evaluating and, thus, determining and selecting only the most 
effective ISC. The methodology presented also laid down the foundation for the 
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development of a fuzzy expert system as a solution to the ISC existing evaluation and 
ranking problem. 
Other contributions from the methodology created in this dissertation include that it: 
- is relatively simple, can be implemented in a spreadsheet or software tool, and promote 
usage in practical scenarios where highly complex methodologies for ISC selection are 
impractical.  
- fuses multiple evaluation criteria to provide a holistic view of the overall quality of ISC.  
- is easily extended to include additional evaluation criteria factor not considered within 
this dissertation (this is possibly on of the most meaningful contribution from this 
dissertation).  
- provides a mechanism to evaluate the quality of ISC in various domains.  
Overall, the methodology presented in this dissertation proved to be a feasible technique 
for evaluating ISC in organizations.  
5.5 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
A key advantage of using a FST-based decision support model for ISC evaluation is 
that it provides a natural, effective way of handling problems in which the source of 
imprecision is the absence of sharply defined criteria. Nevertheless, the solution requires 
the specification of membership functions of fuzzy sets, definitions of linguistic 
variables, and fuzzy operators in order to model the attitudes and assumptions of 
organizations regarding the relevance of ISC. In other words, fuzzy sets must be specified 
with regard to the objective function, constraints established, as well as terms and 
membership functions of the linguistic variables. Further empirical work would 
contribute to identify the aforementioned attitudes and assumptions of decision makers 
112 
 
 
 
within organizations. Despite the limitation stated above, it was argued throughout this 
dissertation that a FST-based perspective of evaluating ISC is a valuable tool for 
organizations when dealing with uncertainty and imprecision.  
There were other limitations associated with this dissertation study. First, due to 
convenience and availability, this dissertation involved a single, Puerto Rico-based, 
small-to-medium size type organization within the schools, universities, and non-profit 
industry. Therefore, findings can be generalized to similar size type and industry 
organizations located in Puerto Rico. Further similar studies may be needed at 
organizations outside of Puerto Rico, or from different sizes and industry types within 
Puerto Rico in order to generalize the findings of this dissertation in a broader scope. 
Second, the questionnaire used in this dissertation was completed by the organization 
within a three week timeframe. A longitudinal study may add significant value as 
organization goals, objectives, and laws and regulations, among others, shift over time 
and, thus, the need to select and implement different ISC. Organizations must 
periodically reassess their ISC implementation and adjust their selection criteria 
consistent with new goals, objectives, laws, and regulations. 
Third, Tichy (1998) as well as Zelkowitz and Wallace (1998), stressed that 
implementing a DSR’s developed artifact in a single organization (as is the case in this 
dissertation) represents a challenge, as results may not be generalizable to other 
organizations or environments. Implementation of the DSR research method further 
represents a limitation given the rapid advances in technology that can potentially upset 
its results before they are implemented successfully in organizations, or before benefits 
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can be obtained. DSR results can be outrun by technology before they even show up in 
the research literature (Hevner et al., 2004).  
Regarding future work, the following opportunities extend the research conducted 
within this dissertation:  
 investigate whether it is reasonable to develop fuzzy rules and baselines of 
membership functions for ISC in particular environments.  
 interview experts from organizations within similar industries in order to identify 
fuzzy sets for ISC assessments that can potentially be utilized as 
guidelines/standards across organizations within similar industries. 
 add criteria factors to evaluate ISC other than the ones included in this 
dissertation. Refinement or the incorporation of additional assessment factors, 
specifically targeting organization’s restrictions, goals, objectives, regulations, 
etc., can certainly improve the current investigation.  
 examine results from this dissertation and compare them to other assessment 
results from other similar organizations.  
Another potential direction for future research considers utilizing a hybrid approach, 
using FST and traditional methodologies, to assess ISC. As evidenced in this dissertation, 
when assessing ISC within the Human Resources Security area, the FST-based 
methodology did not output a better selection of ISC to protect financial information 
systems or address relevant information security risks. Applying a hybrid approach to 
assess ISC could not only extend the work performed in this dissertation, but can also 
strengthen current ISC evaluation and selection processes in organizations.  
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Future research can develop more interactive and more user friendly application 
programs for ISC evaluation. Finally, more case studies should be conducted within the 
industry evaluated in this study (i.e., schools, universities, and not-for-profits) and use 
those results to construct the related norm database of evaluation model for the 
establishment of industrial best practice examples.  
5.6 Delimitations 
A critical part of the scope of this dissertation is related to the information systems 
that were involved. That is, the information systems and applications where ISC were 
evaluated for comprised only financial-related systems and applications. All other 
systems and/or applications within the selected organization (e.g., operational-purpose 
applications, databases, operating systems, networks, etc.) were not in scope for purposes 
of this dissertation, although the methodology is flexible enough to also consider other 
systems and applications.  
Additionally, the target audience comprised only key information security personnel 
(i.e., Information Security Manager). Due to their knowledge and experience, the target 
audience reflects an accurate representation of the population, allowing for results to be 
generalizable and, thus, consistently applied to other small-to-medium size type 
organizations, as considered herein (Salkind, 2009). Requests for participation were made 
to small-to-medium size type organizations within a specific industry (i.e., schools, 
universities, and non-profit). The targeted organization was located in the state of Puerto 
Rico and was contacted based on convenience and availability. 
Another delimitation used to constrain the scope of this dissertation referred to the 
specific membership functions of fuzzy sets, linguistic variables, and fuzzy operators that 
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were used to model the particular attitudes and assumptions of decision makers when 
assessing ISC. That is, the membership functions used to represent fuzzy numbers within 
this dissertation were restricted to some of the most common ones (i.e., triangular and 
trapezoidal), which are preferred due to their combination of solid theoretical basis and 
simplicity (Pedrycz, 1994). The linguistic variables or linguistic terms in this study were 
limited to four factors: (1) Estimated Implementation Cost, (2) Scope, (3) Compliance, 
and (4) Risks, which represent an accepted evaluation criteria for ISC assessments based 
on the literature. Lastly, fuzzy operators were limited to ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ to assist fuzzy 
rules when implying fuzzy relationships between antecedents and consequences. The 
fuzzy operator ‘AND’ evaluated the intersection or conjunction of the rule antecedents, 
while the fuzzy operator ‘OR’ assessed the union or disjunction of the rule antecedents. 
The ‘NOT’ operator known as the fuzzy complement was not used in this dissertation. 
Regarding the limitation stated earlier involving DSR’s results being potentially upset by 
technology before they are implemented in organizations, or before they appear in the 
research literature, Hevner et al. (2004) argue that the implementation of DSR results 
from well-designed IT artifacts still impact organizations significantly, as they “enable 
organizations to address important information-related tasks” (p. 98). Rapid advances in 
technology can potentially overturn research results before their implementation, or 
publishing in the literature, resulting in a common risk to all research methods. However, 
DSR mitigated the aforementioned by engaging active technology in the creation of its 
artifacts and by providing effective results and solutions to current organizational 
problems.  
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5.7 Summary 
Adequate evaluation of ISC is crucial to organizations in maintaining a sound 
information security as well as in protecting their information assets. Nevertheless, the 
literature points out several issues, gaps, weaknesses, and/or inadequacies within 
traditional ISC assessment methodologies that prevent an effective assessment of ISC in 
organizations. The goal or research problem addressed by this dissertation was the need 
for development of an ISC assessment tool that could address weaknesses identified in 
traditional ISC assessment methodologies, and potentially enhance ISC evaluations as 
well as overall information security in the organization. Based on a comprehensive 
review of relevant literature (see Table 2), there are evident weaknesses in existing 
assessment methodologies for ISC in organizations that can preclude an effective 
selection. Risks resulting from those weaknesses include inaccurate or incomplete 
processing of data; unauthorized access to data that might destroy or manipulate data (or 
report logic) in a fraudulently or unintentionally way; as well as the potential loss of data 
or inability to access data as required (PCAOB). 
Consistent with the above, the purpose of developing a FST-based ISC assessment 
methodology was to enhance current evaluation processes by addressing weaknesses via 
employing a less-subjective, precision/accuracy-based method; eliminating or preventing 
the random and unnecessary selection of ISC; considering organizations’ restrictions and 
constraints; and improving the overall information security in organizations. Similarly, it 
was argued that a FST-based assessment methodology allows for the modeling of 
imprecise parameters, resulting in a more accurate assessment, which was crucial to 
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determine the best ISC. Surprisingly, such a methodology had not been proposed within 
the information security literature based on the thorough review performed. 
Research questions and hypotheses were raised based on the information, arguments, 
and claims presented (refer to Figure 2), and related to whether an ISC assessment 
methodology developed using FST addressed the weaknesses identified in the literature, 
as well as whether it ultimately enhanced information security in organizations.  
This dissertation followed the DSR method, which is fundamentally a problem-
solving paradigm (Simon, 1996). DSR creates and evaluates IT artifacts intended to solve 
identified organizational problems. Hevner et al. (2004) list seven guidelines that are 
crucial in understanding the requirements for effective DSR. Similar to Hevner et al.’s 
(2004) guidelines, Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2004) also developed a general method 
underlying DSR. Their method included only five process steps, which represent a 
summarized version of Hevner et al.’s (2004) seven DSR guidelines (see Table 4). 
Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2004) further identified expected outputs for their five DSR 
process steps. The Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2004) five-process-steps General 
Methodology of DSR was followed in this dissertation. 
To create the artifact (i.e., FST-based ISC assessment methodology), specific data 
from the organization were collected via questionnaire. The questionnaire was provided 
to the Information Security Manager from a small-to-medium size organization in Puerto 
Rico within the schools, universities, and not-for-profit industry.  
Upon receipt of the questionnaire, the ISM identified the ISC already in place at the 
organization that protect financial-related applications. All other applications and/or 
information systems within the organization (e.g., applications, databases, operating 
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systems, networks in place for operational/non-financial purposes, etc.) were out of scope 
for purposes of this dissertation. The purpose of identifying the ISC already in place was 
to compare them with the ones generated by the newly-developed methodology and 
evaluate, consistent with Hypothesis 2, whether the new set of ISC enhanced information 
security in the organization. The ISC were selected from an all-inclusive list of ISC from 
the ISO/IEC 27002 best practice framework.  
Following identification of the ISC currently implemented, the ISM ranked, in order 
of relevance, the 11 information security areas found in the ISO/IEC 27002 best practice 
framework. As instructed, the ISM identified only the three most relevant information 
security areas based on the organization’s goals and objectives. These were in sequential 
order: Access Control, Compliance, and Human Resources Security.  
For each ISC within the three information security areas identified as relevant, and in 
order to start the assessment process, the ISM provided specific data related to literature-
supported criteria (i.e., EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risks).  
With the specific information collected from the organization, the artifact was built 
using the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB (“toolbox”). The toolbox is an instrument 
for solving problems with fuzzy logic.  
For purposes of the FST-based artifact being created, there were four fuzzy input 
variables defined (also known as linguistic terms), each constituting specific, literature-
supported evaluation criteria (i.e., Estimated Implementation Cost (EIC), Scope, 
Compliance, and Risks). Refer to Figure 9. Membership functions and relevant rules 
were then created for each particular input considering the literature reviewed, and 
decision makers within the organization. Experts were asked to assist in the creation and 
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validation of every single fuzzy rule used for purposes of this dissertation given their 
significant experience combined with their prior knowledge. Table 17 shows the input 
combination that result in the selection of an ISC according to the experts. Once the 
artifact was developed, the next steps were to execute fuzzy logic over the actual data 
collected to prioritize ISC within the higher-ranked information security areas, as well as 
evaluate the artifact. 
As stated earlier, the ISM provided specific data related to literature-supported 
criteria (i.e., EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risks). The conclusions from fuzzy sets 
executed by the Toolbox were converted into real numbers, or a single crisp values (i.e., 
Score) through defuzzification. Tables 18 through 20 showed defuzzification for the 
Access Control, Compliance, and Human Resources Security areas after the FST-based 
methodology was executed. ISC with scores of nine and higher were selected consistent 
with membership functions defined for the ISC_Selected fuzzy output in Table 16 and 
Figure 15.  
With the generated scores, evaluation of the artifact was performed in two steps: 
(1) by evaluating against other ISC assessment methodologies to determine whether 
the weaknesses identified in existing and traditional ISC assessment methodologies have 
been addressed; and  
(2) the new set of ISC generated from the artifact are assessed by a group of experts 
against the organization’s already-implemented ISC in order to determine whether such 
new set improves or not the current ISC selection process, as well as whether the overall 
information security in the organization is enhanced. 
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Per evaluation results, the FST-based ISC assessment methodology addressed the 
weaknesses in traditional methodologies, resulting in a more accurate assessment and 
selection of ISC, thereby addressing and supporting RQ1 and H1, respectively.  
Experts then assisted in determining whether the new set of ISC enhanced 
information security at the organization. Overall, the experts concurred that the 
implementation of the new artifact significantly enhanced the overall information security 
at the organization. As a result, RQ2 and H2, stated under section “Research Questions 
and Hypotheses” and prompting whether an ISC assessment methodology that is 
developed using FST does enhance information security at the organization, were 
addressed and supported. 
The assessment methodology developed in this dissertation precisely evaluated and 
prioritized ISC which, without a doubt, turned out to be of crucial interest to the 
organization. Such methodology also represented a valid contribution to the information 
security literature. Particularly, the methodology addressed gaps and weaknesses 
identified in the academic literature, as well as resulted in a more accurate selection of 
ISC which, in turn, enhanced information security in the organization. 
Research studies continue to support the harmful effects of unsuccessful and/or weak 
information security platforms which results in opportunities for fraud, manipulation of 
information, and computer breaches, among others. Through a review of the literature, 
various key weaknesses were identified when assessing ISC in organizations. The 
methodology developed herein proved successful in assisting an organization selecting the 
most appropriate ISC for implementation, while also maintaining a well-designed and 
controlled information system security environment. 
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Appendix A. Survey Questionnaire 
Survey Questionnaire 
 
An Information Security Control 
Assessment Methodology for Organizations 
Fort Lauderdale-Davie, Florida 33314 
  
  
October 14, 2013 
  
  
Dear Respondent:  
  
I am a doctoral student conducting a survey to determine whether a newly-developed 
methodology corrects weaknesses identified in existing and traditional information 
security controls (ISC) assessment methodologies, and will result in a more effective 
selection of ISC, ultimately enhancing the overall information security in the 
organization. Please note that your feedback is valuable in addressing the aforementioned 
investigation.  
  
In order to ensure the utmost privacy, the completed survey will not be made available to 
anyone other than the research team. Also, note that completing and submitting the 
survey indicate your voluntary participation in the study.  
  
Kindly respond on or before November 1, 2013. I appreciate your time and assistance in 
furthering this research endeavor.  
  
Cordially,  
  
/s/ Angel R. Otero 
Angel R. Otero 
Doctoral Student 
Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences 
Nova Southeastern University 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314 
ao269@nova.edu 
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STEP 1 - CURRENT INFORMATION SECURITY CONTROLS (ISC) AT THE 
ORGANIZATION 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Below there is an all-inclusive list of information security controls 
(ISC) based on the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) / International 
Electro technical Commission (IEC) 27002:2005, considered a best practice framework.   
 
Please mark with an "X" the ISC already in place (implemented) at your 
Organization. 
 
Select 
with 
an "X"   
Information Security Area /  
ISC Description 
    Security Policy 
  1 
An information security policy document should be approved by management, 
and published and communicated to all employees and relevant external parties. 
  2 
The information security policy should be reviewed at planned intervals or if 
significant changes occur to ensure its continuing suitability, adequacy, and 
effectiveness. 
    Organization of Information Security 
  1 
Management should actively support security within the organization through 
clear direction, demonstrated commitment, explicit assignment, and 
acknowledgment of information security responsibilities. 
  2 
Information security activities should be coordinated by representatives from 
different parts of the organization with relevant roles and job functions. 
  3 All information security responsibilities should be clearly defined. 
  4 
A management authorization process for new information processing facilities 
should be defined and implemented. 
  5 
Requirements for confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements reflecting the 
organization’s needs for the protection of information should be identified and 
regularly reviewed. 
  6 Appropriate contacts with relevant authorities should be maintained. 
  7 
Appropriate contacts with special interest groups or other specialist security 
forums and professional associations should be maintained. 
  8 
The organization’s approach to managing information security and its 
implementation (i.e. control objectives, controls, policies, processes, and 
procedures for information security) should be reviewed independently at 
planned intervals, or when significant changes to the security implementation 
occur. 
  9 
The risks to the organization’s information and information processing facilities 
from business processes involving external parties should be identified and 
appropriate controls implemented before granting access. 
  10 
All identified security requirements should be addressed before giving customers 
access to the organization’s information or assets. 
  11 
Agreements with third parties involving accessing, processing, communicating or 
managing the organization’s information or information processing facilities, or 
123 
 
 
 
Select 
with 
an "X"   
Information Security Area /  
ISC Description 
adding products or services to information processing facilities should cover all 
relevant security requirements. 
    Asset Management 
  1 
All assets should be clearly identified and an inventory of all important assets 
drawn up and maintained. 
  2 
All information and assets associated with information processing facilities should 
be owned by a designated part of the organization. 
  3 
Rules for the acceptable use of information and assets associated with 
information processing facilities should be identified, documented, and 
implemented. 
  4 
Information should be classified in terms of its value, legal requirements, 
sensitivity, and criticality to the organization. 
  5 
An appropriate set of procedures for information labeling and handling should be 
developed and implemented in accordance with the classification scheme 
adopted by the organization. 
    Human Resources Security 
  1 
Security roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third party users 
should be defined and documented in accordance with the organization’s 
information security policy. 
  2 
Background verification checks on all candidates for employment, contractors, 
and third party users should be carried out in accordance with relevant laws, 
regulations and ethics, and proportional to the business requirements, the 
classification of the information to be accessed, and the perceived risks. 
  3 
As part of their contractual obligation, employees, contractors and third party 
users should agree and sign the terms and conditions of their employment 
contract, which should state their and the organization’s responsibilities for 
information security. 
  4 
Management should require employees, contractors and third party users to 
apply security in accordance with established policies and procedures of the 
organization. 
  5 
All employees of the organization and, where relevant, contractors and third 
party users should receive appropriate awareness training and regular updates in 
organizational policies and procedures, as relevant for their job function. 
  6 
There should be a formal disciplinary process for employees who have committed 
a security breach. 
  7 
Responsibilities for performing employment termination or change of 
employment should be clearly defined and assigned. 
  8 
All employees, contractors and third party users should return all of the 
organization’s assets in their possession upon termination of their employment, 
contract or agreement. 
  9 
The access rights of all employees, contractors and third party users to 
information and information processing facilities should be removed upon 
termination of their employment, contract or agreement, or adjusted upon 
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Select 
with 
an "X"   
Information Security Area /  
ISC Description 
change. 
    Physical And Environmental Security 
  1 
Security perimeters (barriers such as walls, card controlled entry gates or manned 
reception desks) should be used to protect areas that contain information and 
information processing facilities. 
  2 
Secure areas should be protected by appropriate entry controls to ensure that 
only authorized personnel are allowed access. 
  3 Physical security for offices, rooms, and facilities should be designed and applied. 
  4 
Physical protection against damage from fire, flood, earthquake, explosion, civil 
unrest, and other forms of natural or man-made disaster should be designed and 
applied. 
  5 
Physical protection and guidelines for working in secure areas should be designed 
and applied. 
  6 
Access points such as delivery and loading areas and other points where 
unauthorized persons may enter the premises should be controlled and, if 
possible, isolated from information processing facilities to avoid unauthorized 
access. 
  7 
Equipment should be sited or protected to reduce the risks from environmental 
threats and hazards, and opportunities for unauthorized access. 
  8 
Equipment should be protected from power failures and other disruptions caused 
by failures in supporting utilities. 
  9 
Power and telecommunications cabling carrying data or supporting information 
services should be protected from interception or damage. 
  10 
Equipment should be correctly maintained to ensure its continued availability and 
integrity. 
  11 
Security should be applied to off-site equipment taking into account the different 
risks of working outside the organization’s premises. 
  12 
All items of equipment containing storage media should be checked to ensure 
that any sensitive data and licensed software has been removed or securely 
overwritten prior to disposal. 
  13 
Equipment, information or software should not be taken off-site without prior 
authorization. 
    Communications and Operations Management 
  1 
Operating procedures should be documented, maintained, and made available to 
all users who need them. 
  2 Changes to information processing facilities and systems should be controlled. 
  3 
Duties and areas of responsibility should be segregated to reduce opportunities 
for unauthorized or unintentional modification or misuse of the organization’s 
assets. 
  4 
Development, test, and operational facilities should be separated to reduce the 
risks of unauthorized access or changes to the operational system. 
  5 
It should be ensured that the security controls, service definitions and delivery 
levels included in the third party service delivery agreement are implemented, 
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Select 
with 
an "X"   
Information Security Area /  
ISC Description 
operated, and maintained by the third party. 
  6 
The services, reports and records provided by the third party should be regularly 
monitored and reviewed, and audits should be carried out regularly. 
  7 
Changes to the provision of services, including maintaining and improving existing 
information security policies, procedures and controls, should be managed, taking 
account of the criticality of business systems and processes involved and re-
assessment of risks. 
  8 
The use of resources should be monitored, tuned, and projections made of future 
capacity requirements to ensure the required system performance. 
  9 
Acceptance criteria for new information systems, upgrades, and new versions 
should be established and suitable tests of the system(s) carried out during 
development and prior to acceptance. 
  10 
Detection, prevention, and recovery controls to protect against malicious code 
and appropriate user awareness procedures should be implemented. 
  11 
Where the use of mobile code is authorized, the configuration should ensure that 
the authorized mobile code operates according to a clearly defined security 
policy, and unauthorized mobile code should be prevented from executing. 
  12 
Back-up copies of information and software should be taken and tested regularly 
in accordance with the agreed backup policy. 
  13 
Networks should be adequately managed and controlled, in order to be protected 
from threats, and to maintain security for the systems and applications using the 
network, including information in transit. 
  14 
Security features, service levels, and management requirements of all network 
services should be identified and included in any network services agreement, 
whether these services are provided in-house or outsourced. 
  15 There should be procedures in place for the management of removable media. 
  16 
Media should be disposed of securely and safely when no longer required, using 
formal procedures. 
  17 
Procedures for the handling and storage of information should be established to 
protect this information from unauthorized disclosure or misuse. 
  18 System documentation should be protected against unauthorized access. 
  19 
Formal exchange policies, procedures, and controls should be in place to protect 
the exchange of information through the use of all types of communication 
facilities. 
  20 
Agreements should be established for the exchange of information and software 
between the organization and external parties. 
  21 
Media containing information should be protected against unauthorized access, 
misuse or corruption during transportation beyond an organization’s physical 
boundaries. 
  22 Information involved in electronic messaging should be appropriately protected. 
  23 
Policies and procedures should be developed and implemented to protect 
information associated with the interconnection of business information systems. 
  24 Information involved in electronic commerce passing over public networks should 
126 
 
 
 
Select 
with 
an "X"   
Information Security Area /  
ISC Description 
be protected from fraudulent activity, contract dispute, and unauthorized 
disclosure and modification. 
  25 
Information involved in on-line transactions should be protected to prevent 
incomplete transmission, mis-routing, unauthorized message alteration, 
unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized message duplication or replay. 
  26 
The integrity of information being made available on a publicly available system 
should be protected to prevent unauthorized modification. 
  27 
Audit logs recording user activities, exceptions, and information security events 
should be produced and kept for an agreed period to assist in future 
investigations and access control monitoring. 
  28 
Procedures for monitoring use of information processing facilities should be 
established and the results of the monitoring activities reviewed regularly. 
  29 
Logging facilities and log information should be protected against tampering and 
unauthorized access. 
  30 System administrator and system operator activities should be logged. 
  31 Faults should be logged, analyzed, and appropriate action taken. 
  32 
The clocks of all relevant information processing systems within an organization 
or security domain should be synchronized with an agreed accurate time source. 
    Access Control 
  1 
An access control policy should be established, documented, and reviewed based 
on business and security requirements for access. 
  2 
There should be a formal user registration and de-registration procedure in place 
for granting and revoking access to all information systems and services. 
  3 The allocation and use of privileges should be restricted and controlled. 
  4 
The allocation of passwords should be controlled through a formal management 
process. 
  5 
Management should review users’ access rights at regular intervals using a formal 
process. 
  6 
Users should be required to follow good security practices in the selection and use 
of passwords. 
  7 Users should ensure that unattended equipment has appropriate protection. 
  8 
A clear desk policy for papers and removable storage media and a clear screen 
policy for information processing facilities should be adopted. 
  9 
Users should only be provided with access to the services that they have been 
specifically authorized to use. 
  10 
Appropriate authentication methods should be used to control access by remote 
users. 
  11 
Automatic equipment identification should be considered as a means to 
authenticate connections from specific locations and equipment. 
  12 
Physical and logical access to diagnostic and configuration ports should be 
controlled. 
  13 
Groups of information services, users, and information systems should be 
segregated on networks. 
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Select 
with 
an "X"   
Information Security Area /  
ISC Description 
  14 
For shared networks, especially those extending across the organization’s 
boundaries, the capability of users to connect to the network should be restricted, 
in line with the access control policy and requirements of the business 
applications. 
  15 
Routing controls should be implemented for networks to ensure that computer 
connections and information flows do not breach the access control policy of the 
business applications. 
  16 Access to operating systems should be controlled by a secure log-on procedure. 
  17 
All users should have a unique identifier (user ID) for their personal use only, and 
a suitable authentication technique should be chosen to substantiate the claimed 
identity of a user. 
  18 
Systems for managing passwords should be interactive and should ensure quality 
passwords. 
  19 
The use of utility programs that might be capable of overriding system and 
application controls should be restricted and tightly controlled. 
  20 Inactive sessions should shut down after a defined period of inactivity. 
  21 
Restrictions on connection times should be used to provide additional security for 
high-risk applications. 
  22 
Access to information and application system functions by users and support 
personnel should be restricted in accordance with the defined access control 
policy. 
  23 Sensitive systems should have a dedicated (isolated) computing environment. 
  24 
A formal policy should be in place, and appropriate security measures should be 
adopted to protect against the risks of using mobile computing and 
communication facilities. 
  25 
A policy, operational plans and procedures should be developed and 
implemented for teleworking activities. 
    Information Systems Acquisition, Development And Maintenance 
  1 
Statements of business requirements for new information systems, or 
enhancements to existing information systems should specify the requirements 
for security controls. 
  2 
Data input to applications should be validated to ensure that this data is correct 
and appropriate. 
  3 
Validation checks should be incorporated into applications to detect any 
corruption of information through processing errors or deliberate acts. 
  4 
Requirements for ensuring authenticity and protecting message integrity in 
applications should be identified, and appropriate controls identified and 
implemented. 
  5 
Data output from an application should be validated to ensure that the processing 
of stored information is correct and appropriate to the circumstances. 
  6 
A policy on the use of cryptographic controls for protection of information should 
be developed and implemented. 
  7 Key management should be in place to support the organization’s use of 
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Select 
with 
an "X"   
Information Security Area /  
ISC Description 
cryptographic techniques. 
  8 
There should be procedures in place to control the installation of software on 
operational systems. 
  9 Test data should be selected carefully, and protected and controlled. 
  10 Access to program source code should be restricted. 
  11 
The implementation of changes should be controlled by the use of formal change 
control procedures. 
  12 
When operating systems are changed, business critical applications should be 
reviewed and tested to ensure there is no adverse impact on organizational 
operations or security. 
  13 
Modifications to software packages should be discouraged, limited to necessary 
changes, and all changes should be strictly controlled. 
  14 Opportunities for information leakage should be prevented. 
  15 
Outsourced software development should be supervised and monitored by the 
organization. 
  16 
Timely information about technical vulnerabilities of information systems being 
used should be obtained, the organization's exposure to such vulnerabilities 
evaluated, and appropriate measures taken to address the associated risk. 
    Information Security Incident Management 
  1 
Information security events should be reported through appropriate management 
channels as quickly as possible. 
  2 
All employees, contractors and third party users of information systems and 
services should be required to note and report any observed or suspected security 
weaknesses in systems or services. 
  3 
Management responsibilities and procedures should be established to ensure a 
quick, effective, and orderly response to information security incidents. 
  4 
There should be mechanisms in place to enable the types, volumes, and costs of 
information security incidents to be quantified and monitored. 
  5 
Where a follow-up action against a person or organization after an information 
security incident involves legal action (either civil or criminal), evidence should be 
collected, retained, and presented to conform to the rules for evidence laid down 
in the relevant jurisdiction(s). 
    Business Continuity Management 
  1 
A managed process should be developed and maintained for business continuity 
throughout the organization that addresses the information security 
requirements needed for the organization’s business continuity. 
  2 
Events that can cause interruptions to business processes should be identified, 
along with the probability and impact of such interruptions and their 
consequences for information security. 
  3 
Plans should be developed and implemented to maintain or restore operations 
and ensure availability of information at the required level and in the required 
time scales following interruption to, or failure of, critical business processes. 
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Select 
with 
an "X"   
Information Security Area /  
ISC Description 
  4 
A single framework of business continuity plans should be maintained to ensure 
all plans are consistent, to consistently address information security 
requirements, and to identify priorities for testing and maintenance. 
  5 
Business continuity plans should be tested and updated regularly to ensure that 
they are up to date and effective. 
    Compliance 
  1 
All relevant statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements and the 
organization’s approach to meet these requirements should be explicitly defined, 
documented, and kept up to date for each information system and the 
organization. 
  2 
Appropriate procedures should be implemented to ensure compliance with 
legislative, regulatory, and contractual requirements on the use of material in 
respect of which there may be intellectual property rights and on the use of 
proprietary software products. 
  3 
Important records should be protected from loss, destruction, and falsification, in 
accordance with statutory, regulatory, contractual, and business requirements. 
  4 
Data protection and privacy should be ensured as required in relevant legislation, 
regulations, and, if applicable, contractual clauses. 
  5 
Users should be deterred from using information processing facilities for 
unauthorized purposes. 
  6 
Cryptographic controls should be used in compliance with all relevant 
agreements, laws, and regulations. 
  7 
Managers should ensure that all security procedures within their area of 
responsibility are carried out correctly to achieve compliance with security 
policies and standards. 
  8 
Information systems should be regularly checked for compliance with security 
implementation standards. 
  9 
Audit requirements and activities involving checks on operational systems should 
be carefully planned and agreed to minimize the risk of disruptions to business 
processes. 
  10 
Access to information systems audit tools should be protected to prevent any 
possible misuse or compromise. 
 
STEP 2 - RANKING ISO/IEC 27002:2005 INFORMATION SECURITY AREAS 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Below there is a list of the ISO/IEC 27002:2005 Information 
Security Areas.  Please rank these areas in order of relevance in relation to your 
organization from 1 - 11 ("1" representing the most important). For example, Access 
Management may be "1", Compliance "2", Business Continuity Management "3", and so 
forth. 
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Rank in order of 
relevance from 1 -
11. ISO/IEC 27002:2005 Information Security Area 
  Security Policy 
  Organization of Information Security 
  Asset Management 
  Human Resources Security 
  Physical And Environmental Security 
  Communications and Operations Management 
  Access Control 
  Information Systems Acquisition, Development and Maintenance 
  Information Security Incident Management 
  Business Continuity Management 
  Compliance 
 
 
STEP 3 - EVALUATION OF LITERATURE-SUPPORTED CRITERIA  
 
Please assess the four-criteria below for each ISC listed. Note: As instructed and for 
purposes of this investigation, please perform the evaluation below for only the first three 
ranked information security areas identified in STEP 2.  
 
Security Policy 
 
   ISC Description - Security Policy 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
1 
An information security policy 
document should be approved by 
management, and published and 
communicated to all employees and 
relevant external parties. 
        
2 
The information security policy 
should be reviewed at planned 
intervals or if significant changes 
occur to ensure its continuing 
suitability, adequacy, and 
effectiveness. 
        
      ** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing 
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resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities. 
 
Organization of Information Security 
 
  
 ISC Description - Organization of 
Information Security 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
1 
Management should actively support 
security within the organization 
through clear direction, 
demonstrated commitment, explicit 
assignment, and acknowledgment of 
information security responsibilities. 
        
2 
Information security activities should 
be coordinated by representatives 
from different parts of the 
organization with relevant roles and 
job functions. 
        
3 
Allocation of information security 
responsibilities: All information 
security responsibilities should be 
clearly defined.         
4 
A management authorization process 
for new information processing 
facilities should be defined and 
implemented.         
5 
Requirements for confidentiality or 
non-disclosure agreements reflecting 
the organization’s needs for the 
protection of information should be 
identified and regularly reviewed.         
6 
Appropriate contacts with relevant 
authorities should be maintained.         
7 
Appropriate contacts with special 
interest groups or other specialist 
security forums and professional 
associations should be maintained.         
8 
The organization’s approach to 
managing information security and 
its implementation (i.e. control 
objectives, controls, policies, 
processes, and procedures for 
information security) should be         
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 ISC Description - Organization of 
Information Security 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
reviewed independently at planned 
intervals, or when significant changes 
to the security implementation occur. 
9 
The risks to the organization’s 
information and information 
processing facilities from business 
processes involving external parties 
should be identified and appropriate 
controls implemented before 
granting access.         
10 
All identified security requirements 
should be addressed before giving 
customers access to the 
organization’s information or assets.         
11 
Agreements with third parties 
involving accessing, processing, 
communicating or managing the 
organization’s information or 
information processing facilities, or 
adding products or services to 
information processing facilities 
should cover all relevant security 
requirements.         
      ** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing 
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities. 
 
Asset Management 
 
   ISC Description - Asset Management 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
1 
All assets should be clearly identified 
and an inventory of all important 
assets drawn up and maintained. 
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   ISC Description - Asset Management 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
2 
All information and assets associated 
with information processing facilities 
should be owned by a designated 
part of the organization. 
        
3 
Rules for the acceptable use of 
information and assets associated 
with information processing facilities 
should be identified, documented, 
and implemented.         
4 
Information should be classified in 
terms of its value, legal requirements, 
sensitivity, and criticality to the 
organization.         
5 
An appropriate set of procedures for 
information labeling and handling 
should be developed and 
implemented in accordance with the 
classification scheme adopted by the 
organization.         
      ** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing 
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities. 
 
Human Resources Security 
 
  
 ISC Description - Human Resources 
Security 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
1 
Security roles and responsibilities of 
employees, contractors and third 
party users should be defined and 
documented in accordance with the 
organization’s information security 
policy. 
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 ISC Description - Human Resources 
Security 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
2 
Background verification checks on all 
candidates for employment, 
contractors, and third party users 
should be carried out in accordance 
with relevant laws, regulations and 
ethics, and proportional to the 
business requirements, the 
classification of the information to be 
accessed, and the perceived risks.   
      
3 
As part of their contractual 
obligation, employees, contractors 
and third party users should agree 
and sign the terms and conditions of 
their employment contract, which 
should state their and the 
organization’s responsibilities for 
information security.   
      
4 
Management should require 
employees, contractors and third 
party users to apply security in 
accordance with established policies 
and procedures of the organization.   
      
5 
All employees of the organization 
and, where relevant, contractors and 
third party users should receive 
appropriate awareness training and 
regular updates in organizational 
policies and procedures, as relevant 
for their job function. 
        
6 
There should be a formal disciplinary 
process for employees who have 
committed a security breach.   
      
7 
Responsibilities for performing 
employment termination or change 
of employment should be clearly 
defined and assigned. 
        
8 
All employees, contractors and third 
party users should return all of the 
organization’s assets in their 
possession upon termination of their 
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 ISC Description - Human Resources 
Security 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
employment, contract or agreement. 
9 
The access rights of all employees, 
contractors and third party users to 
information and information 
processing facilities should be 
removed upon termination of their 
employment, contract or agreement, 
or adjusted upon change. 
        
      ** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing 
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities. 
 
Physical and Environmental Security 
 
  
 ISC Description - Physical And 
Environmental Security 
Estimated 
Implementatio
n Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulation
s 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
1 
Security perimeters (barriers such as 
walls, card controlled entry gates or 
manned reception desks) should be 
used to protect areas that contain 
information and information 
processing facilities. 
        
2 
Secure areas should be protected by 
appropriate entry controls to ensure 
that only authorized personnel are 
allowed access. 
        
3 
Physical security for offices, rooms, 
and facilities should be designed and 
applied.         
4 
Physical protection against damage 
from fire, flood, earthquake, 
explosion, civil unrest, and other forms         
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 ISC Description - Physical And 
Environmental Security 
Estimated 
Implementatio
n Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulation
s 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
of natural or man-made disaster 
should be designed and applied. 
5 
Physical protection and guidelines for 
working in secure areas should be 
designed and applied.         
6 
Access points such as delivery and 
loading areas and other points where 
unauthorized persons may enter the 
premises should be controlled and, if 
possible, isolated from information 
processing facilities to avoid 
unauthorized access.         
7 
Equipment should be sited or 
protected to reduce the risks from 
environmental threats and hazards, 
and opportunities for unauthorized 
access.         
8 
Equipment should be protected from 
power failures and other disruptions 
caused by failures in supporting 
utilities.         
9 
Power and telecommunications 
cabling carrying data or supporting 
information services should be 
protected from interception or 
damage.         
1
0 
Equipment should be correctly 
maintained to ensure its continued 
availability and integrity.         
1
1 
Security should be applied to off-site 
equipment taking into account the 
different risks of working outside the 
organization’s premises.         
1
2 
All items of equipment containing 
storage media should be checked to 
ensure that any sensitive data and 
licensed software has been removed 
or securely overwritten prior to 
disposal.         
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 ISC Description - Physical And 
Environmental Security 
Estimated 
Implementatio
n Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulation
s 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
1
3 
Equipment, information or software 
should not be taken off-site without 
prior authorization.         
      ** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing 
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities. 
 
Communications and Operations Management 
 
  
 ISC Description - Communications 
and Operations Management 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
1 
Operating procedures should be 
documented, maintained, and made 
available to all users who need them. 
        
2 
Changes to information processing 
facilities and systems should be 
controlled. 
        
3 
Duties and areas of responsibility 
should be segregated to reduce 
opportunities for unauthorized or 
unintentional modification or misuse 
of the organization’s assets.         
4 
Development, test, and operational 
facilities should be separated to 
reduce the risks of unauthorised 
access or changes to the operational 
system.         
5 
It should be ensured that the security 
controls, service definitions and 
delivery levels included in the third 
party service delivery agreement are 
implemented, operated, and 
maintained by the third party.         
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 ISC Description - Communications 
and Operations Management 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
6 
The services, reports and records 
provided by the third party should be 
regularly monitored and reviewed, 
and audits should be carried out 
regularly.         
7 
Changes to the provision of services, 
including maintaining and improving 
existing information security policies, 
procedures and controls, should be 
managed, taking account of the 
criticality of business systems and 
processes involved and re-
assessment of risks.         
8 
The use of resources should be 
monitored, tuned, and projections 
made of future capacity 
requirements to ensure the required 
system performance.         
9 
Acceptance criteria for new 
information systems, upgrades, and 
new versions should be established 
and suitable tests of the system(s) 
carried out during development and 
prior to acceptance.         
10 
Detection, prevention, and recovery 
controls to protect against malicious 
code and appropriate user awareness 
procedures should be implemented.         
11 
Where the use of mobile code is 
authorized, the configuration should 
ensure that the authorized mobile 
code operates according to a clearly 
defined security policy, and 
unauthorized mobile code should be 
prevented from executing.         
12 
Back-up copies of information and 
software should be taken and tested 
regularly in accordance with the 
agreed backup policy.         
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 ISC Description - Communications 
and Operations Management 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
13 
Networks should be adequately 
managed and controlled, in order to 
be protected from threats, and to 
maintain security for the systems and 
applications using the network, 
including information in transit.         
14 
Security features, service levels, and 
management requirements of all 
network services should be identified 
and included in any network services 
agreement, whether these services 
are provided in-house or outsourced.         
15 
There should be procedures in place 
for the management of removable 
media.         
16 
Media should be disposed of securely 
and safely when no longer required, 
using formal procedures.         
17 
Procedures for the handling and 
storage of information should be 
established to protect this 
information from unauthorized 
disclosure or misuse.         
18 
System documentation should be 
protected against unauthorized 
access.         
19 
Formal exchange policies, 
procedures, and controls should be in 
place to protect the exchange of 
information through the use of all 
types of communication facilities.         
20 
Agreements should be established for 
the exchange of information and 
software between the organization 
and external parties.         
21 
Media containing information should 
be protected against unauthorized 
access, misuse or corruption during 
transportation beyond an 
organization’s physical boundaries.         
140 
 
 
 
  
 ISC Description - Communications 
and Operations Management 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
22 
Information involved in electronic 
messaging should be appropriately 
protected.         
23 
Policies and procedures should be 
developed and implemented to 
protect information associated with 
the interconnection of business 
information systems.         
24 
Information involved in electronic 
commerce passing over public 
networks should be protected from 
fraudulent activity, contract dispute, 
and unauthorized disclosure and 
modification.         
25 
Information involved in on-line 
transactions should be protected to 
prevent incomplete transmission, 
mis-routing, unauthorized message 
alteration, unauthorized disclosure, 
unauthorized message duplication or 
replay.         
26 
Publicly available information: The 
integrity of information being made 
available on a publicly available 
system should be protected to 
prevent unauthorized modification.         
27 
Audit logs recording user activities, 
exceptions, and information security 
events should be produced and kept 
for an agreed period to assist in 
future investigations and access 
control monitoring.         
28 
Procedures for monitoring use of 
information processing facilities 
should be established and the results 
of the monitoring activities reviewed 
regularly.         
29 
Logging facilities and log information 
should be protected against 
tampering and unauthorized access.         
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 ISC Description - Communications 
and Operations Management 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
30 
System administrator and system 
operator activities should be logged.         
31 
Faults should be logged, analyzed, 
and appropriate action taken.         
32 
The clocks of all relevant information 
processing systems within an 
organization or security domain 
should be synchronized with an 
agreed accurate time source.         
      ** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing 
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities. 
 
Access Control 
 
   ISC Description - Access Control 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
1 
An access control policy should be 
established, documented, and 
reviewed based on business and 
security requirements for access. 
        
2 
There should be a formal user 
registration and de-registration 
procedure in place for granting and 
revoking access to all information 
systems and services. 
        
3 
The allocation and use of privileges 
should be restricted and controlled.   
      
4 
The allocation of passwords should 
be controlled through a formal 
management process.   
      
5 
Management should review users’ 
access rights at regular intervals using 
a formal process.   
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   ISC Description - Access Control 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
6 
Users should be required to follow 
good security practices in the 
selection and use of passwords.   
      
7 
Users should ensure that unattended 
equipment has appropriate 
protection.   
      
8 
A clear desk policy for papers and 
removable storage media and a clear 
screen policy for information 
processing facilities should be 
adopted.   
      
9 
Users should only be provided with 
access to the services that they have 
been specifically authorized to use.   
      
10 
Appropriate authentication methods 
should be used to control access by 
remote users.   
      
11 
Automatic equipment identification 
should be considered as a means to 
authenticate connections from 
specific locations and equipment. 
        
12 
Physical and logical access to 
diagnostic and configuration ports 
should be controlled. 
        
13 
Groups of information services, users, 
and information systems should be 
segregated on networks.   
      
14 
For shared networks, especially those 
extending across the organization’s 
boundaries, the capability of users to 
connect to the network should be 
restricted, in line with the access 
control policy and requirements of 
the business applications.   
      
15 
Routing controls should be 
implemented for networks to ensure 
that computer connections and 
information flows do not breach the 
access control policy of the business 
applications.   
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   ISC Description - Access Control 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
16 
Access to operating systems should 
be controlled by a secure log-on 
procedure.   
      
17 
All users should have a unique 
identifier (user ID) for their personal 
use only, and a suitable 
authentication technique should be 
chosen to substantiate the claimed 
identity of a user.   
      
18 
Systems for managing passwords 
should be interactive and should 
ensure quality passwords.   
      
19 
The use of utility programs that might 
be capable of overriding system and 
application controls should be 
restricted and tightly controlled. 
        
20 
Inactive sessions should shut down 
after a defined period of inactivity.   
      
21 
Restrictions on connection times 
should be used to provide additional 
security for high-risk applications.   
      
22 
Access to information and application 
system functions by users and 
support personnel should be 
restricted in accordance with the 
defined access control policy.   
      
23 
Sensitive systems should have a 
dedicated (isolated) computing 
environment.   
      
24 
A formal policy should be in place, 
and appropriate security measures 
should be adopted to protect against 
the risks of using mobile computing 
and communication facilities. 
        
25 
A policy, operational plans, and 
procedures should be developed and 
implemented for teleworking 
activities. 
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** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing 
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities. 
 
Information Systems Acquisition, Development, and Maintenance 
 
  
 ISC Description - Information 
Systems Acquisition, Development, 
And Maintenance 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
1 
Statements of business requirements 
for new information systems, or 
enhancements to existing 
information systems should specify 
the requirements for security 
controls. 
        
2 
Data input to applications should be 
validated to ensure that this data is 
correct and appropriate. 
        
3 
Validation checks should be 
incorporated into applications to 
detect any corruption of information 
through processing errors or 
deliberate acts.         
4 
Requirements for ensuring 
authenticity and protecting message 
integrity in applications should be 
identified, and appropriate controls 
identified and implemented.         
5 
Data output from an application 
should be validated to ensure that 
the processing of stored information 
is correct and appropriate to the 
circumstances.         
6 
A policy on the use of cryptographic 
controls for protection of information 
should be developed and 
implemented.         
7 
Key management should be in place 
to support the organization’s use of 
cryptographic techniques.         
8 
There should be procedures in place 
to control the installation of software 
on operational systems.         
9 Test data should be selected         
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 ISC Description - Information 
Systems Acquisition, Development, 
And Maintenance 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
carefully, and protected and 
controlled. 
10 
Access to program source code 
should be restricted.         
11 
The implementation of changes 
should be controlled by the use of 
formal change control procedures.         
12 
When operating systems are 
changed, business critical 
applications should be reviewed and 
tested to ensure there is no adverse 
impact on organizational operations 
or security.         
13 
Modifications to software packages 
should be discouraged, limited to 
necessary changes, and all changes 
should be strictly controlled.         
14 
Opportunities for information 
leakage should be prevented.         
15 
Outsourced software development 
should be supervised and monitored 
by the organization.         
16 
Timely information about technical 
vulnerabilities of information systems 
being used should be obtained, the 
organization's exposure to such 
vulnerabilities evaluated, and 
appropriate measures taken to 
address the associated risk.         
      ** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing 
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities. 
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Information Security Incident Management 
 
  
 ISC Description - Information 
Security Incident Management 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
1 
Information security events should be 
reported through appropriate 
management channels as quickly as 
possible. 
        
2 
All employees, contractors and third 
party users of information systems 
and services should be required to 
note and report any observed or 
suspected security weaknesses in 
systems or services. 
        
3 
Management responsibilities and 
procedures should be established to 
ensure a quick, effective, and orderly 
response to information security 
incidents.         
4 
There should be mechanisms in place 
to enable the types, volumes, and 
costs of information security 
incidents to be quantified and 
monitored.         
5 
Where a follow-up action against a 
person or organization after an 
information security incident involves 
legal action (either civil or criminal), 
evidence should be collected, 
retained, and presented to conform 
to the rules for evidence laid down in 
the relevant jurisdiction(s).         
      ** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing 
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities. 
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Business Continuity Management 
 
  
 ISC Description - Business Continuity 
Management 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
1 
A managed process should be 
developed and maintained for 
business continuity throughout the 
organization that addresses the 
information security requirements 
needed for the organization’s 
business continuity. 
        
2 
Events that can cause interruptions 
to business processes should be 
identified, along with the probability 
and impact of such interruptions and 
their consequences for information 
security. 
        
3 
Plans should be developed and 
implemented to maintain or restore 
operations and ensure availability of 
information at the required level and 
in the required time scales following 
interruption to, or failure of, critical 
business processes.         
4 
A single framework of business 
continuity plans should be 
maintained to ensure all plans are 
consistent, to consistently address 
information security requirements, 
and to identify priorities for testing 
and maintenance.         
5 
Business continuity plans should be 
tested and updated regularly to 
ensure that they are up to date and 
effective.         
      ** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing 
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities. 
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Compliance 
 
   ISC Description - Compliance 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
1 
All relevant statutory, regulatory, and 
contractual requirements and the 
organization’s approach to meet 
these requirements should be 
explicitly defined, documented, and 
kept up to date for each information 
system and the organization. 
        
2 
Appropriate procedures should be 
implemented to ensure compliance 
with legislative, regulatory, and 
contractual requirements on the use 
of material in respect of which there 
may be intellectual property rights 
and on the use of proprietary 
software products.   
      
3 
Important records should be 
protected from loss, destruction, and 
falsification, in accordance with 
statutory, regulatory, contractual, 
and business requirements.   
      
4 
Data protection and privacy should 
be ensured as required in relevant 
legislation, regulations, and, if 
applicable, contractual clauses.   
      
5 
Users should be deterred from using 
information processing facilities for 
unauthorized purposes.   
      
6 
Cryptographic controls should be 
used in compliance with all relevant 
agreements, laws, and regulations. 
  
  
    
7 
Managers should ensure that all 
security procedures within their area 
of responsibility are carried out 
correctly to achieve compliance with 
security policies and standards. 
  
  
    
8 
Information systems should be 
regularly checked for compliance 
with security implementation   
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   ISC Description - Compliance 
Estimated 
Implementation 
Cost  
(in thousands) 
** 
Scope - Number of 
systems/applications 
protected by ISC. 
[1, More than 1] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
Complies 
with 
required, 
external 
laws and 
regulations 
[0 - 100%] 
Extent to 
which the 
ISC 
addresses 
information 
security 
risks  
[0 - 100%] 
standards. 
9 
Audit requirements and activities 
involving checks on operational 
systems should be carefully planned 
and agreed to minimize the risk of 
disruptions to business processes.   
      
10 
Access to information systems audit 
tools should be protected to prevent 
any possible misuse or compromise.   
      
      ** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing 
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities. 
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Appendix B. Experts’ Interviews and Calls 
Legend: 
AC - Access Control 
C - Compliance 
HRS - Human Resource Security 
P.I. - Personal Interview 
P.C. - Phone Call 
 
 
Date 
Relevant Information 
Security Risk 
("RISR") 
Expert 
# P.I. P.C. 
Time  
Start 
Time  
End  Duration 
Risk 
Addressed?  
Comments 
Summarizing Risk 
Determination 
1 11/7/2013 AC-1 Security 
parameters are not 
adequately configured, 
allowing for potential 
unauthorized user 
access to financially 
significant systems, 
applications, or 
databases. 
1  √ 8:00 
AM 
8:30 
AM 
0:30 Yes "FST generated ISC 6, 
which prompts users to 
select and use good 
passwords, as well as 
ISC 16 to control 
access to systems via 
secure logons. Both of 
these controls address 
this risk." 
2 11/7/2013 AC-1 Security 
parameters are not 
adequately configured, 
allowing for potential 
unauthorized user 
access to financially 
significant systems, 
applications, or 
databases. 
2  √ 5:00 
PM 
6:00 
PM 
1:00 Yes "To prevent 
unauthorized access, 
the new methodology 
resulted in ISC 3, ISC 
5, and ISC 9, all 
relating to the control, 
review, and assignment 
of adequate access." 
3 11/8/2013 AC-1 Security 
parameters are not 
adequately configured, 
allowing for potential 
unauthorized user 
access to financially 
significant systems, 
applications, or 
databases. 
3 √  10:00 
AM 
11:00 
AM 
1:00 Yes "The controls ISC 6, 
ISC 10, and ISC 17 
selected by the FST 
methodology help in 
mitigating this risk. 
Also, there are other 
selected controls like 
ISC 5 that can deal 
with the issue of 
unauthorized access." 
4 11/11/2013 AC-2 Privileges are 
granted to users which 
are not consistent with 
their job functions. 
The above allows 
unauthorized or 
incorrect modifications 
to financial data, 
resulting in 
segregation of duties 
conflicts, unprevented 
or undetected errors, 
incorrect financials, 
and/or management 
decisions based upon 
misleading 
information. 
1  √ 8:00 
AM 
8:45 
AM 
0:45 Yes "ISC 3 calls for the 
control and restriction 
of privileges, while 
ISC 5 reviews user 
access. ISC 9 further 
states that users should 
only be provided 
access to the services 
they are responsible for 
and have been 
authorized to use. The 
combination of these 
three controls 
addresses this risk." 
5 11/11/2013 AC-2 Privileges are 
granted to users which 
are not consistent with 
their job functions. 
The above allows 
unauthorized or 
incorrect modifications 
to financial data, 
resulting in 
segregation of duties 
conflicts, unprevented 
or undetected errors, 
incorrect financials, 
and/or management 
2  √ 2:00 
PM 
3:00 
PM 
1:00 Yes "The FST methodology 
prompted the selection 
of ISC 3 and ISC 9. 
ISC 3 restricts access 
and ISC 9 ensures that 
access must be 
authorized and granted 
only to the services and 
responsibilities users 
need. Both of these 
controls address the 
RISR." 
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Relevant Information 
Security Risk 
("RISR") 
Expert 
# P.I. P.C. 
Time  
Start 
Time  
End  Duration 
Risk 
Addressed?  
Comments 
Summarizing Risk 
Determination 
decisions based upon 
misleading 
information. 
6 11/11/2013 AC-3 Users with 
terminated accounts as 
well as other 
unauthorized users can 
gain access to financial 
systems or data, and 
view and/or change 
critical, confidential, or 
sensitive financial 
information. 
1  √ 9:00 
AM 
9:30 
AM 
0:30 Yes "Selection of ISC 5 
takes care of this risk." 
7 11/11/2013 AC-3 Users with 
terminated accounts as 
well as other 
unauthorized users can 
gain access to financial 
systems or data, and 
view and/or change 
critical, confidential, or 
sensitive financial 
information. 
2  √ 3:00 
PM 
4:00 
PM 
1:00 Yes "ISC 5 relates to the 
periodic reviews of 
user access rights by 
Management. Frequent 
reviews of user access 
ensure, for example, 
that terminated user 
accounts do not gain 
access to financial 
systems or data. 
Additionally, ISC 1 
(also selected by FST) 
prompts for the 
establishment of a 
policy to guide access 
control." 
8 11/13/2013 AC-2 Privileges are 
granted to users which 
are not consistent with 
their job functions. 
The above allows 
unauthorized or 
incorrect modifications 
to financial data, 
resulting in 
segregation of duties 
conflicts, unprevented 
or undetected errors, 
incorrect financials, 
and/or management 
decisions based upon 
misleading 
information. 
3 √  6:00 
PM 
6:30 
PM 
0:30 Yes "Controls ISC 3, ISC 5, 
and ISC 9 address this 
RISR. These controls 
were selected by the 
FST methodology. In 
addition, ISC 1, which 
talks about the need of 
an access control 
policy, is also a good 
control to address this 
risk since 
implementation of such 
type of control sets the 
right tone at the top." 
9 11/13/2013 AC-3 Users with 
terminated accounts as 
well as other 
unauthorized users can 
gain access to financial 
systems or data, and 
view and/or change 
critical, confidential, or 
sensitive financial 
information. 
3 √  6:30 
PM 
7:00 
PM 
0:30 Yes "The combination of 
ISC5 and ISC 20, both 
selected by the FST 
methodology, in my 
opinion, help address 
this RISR. ISC 5 
requires management 
reviews of access to be 
performed at regular 
intervals. This will 
most likely detect 
accounts (terminated, 
for example) that 
should not be active. 
At the same time, ISC 
20 relates to shutting 
down inactive sessions, 
which is also required 
for terminated 
accounts." 
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Relevant Information 
Security Risk 
("RISR") 
Expert 
# P.I. P.C. 
Time  
Start 
Time  
End  Duration 
Risk 
Addressed?  
Comments 
Summarizing Risk 
Determination 
10 11/13/2013 AC-4 Users with 
unauthorized accounts 
can change 
configuration settings 
or execute system 
administration 
activities to financial 
applications’ 
parameters, giving rise 
to potential fraud, 
invalid data, failure to 
safeguard assets, or 
misled management. 
3 √  7:00 
PM 
8:00 
PM 
1:00 Yes "The FST methodology 
suggested the selection 
of ISC 16, which 
requires secure log-on 
procedures to access 
operating systems 
(including access to 
their system functions, 
configuration settings, 
etc.).  Moreover, ISC 
19 (also suggested for 
selection) restricts 
access to utility 
programs which can 
impact, in a negative 
way, current systems 
and application 
settings, controls, etc. 
Lastly, an access 
control policy should 
be established to 
include the controls 
and procedures just 
mentioned. All these 
controls put in place 
address the RISR." 
11 11/15/2013 AC-4 Users with 
unauthorized accounts 
can change 
configuration settings 
or execute system 
administration 
activities to financial 
applications’ 
parameters, giving rise 
to potential fraud, 
invalid data, failure to 
safeguard assets, or 
misled management. 
1  √ 8:00 
AM 
8:20 
AM 
0:20 Yes "The selected control 
ISC 22 restricts access 
to system functions, 
including, 
configuration settings, 
systems' and 
applications’ 
parameters within 
applications, thereby, 
taking care of this 
risk." 
12 11/15/2013 C-1 Breaches of any 
law, statutory, 
regulatory or 
contractual 
obligations, and of any 
security requirements 
take place over the 
design, operation, use, 
and management of 
information systems. 
1  √ 8:20 
AM 
9:10 
AM 
0:50 Yes "The tool selected ISC 
1, which requires 
explicit definitions of 
'all relevant statutory, 
regulatory, and 
contractual 
requirements and the 
organization’s 
approach to meet these 
requirements'. 
Establishment of these 
requirements will serve 
well in addressing this 
risk." 
13 11/18/2013 AC-4 Users with 
unauthorized accounts 
can change 
configuration settings 
or execute system 
administration 
activities to financial 
applications’ 
parameters, giving rise 
to potential fraud, 
invalid data, failure to 
safeguard assets, or 
misled management. 
2  √ 10:30 
AM 
11:15 
AM 
0:45 Yes "Utility programs that 
can override system 
and application 
controls should be 
restricted and 
controlled, which is the 
purposes of ISC 19. A 
defined access control 
policy, as required by 
ISC 22, will further 
restrict access to 
system functions 
within applications. 
The 2 controls just 
mentioned address this 
RISR." 
14 11/20/2013 C-1 Breaches of any 
law, statutory, 
regulatory or 
contractual 
obligations, and of any 
security requirements 
take place over the 
2  √ 4:00 
PM 
4:30 
PM 
0:30 Yes "Verifying systems and 
applications regularly 
for compliance (ISC 8), 
as well as having a 
clear definition of all 
relevant statutory, 
regulatory, and 
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Security Risk 
("RISR") 
Expert 
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Time  
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Summarizing Risk 
Determination 
design, operation, use, 
and management of 
information systems. 
contractual 
requirements (ISC 1), 
both, should address 
the RISR in question." 
15 11/23/2013 C-1 Breaches of any 
law, statutory, 
regulatory or 
contractual 
obligations, and of any 
security requirements 
take place over the 
design, operation, use, 
and management of 
information systems. 
3 √  4:00 
PM 
4:40 
PM 
0:40 Yes "The FST methodology 
suggested the selection 
of ISC 1 ('All relevant 
statutory, regulatory, 
and contractual 
requirements and the 
organization’s 
approach to meet these 
requirements should be 
explicitly defined, 
documented, and kept 
up to date for each 
information system and 
the organization.'), a 
critical step in 
addressing this RISR. 
Further, and combined 
with the above, 
checking information 
systems, applications, 
etc. periodically for 
compliance with 
obligations (regulatory, 
statutory, contractual, 
etc.) (control ISC 8) 
will also address the 
risk, as well as 
strengthen current 
compliance procedures 
at the Organization." 
16 11/23/2013 C-2 Information 
systems are not in 
compliance with 
organizational security 
implementation 
policies, standards, and 
documented security 
controls. 
3 √  4:50 
PM 
5:20 
PM 
0:30 Yes "The selection of 
controls ISC 1 and ISC 
8 by the new 
methodology ensures 
the RISR in question is 
addressed. ISC 1, for 
instance, mandates that 
significant 
requirements 
(statutory, regulatory, 
and contractual) be 
defined and 
documented so that 
they can be complied 
with. Equally 
important and to add to 
ISC 1, periodic checks 
for compliance with 
statutory, regulatory, 
and contractual 
requirements must 
occur consistent with 
control ISC 8."  
17 11/23/2013 C-3 Operational 
systems and audit tools 
are not adequately 
safeguarded to prevent 
their misuse. 
3 √  5:25 
PM 
6:05 
PM 
0:40 Yes "The FST methodology 
suggested the selection 
of ISC 9 to monitor 
operational systems' 
activities to reduce 
disruptions to business 
processes. ISC 10, also 
selected by the 
methodology, calls for 
access protection of 
information systems 
audit tools, again, to 
avoid any possible 
misuse, compromise, 
etc. These two ISC's 
address the RISR." 
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Security Risk 
("RISR") 
Expert 
# P.I. P.C. 
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Start 
Time  
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Addressed?  
Comments 
Summarizing Risk 
Determination 
18 11/25/2013 C-2 Information 
systems are not in 
compliance with 
organizational security 
implementation 
policies, standards, and 
documented security 
controls. 
2  √ 9:00 
AM 
9:35 
AM 
0:35 Yes "ISC 1 calls for the 
establishment, 
definition, and 
compliance of 
information systems 
with 'all relevant 
statutory, regulatory, 
and contractual 
requirements...', 
thereby, addressing this 
RISR." 
19 11/25/2013 C-3 Operational 
systems and audit tools 
are not adequately 
safeguarded to prevent 
their misuse. 
2  √ 9:35 
AM 
10:30 
AM 
0:55 Yes "The requirement for 
protection of 
information systems 
and audit tools to avoid 
misuses, etc., stated by 
the selected ISC 10, 
addresses the RISR." 
20 11/26/2013 C-2 Information 
systems are not in 
compliance with 
organizational security 
implementation 
policies, standards, and 
documented security 
controls. 
1  √ 8:00 
AM 
8:35 
AM 
0:35 Yes "ISC 8, selected, states 
that information 
systems should be 
regularly checked for 
compliance with 
security 
implementation 
standards. Such 
control, on its own, 
addresses this risk." 
21 11/26/2013 C-3 Operational 
systems and audit tools 
are not adequately 
safeguarded to prevent 
their misuse. 
1  √ 8:35 
AM 
9:00 
AM 
0:25 Yes "ISC 9 and ISC 10 
require procedures to 
be performed on 
operating systems and 
audit tools to keep 
them functional and 
protected, respectively. 
Both address this risk 
directly." 
22 11/30/2013 HRS-1 Employees, 
contractors, and third 
party users do not 
understand their 
responsibilities, and 
are not suitable for the 
roles they are 
considered for. 
3 √  3:00 
PM 
4:00 
PM 
1:00 Undecided N/A 
23 12/3/2013 HRS-1 Employees, 
contractors, and third 
party users do not 
understand their 
responsibilities, and 
are not suitable for the 
roles they are 
considered for. 
1  √ 8:00 
AM 
8:55 
AM 
0:55 Yes "ISC 1 responds solidly 
to this risk by defining 
all security roles and 
responsibilities of 
employees, etc."  
24 12/3/2013 HRS-1 Employees, 
contractors, and third 
party users do not 
understand their 
responsibilities, and 
are not suitable for the 
roles they are 
considered for. 
2  √ 11:00 
AM 
11:55 
AM 
0:55 Undecided N/A 
25 12/6/2013 HRS-2 The risk of 
theft, fraud or misuse 
of facilities is not 
reduced.  
1  √ 7:30 
AM 
8:20 
AM 
0:50 No "To reduce the risk of 
theft, fraud or misuse 
of facilities, ISC 6 
(enforcement of a 
'formal disciplinary 
process for employees 
who have committed a 
security breach') should 
have been selected, but 
it wasn't. Luckily, this 
ISC was already 
implemented by the 
Organization." 
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26 12/6/2013 HRS-2 The risk of 
theft, fraud or misuse 
of facilities is not 
reduced.  
2  √ 1:00 
PM 
1:40 
PM 
0:40 No "There is no current 
process for 
reprimanding users 
when faulting or 
committing security 
breaches (required by 
ISC 6). Because of 
that, ISC 6 should have 
been selected." 
27 12/7/2013 HRS-2 The risk of 
theft, fraud or misuse 
of facilities is not 
reduced.  
3 √  10:00 
AM 
11:00 
AM 
1:00 No "The FST methodology 
did not select ISC 6, 
which targets this 
RISR via the 
establishment of a 
disciplinary process." 
28 12/7/2013 HRS-3 Security 
responsibilities related 
to job descriptions and 
conditions of 
employment are not 
necessarily addressed 
prior to employment. 
1  √ 4:00 
PM 
4:30 
PM 
0:30 No "ISC 3 should have 
been selected to 
properly address 
employees' 
understanding of 
security 
responsibilities, which 
refers to the risk here." 
29 12/11/2013 HRS-1 Employees, 
contractors, and third 
party users do not 
understand their 
responsibilities, and 
are not suitable for the 
roles they are 
considered for. 
2  √ 11:30 
AM 
12:30 
PM 
1:00 No Undecided on 
12/3/2013. "To address 
this RISR, users should 
receive appropriate 
training, relevant for 
their job function, as 
well as agree by 
signing the terms, 
conditions, and 
responsibilities they 
were hired for. The 
requirements just 
mentioned are stated in 
ISC 3 and ISC 5, 
respectively, both 
controls not selected by 
the tool. The RISR is 
not addressed." 
30 12/12/2013 HRS-1 Employees, 
contractors, and third 
party users do not 
understand their 
responsibilities, and 
are not suitable for the 
roles they are 
considered for. 
3 √  6:00 
PM 
7:00 
PM 
1:00 No Refer to previous 
meeting held on 
11/30/2013. "Even 
though ISC 1 was 
selected by the FST 
methodology 
prompting for the 
definition and 
documentation of 
security roles and 
responsibilities for all 
employees, ISC 3 and 
ISC 5, both dealing 
directly with this RISR, 
were not selected. 
Awareness trainings 
represent a critical step 
for organizations to 
provide new and 
existing employees 
relevant information 
regarding 
organizational policies, 
procedures, and 
responsibilities of the 
job function (ISC 5). 
Proof of training 
participation and 
understanding of the 
material covered must 
be obtained and 
evidenced through 
formal, signed 
agreements from 
employees, contractors, 
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and third party users." 
31 12/14/2013 HRS-3 Security 
responsibilities related 
to job descriptions and 
conditions of 
employment are not 
necessarily addressed 
prior to employment. 
3 √  10:30 
AM 
10:55 
AM 
0:25 No "The FST methodology 
did not select ISC 3, 
which requires formal 
agreement of the 
employee and his or 
her new contractual 
obligation, as well as 
organization’s 
responsibilities specific 
to information security. 
In addition, prior to 
employment, 
background 
verification checks 
should be enforced and 
performed on all 
potential employees 
consistent with relevant 
laws, regulations, and 
ethics (said control 
refers to the unselected 
ISC 2). I understand 
that the RISR was not 
addressed." 
32 12/14/2013 HRS-4 All candidates 
for employment, 
contractors, and third 
party are not 
adequately screened, 
especially for sensitive 
jobs. 
3 √  11:00 
AM 
11:50 
AM 
0:50 No "ISC 2 deals with 
performing background 
verification checks as 
part of the screening 
process on potential 
employees. Such 
control was not 
selected. ISC 3, on the 
other hand, and similar 
to my previous 
comment, was also not 
selected by the FST 
methodology. ISC 3 
requires agreement 
between the 
organization and the 
employee in terms of 
their understanding of 
information security 
prior to employment. 
The absence of these 2 
controls renders the 
RISR, in my opinion, 
not addressed." 
33 12/14/2013 HRS-5 Employees, 
contractors, and third 
party users are (1) not 
aware of information 
security threats and 
concerns, their 
responsibilities and/or 
liabilities; and (2) not 
equipped to support 
organizational security 
policy in the course of 
their normal work, and 
3 √  1:20 
PM 
2:00 
PM 
0:40 No "The already-selected 
ISC 1 talks about 
defining security roles 
and responsibilities for 
employees, contractors, 
third party, etc. to 
assist them in 
understanding 
information security 
threats and concerns, 
etc. However, such 
understanding should 
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to reduce the risk of 
human error. 
be refreshed 
periodically via 
awareness trainings 
(purpose of ISC 5). 
Having awareness 
trainings and regular 
updates in 
organizational policies 
and procedures, for 
example, was not one 
of the controls selected 
by the FST tool. As 
such, the RISR is not 
addressed." 
34 12/17/2013 HRS-3 Security 
responsibilities related 
to job descriptions and 
conditions of 
employment are not 
necessarily addressed 
prior to employment. 
2  √ 9:00 
AM 
9:30 
AM 
0:30 No "ISC 3 requires formal 
agreement (evidenced 
by a signoff) between 
employees and the 
organization in regards 
to the terms and 
conditions of the 
employment contract, 
including and, more 
importantly, their 
responsibilities in 
terms of information 
security. The selection 
of this control alone 
should have addressed 
the RISR." 
35 12/17/2013 HRS-4 All candidates 
for employment, 
contractors, and third 
party are not 
adequately screened, 
especially for sensitive 
jobs. 
1  √ 3:30 
PM 
4:00 
PM 
0:30 No "Screenings of 
candidates via 
background 
verification checks, for 
instance, are required 
by ISC 2, which was 
not one of the controls 
selected. Thus, this risk 
is not mitigated." 
36 12/18/2013 HRS-4 All candidates 
for employment, 
contractors, and third 
party are not 
adequately screened, 
especially for sensitive 
jobs. 
2  √ 9:45 
AM 
10:20 
AM 
0:35 No "The methodology did 
not prompt ISC 2 for 
selection. ISC 2 
requires background 
checks, screenings to 
be performed on 
potential employees, 
particularly when 
considered for critical 
and sensitive jobs." 
37 1/3/2014 HRS-5 Employees, 
contractors, and third 
party users are (1) not 
aware of information 
security threats and 
concerns, their 
responsibilities and/or 
liabilities; and (2) not 
equipped to support 
organizational security 
policy in the course of 
their normal work, and 
to reduce the risk of 
human error. 
1  √ 7:30 
AM 
8:40 
AM 
1:10 No "Even though control 
ISC 1 (definition of 
security roles and 
responsibilities) was 
selected, ISC 5 
(awareness trainings) 
was not. The 
organization should 
implement both, ISC1 
and ISC5, to strengthen 
its security."  
38 1/3/2014 HRS-6 An adequate 
level of awareness, 
education, and training 
in security procedures 
and the correct use of 
information processing 
facilities is not 
provided to all 
employees, contractors 
and third party users to 
minimize possible 
security risks. 
1  √ 8:40 
AM 
9:20 
AM 
0:40 No "Control ISC 5 was not 
selected; risk is not 
addressed."  
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39 1/6/2014 HRS-5 Employees, 
contractors, and third 
party users are (1) not 
aware of information 
security threats and 
concerns, their 
responsibilities and/or 
liabilities; and (2) not 
equipped to support 
organizational security 
policy in the course of 
their normal work, and 
to reduce the risk of 
human error. 
2 √  3:00 
PM 
4:05 
PM 
1:05 No "Awareness of security 
threats, concerns, 
responsibilities, etc. at 
organizations comes 
from having an 
adequate training or 
seminar program in 
place. This is suggested 
by ISC 5, which was 
not selected by the 
tool. As a result, the 
RISR is not 
addressed." 
40 1/6/2014 HRS-6 An adequate 
level of awareness, 
education, and training 
in security procedures 
and the correct use of 
information processing 
facilities is not 
provided to all 
employees, contractors 
and third party users to 
minimize possible 
security risks. 
2 √  5:00 
PM 
6:00 
PM 
1:00 No "ISC 5 deals with this 
RISR directly and such 
control was not 
selected by the tool, 
leaving the RISR 
unaddressed. 
Fortunately, this 
control had been in 
place by the 
organization. The 
organization should 
continue performing 
this control." 
41 1/8/2014 HRS-7 A formal 
disciplinary process 
for handling security 
breaches is not 
established. 
1  √ 7:30 
AM 
8:00 
AM 
0:30 No "Control ISC 6 was not 
selected; risk is not 
addressed."  
42 1/8/2014 HRS-8 The exit 
process for employees, 
contractors, and third 
party is not performed 
effectively or in a 
timely or orderly 
manner. 
Responsibilities should 
be in place to ensure 
an employee’s, 
contractor’s or third 
party user’s exit from 
the organization is 
managed, and that the 
return of all equipment 
and the removal of all 
access rights are 
completed. 
1  √ 8:00 
AM 
8:40 
AM 
0:40 Yes "Selection of controls 
ISC 7 and ISC 9, both 
related to termination 
access and procedures, 
will address this risk." 
43 1/10/2014 HRS-7 A formal 
disciplinary process 
for handling security 
breaches is not 
established. 
2  √ 4:00 
PM 
4:40 
PM 
0:40 No "ISC 6 was not 
selected, so no formal 
disciplinary process is 
required to be in place 
at the organization." 
44 1/10/2014 HRS-8 The exit 
process for employees, 
contractors, and third 
party is not performed 
effectively or in a 
timely or orderly 
manner. 
Responsibilities should 
be in place to ensure 
an employee’s, 
contractor’s or third 
party user’s exit from 
the organization is 
managed, and that the 
return of all equipment 
and the removal of all 
access rights are 
completed. 
2  √ 4:45 
PM 
5:25 
PM 
0:40 Undecided N/A 
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45 1/11/2014 HRS-6 An adequate 
level of awareness, 
education, and training 
in security procedures 
and the correct use of 
information processing 
facilities is not 
provided to all 
employees, contractors 
and third party users to 
minimize possible 
security risks. 
3 √  11:00 
AM 
11:40 
AM 
0:40 No "Again, ISC 5 was not 
selected by the new 
methodology; 
therefore, the RISR is 
not addressed. 
Nevertheless, control 
ISC 5 was already part 
of the ISC's in place at 
the organization. This 
is an example where 
controls already 
implemented at the 
organization plus the 
ones selected by FST, 
when combined, can 
strengthen information 
security." 
46 1/11/2014 HRS-7 A formal 
disciplinary process 
for handling security 
breaches is not 
established. 
3 √  1:15 
PM 
1:50 
PM 
0:35 No "The methodology did 
not select ISC 6, which 
deals specifically with 
having a disciplinary 
process in case of 
security breaches, etc. 
Although the RISR is 
not addressed, the 
organization had this 
control in place prior to 
running the FST 
methodology. This is 
another example where 
the organization should 
continue with its 
previous control to 
continue having a 
proper level of security 
around this area." 
47 1/11/2014 HRS-8 The exit 
process for employees, 
contractors, and third 
party is not performed 
effectively or in a 
timely or orderly 
manner. 
Responsibilities should 
be in place to ensure 
an employee’s, 
contractor’s or third 
party user’s exit from 
the organization is 
managed, and that the 
return of all equipment 
and the removal of all 
access rights are 
completed. 
3 √  2:00 
PM 
2:25 
PM 
0:25 No "To address the RISR 
of not performing an 
effective, timely, and 
ordered exit meeting 
process, control ISC 8 
(requiring employees 
to return all 
organization’s 
equipment upon 
termination) should 
have been chosen by 
the FST methodology." 
48 1/11/2014 HRS-9 Users with 
terminated accounts as 
well as other 
unauthorized users can 
gain access to financial 
systems or data, and 
view and/or change 
critical, confidential, or 
sensitive financial 
information. 
3 √  2:25 
PM 
3:00 
PM 
0:35 Yes "The methodology 
chose ISC 7, which 
requires all 
responsibilities related 
to employment 
termination to be 
clearly defined and 
assigned. In addition, 
ISC 9, requires the 
removal of access for 
all accounts upon 
termination. Both 
selected controls 
address the RISR." 
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49 1/15/2014 HRS-8 The exit 
process for employees, 
contractors, and third 
party is not performed 
effectively or in a 
timely or orderly 
manner. 
Responsibilities should 
be in place to ensure 
an employee’s, 
contractor’s or third 
party user’s exit from 
the organization is 
managed, and that the 
return of all equipment 
and the removal of all 
access rights are 
completed. 
2  √ 10:00 
AM 
11:05 
AM 
1:05 Yes "Undecided at 
1/10/2014 given that 
ISC 8 had not been 
selected by the tool. 
However, the 
combination of 
selected controls ISC 7 
and ISC 9, both stating 
responsibilities when 
dealing with 
terminations, in my 
opinion, address the 
RISR."  
50 1/15/2014 HRS-9 Users with 
terminated accounts as 
well as other 
unauthorized users can 
gain access to financial 
systems or data, and 
view and/or change 
critical, confidential, or 
sensitive financial 
information. 
2  √ 11:15 
AM 
11:50 
AM 
0:35 Yes "ISC 9 prevents 
terminated users from 
gaining unauthorized 
access to financial 
systems (which refers 
to this RISR) by 
prompting the removal 
of access of all such 
terminated employees, 
contractors, and third 
party users." 
51 1/16/2014 HRS-9 Users with 
terminated accounts as 
well as other 
unauthorized users can 
gain access to financial 
systems or data, and 
view and/or change 
critical, confidential, or 
sensitive financial 
information. 
1  √ 8:00 
AM 
8:45 
AM 
0:45 Yes "Control ISC 9, 
selected, addresses this 
risk." 
  Total Personal 
Interviews, Phone 
Calls, and Duration 
 
19 32 
  
12:55 
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